Foresighted Deception in Dynamic Security Games

Deception has been widely considered in literature as an effective means of enhancing security protection when the defender holds some private information about the ongoing rivalry unknown to the attacker. However, most of the existing works on deception assume static environments and thus consider only myopic deception, while practical security games between the defender and the attacker may happen in dynamic scenarios. To better exploit the defender's private information in dynamic environments and improve security performance, a stochastic deception game (SDG) framework is developed in this work to enable the defender to conduct foresighted deception. To solve the proposed SDG, a new iterative algorithm that is provably convergent is developed. A corresponding learning algorithm is developed as well to facilitate the defender in conducting foresighted deception in unknown dynamic environments. Numerical results show that the proposed foresighted deception can offer a substantial performance improvement as compared to the conventional myopic deception.