Biblio

Nowadays, the MOBA game is the game type with the most audiences and players around the world. Recently, the League of Legends has become an official sport as an e-sport among 37 events in the 2022 Asia Games held in Hangzhou. As the development in the e-sport, analytical skills are also involved in this field. The topic of this research is to use the machine learning approach to analyze the data of the League of Legends and make a prediction about the result of the game. In this research, the method of machine learning is applied to the dataset which records the first 10 minutes in diamond-ranked games. Several popular machine learning (AdaBoost, GradientBoost, RandomForest, ExtraTree, SVM, Naïve Bayes, KNN, LogisticRegression, and DecisionTree) are applied to test the performance by cross-validation. Then several algorithms that outperform others are selected to make a voting classifier to predict the game result. The accuracy of the voting classifier is 72.68%.

Using the methods of literature and interview, this paper analyzes the current situation of performance evaluation of volunteers in large-scale games based on mobile Internet, By analyzing the popularity of mobile Internet, the convenience of performance evaluation, the security and privacy of performance evaluation, this paper demonstrates the necessity of performance evaluation of volunteers in large-scale games based on mobile Internet, This paper puts forward the Countermeasures of performance evaluation of volunteers in large-scale games based on mobile Internet.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology is developing rapidly, permeating every aspect of human life. Although the integration between AI and communication contributes to the flourishing development of wireless communication, it induces severer security problems. As a supplement to the upper-layer cryptography protocol, physical layer security has become an intriguing technology to ensure the security of wireless communication systems. However, most of the current physical layer security research does not consider the intelligence and mobility of collusive eavesdroppers. In this paper, we consider a MIMO system model with a friendly intelligent jammer against multiple collusive intelligent eavesdroppers, and zero-sum game is exploited to formulate the confrontation of them. The Nash equilibrium is derived by convex optimization and alternative optimization in the free-space scenario of a single user system. We propose a zero-sum game deep learning algorithm (ZGDL) for general situations to solve non-convex game problems. In terms of the effectiveness, simulations are conducted to confirm that the proposed algorithm can obtain the Nash equilibrium.

Currently, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are widely used due to its self-configuring feature. However, it is vulnerable to the malicious jammers in practice. Traditional anti-jamming approaches, such as channel hopping based on deterministic sequences, may not be the reliable solution against intelligent jammers due to its fixed patterns. To address this problem, we propose a distributed game theory-based multi-agent anti-jamming (DMAA) algorithm in this paper. It enables each user to exploit all information from its neighboring users before the network attacks, and derive dynamic local policy knowledge to overcome intelligent jamming attacks efficiently as well as guide the users to cooperatively hop to the same channel with high probability. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can learn an optimal policy to guide the users to avoid malicious jamming more efficiently and rapidly than the random and independent Q-learning baseline algorithms,

This paper considers network protection games for a heterogeneous network system with N nodes against cyber-attackers of two different types of intentions. The first type tries to maximize damage based on the value of each net-worked node, while the second type only aims at successful infiltration. A defender, by applying defensive resources to networked nodes, can decrease those nodes' vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, the defender needs to balance the cost of using defensive resources and potential security benefits. Existing literature shows that, in a Nash equilibrium, the defender should adopt different resource allocation strategies against different types of attackers. However, it could be difficult for the defender to know the type of incoming cyber-attackers. A Bayesian game is investigated considering the case that the defender is uncertain about the attacker's type. We demonstrate that the Bayesian equilibrium defensive resource allocation strategy is a mixture of the Nash equilibrium strategies from the games against the two types of attackers separately.

Cyberspace is vulnerable to continuous malicious attacks. Traceability of network attacks is an effective defense means to curb and counter network attacks. In this paper, the evolutionary game model is used to analyze the network attack and defense behavior. On the basis of the quantification of attack and defense benefits, the replication dynamic learning mechanism is used to describe the change process of the selection probability of attack and defense strategies, and finally the evolutionary stability strategies and their solution curves of both sides are obtained. On this basis, the attack behavior is analyzed, and the probability curve of attack strategy and the optimal attack strategy are obtained, so as to realize the effective traceability of attack behavior.

At present, the research on the network security problem of underwater wireless sensors is still few, and since the underwater environment is exposed, passive security defense technology is not enough to deal with unknown security threats. Aiming at this problem, this paper proposes an offensive and defensive game model from the finite rationality of the network attack and defense sides, combined with evolutionary game theory. The replicated dynamic equation is introduced to analyze the evolution trend of strategies under different circumstances, and the selection algorithm of optimal strategy is designed, which verifies the effectiveness of this model through simulation and provides guidance for active defense technology.

In this short paper, we survey some work at the intersection of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and security that are based on game theoretic considerations, and particularly focus on the author's (our) contribution in these areas. One half of this paper focuses on applications of game theoretic and learning reasoning for addressing security applications such as in public safety and wildlife conservation. In the second half, we present recent work that attacks the learning components of these works, leading to sub-optimal defense allocation. We finally end by pointing to issues and potential research problems that can arise due to data quality in the real world.

Cyber physical system (CPS) Critical infrastructures (CIs) like the power and energy systems are increasingly becoming vulnerable to cyber attacks. Mitigating cyber risks in CIs is one of the key objectives of the design and maintenance of these systems. These CPS CIs commonly use legacy devices for remote monitoring and control where complete upgrades are uneconomical and infeasible. Therefore, risk assessment plays an important role in systematically enumerating and selectively securing vulnerable or high-risk assets through optimal investments in the cybersecurity of the CPS CIs. In this paper, we propose a CPS CI security framework and software tool, CySec Game, to be used by the CI industry and academic researchers to assess cyber risks and to optimally allocate cybersecurity investments to mitigate the risks. This framework uses attack tree, attack-defense tree, and game theory algorithms to identify high-risk targets and suggest optimal investments to mitigate the identified risks. We evaluate the efficacy of the framework using the tool by implementing a smart grid case study that shows accurate analysis and feasible implementation of the framework and the tool in this CPS CI environment.

Rational and smart decision making by means of strategic interaction and mathematical modelling is the key aspect of Game theory. Security games based on game theory are used extensively in cyberspace for various levels of security. The contemporary security issues can be modelled and analyzed using game theory as a robust mathematical framework. The attackers, defenders and the adversarial as well as defensive interactions can be captured using game theory. The security games equilibrium evaluation can help understand the attackers' strategies and potential threats at a deeper level for efficient defense. Wireless sensor network (WSN) designs are greatly benefitted by game theory. A deep learning adversarial network algorithm is used in combination with game theory enabling energy efficiency, optimal data delivery and security in a WSN. The trade-off between energy resource utilization and security is balanced using this technique.

Developers of mobile applications rely on the trust of their customers. On the one hand the requirement exists to create feature-rich and secure apps, which adhere to privacy standards to not deliberately disclose user information. On the other hand the development process must be streamlined to reduce costs. Here third-party libraries come into play. Inclusion of many, possibly nested libraries pose security risks, app-creators are often not aware of. This paper presents a way to combine free open-source tools to support developers in checking their application that it does not induce security issues by using third-party libraries. The tools FlowDroid, Frida, and mitm-proxy are used in combination in a simple and viable way to perform checks to identify privacy leaks of third-party apps. Our proposed setup and configuration empowers average app developers to preserve user privacy without being dedicated security experts and without expensive external advice.

Axie infinity is a complicated card game with a huge-scale action space. This makes it difficult to solve this challenge using generic Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms. We propose a hybrid RL framework to learn action representations and game strategies. To avoid evaluating every action in the large feasible action set, our method evaluates actions in a fixed-size set which is determined using action representations. We compare the performance of our method with two baseline methods in terms of their sample efficiency and the winning rates of the trained models. We empirically show that our method achieves an overall best winning rate and the best sample efficiency among the three methods.

A “tripartite and bilateral” dynamic game model was constructed to study the impact of space deterrence on the challenger's military strategy in a military conflict. Based on the signal game theory, the payment matrices and optimal strategies of the sheltering side and challenging side were analyzed. In a theoretical framework, the indicators of the effectiveness of the challenger's response to space deterrence and the influencing factors of the sheltering's space deterrence were examined. The feasibility and effective means for the challenger to respond to the space deterrent in a “tripartite and bilateral” military conflict were concluded.

At the end of the IT Security degree program a simulation game is conducted to repeat and consolidate the core skills of a Bachelor’s graduate. The focus is not on teaching content, but on the application of already learned skills. The scenario shows the students the risks of a completely networked world, which has come to a complete standstill due to a catastrophe. The participants occupy in groups the predefined companies, which are assigned with the reconstruction of the communication infrastructure (the internet). This paper describes the preparation, technical and organizational implementation of the. Also, the most important conclusions drawn by the authors.

Can quantum entanglement increase the capacity of (classical) covert channels? To one familiar with Holevo's Theorem it is tempting to think that the answer is obviously no. However, in this work we show: quantum entanglement can in fact increase the capacity of a classical covert channel, in the presence of an active adversary; on the other hand, a zero-capacity channel is not improved by entanglement, so entanglement cannot create ‘purely quantum’ covert channels; the problem of determining the capacity of a given channel in the presence of entanglement is undecidable; but there is an algorithm to bound the entangled capacity of a channel from above, adapted from the semi-definite hierarchy from the theory of non-local games, whose close connection to channel capacity is at the core of all of our results.

This paper studies the problem of designing optimal privacy mechanism with less energy cost. The eavesdropper and the defender with limited resources should choose which channel to eavesdrop and defend, respectively. A zero-sum stochastic game framework is used to model the interaction between the two players and the game is solved through the Nash Q-learning approach. A numerical example is given to verify the proposed method.

In order to solve the problem that the traditional “centralized” access control technology can no longer guarantee the security of access control in the current Internet of Things (IoT)environment, a dynamic access control game mechanism based on trust is proposed. According to the reliability parameters of the recommended information obtained by the two elements of interaction time and the number of interactions, the user's trust value is dynamically calculated, and the user is activated and authorized to the role through the trust level corresponding to the trust value. The trust value and dynamic adjustment factor are introduced into the income function to carry out game analysis to avoid malicious access behavior of users. The hybrid Nash equilibrium strategy of both sides of the transaction realizes the access decision-making work in the IoT environment. Experimental results show that the game mechanism proposed in this paper has a certain restraining effect on malicious nodes and can play a certain incentive role in the legitimate access behavior of IoT users.

In this modern era, web security is often required to beware from fraudulent activities. There are several hackers try to build a program that can interact with web pages automatically and try to breach the data or make several junk entries due to that web servers get hanged. To stop the junk entries; CAPTCHA is a solution through which bots can be identified and denied the machine based program to intervene with. CAPTCHA stands for Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart. In the progression of CAPTCHA; there are several methods available such as distorted text, picture recognition, math solving and gaming based CAPTCHA. Game based turing test is very much popular now a day but there are several methods through which game can be cracked because game is not intellectual. So, there is a required of intrinsic CAPTCHA. The proposed system is based on Intrinsic Decision based Situation Reaction Challenge. The proposed system is able to better classify the humans and bots by its intrinsic problem. It has been considered as human is more capable to deal with the real life problems and machine is bit poor to understand the situation or how the problem can be solved. So, proposed system challenges with simple situations which is easier for human but almost impossible for bots. Human is required to use his common sense only and problem can be solved with few seconds.

The success of human-robot interaction is strongly affected by the people’s ability to infer others’ intentions and behaviours, and the level of people’s trust that others will abide by their same principles and social conventions to achieve a common goal. The ability of understanding and reasoning about other agents’ mental states is known as Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM and trust, therefore, are key factors in the positive outcome of human-robot interaction. We believe that a robot endowed with a ToM is able to gain people’s trust, even when this may occasionally make errors.In this work, we present a user study in the field in which participants (N=123) interacted with a robot that may or may not have a ToM, and may or may not exhibit erroneous behaviour. Our findings indicate that a robot with ToM is perceived as more reliable, and they trusted it more than a robot without a ToM even when the robot made errors. Finally, ToM results to be a key driver for tuning people’s trust in the robot even when the initial condition of the interaction changed (i.e., loss and regain of trust in a longer relationship).

The main objective of this research is to increase security awareness against phishing attacks in the education sector by teaching users about phishing URLs. The educational media was made based on references from several previous studies that were used as basic references. Development of antiphishing game framework educational media using the extended DPE framework. Participants in this study were vocational and college students in the technology field. The respondents included vocational and college students, each with as many as 30 respondents. To assess the level of awareness and understanding of phishing, especially phishing URLs, participants will be given a pre-test before playing the game, and after completing the game, the application will be given a posttest. A paired t-test was used to answer the research hypothesis. The results of data analysis show differences in the results of increasing identification of URL phishing by respondents before and after using educational media of the anti-phishing game framework in increasing security awareness against URL phishing attacks. More serious game development can be carried out in the future to increase user awareness, particularly in phishing or other security issues, and can be implemented for general users who do not have a background in technology.

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game where there is a defender (also called leader) who has to defend a target and an attacker (also called follower). The attacker has a private type that evolves as a controlled Markov process. The objective is to compute the stochastic Stackelberg equilibrium of the game where defender commits to a strategy. The attacker’s strategy is the best response to the defender strategy and defender’s strategy is optimum given the attacker plays the best response. In general, computing such equilibrium involves solving a fixed-point equation for the whole game. In this paper, we present an algorithm that computes such strategies by solving lower dimensional fixed-point equations for each time t. Based on this algorithm, we compute the Stackelberg equilibrium of a security example.

With the widespread application of power Internet of Things (IoT), the edge IoT agents are often threatened by various attacks, among which the white-box attack is the most serious. The white-box implementation of the cryptography algorithm can hide key information even in the white-box attack context by means of obfuscation. However, under the specially designed attack, there is still a risk of the information being recovered within a certain time complexity. In this paper, by introducing pseudo states, a new white-box implementation of SM4 algorithm is proposed. The encryption and decryption processes are implemented in the form of matrices and lookup tables, which are obfuscated by scrambling encodings. The introduction of pseudo states could complicate the obfuscation, leading to the great improvement in the security. The number of pseudo states can be changed according to the requirements of security. Through several quantitative indicators, including diversity, ambiguity, the time complexity required to extract the key and the value space of the key and external encodings, it is proved that the security of the proposed implementation could been enhanced significantly, compared with the existing schemes under similar memory occupation.

A new Domain Name System (DNS) cache poisoning attack aiming at clients has emerged recently. It induced cloud users to visit fake web sites and thus reveal information such as account passwords. However, the design of current DNS defense architecture does not formally consider the protection of clients. Although the DNS traffic encryption technology can alleviate this new attack, its deployment is as slow as the new DNS architecture. Thus we propose a lightweight adaptive intelligent defense strategy, which only needs to be deployed on the client without any configuration support of DNS. Firstly, we model the attack and defense process as a static stochastic game with incomplete information under bounded rationality conditions. Secondly, to solve the problem caused by uncertain attack strategies and large quantities of game states, we adopt a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) with guaranteed monotonic improvement. Finally, through the prototype system experiment in Alibaba Cloud, the effectiveness of our method is proved against multiple attack modes with a success rate of 97.5% approximately.

In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader, and a follower. The follower observes the state of the system privately while the leader does not. Players play Stackelberg equilibrium where the follower plays best response to the leader's strategy. In such a scenario, the leader has the advantage of committing to a policy that maximizes its returns given the knowledge that the follower is going to play the best response to its policy. Such a pair of strategies of both the players is defined as Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. Recently, [1] provided a sequential decomposition algorithm to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium for such games which allow for the computation of Markovian equilibrium policies in linear time as opposed to double exponential, as before. In this paper, we extend that idea to the case when the state update dynamics are not known to the players, to propose an reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm based on Expected Sarsa that learns the Stackelberg equilibrium policy by simulating a model of the underlying Markov decision process (MDP). We use particle filters to estimate the belief update for a common agent that computes the optimal policy based on the information which is common to both the players. We present a security game example to illustrate the policy learned by our algorithm.

We propose a novel theoretical approach for solving a Stochastic Security Game using augmented Markov Decison Processes and an experimental evaluation. Most of the previous works mentioned in the literature focus on Linear Programming techniques seeking Strong Stackelberg Equilibria through the defender and attacker’s strategy spaces. Although effective, these techniques are computationally expensive and tend to not scale well to very large problems. By fixing the set of the possible defense strategies, our approach is able to use the well-known augmented MDP formalism to compute an optimal policy for an attacker facing a defender patrolling. Experimental results on fully observable cases validate our approach and show good performances in comparison with optimistic and pessimistic approaches. However, these results also highlight the need of scalability improvements and of handling the partial observability cases.