Biblio
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) paradigm at large continues to be compromised, hindering the privacy, dependability, security, and safety of our nations. While the operational security communities (i.e., CERTS, SOCs, CSIRT, etc.) continue to develop capabilities for monitoring cyberspace, tools which are IoT-centric remain at its infancy. To this end, we address this gap by innovating an actionable Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) feed related to Internet-scale infected IoT devices. The feed analyzes, in near real-time, 3.6TB of daily streaming passive measurements ( ≈ 1M pps) by applying a custom-developed learning methodology to distinguish between compromised IoT devices and non-IoT nodes, in addition to labeling the type and vendor. The feed is augmented with third party information to provide contextual information. We report on the operation, analysis, and shortcomings of the feed executed during an initial deployment period. We make the CTI feed available for ingestion through a public, authenticated API and a front-end platform.
Intelligent networked vehicles are rapidly developing in intelligence and networking. The communication architecture is becoming more complex, external interfaces are richer, and data types are more complex. Different from the information security of the traditional Internet of Things, the scenarios that need to be met for the security of the Internet of Vehicles are more diverse and the security needs to be more stable. Based on the security technology of traditional Internet of Things, password application is the main protection method to ensure the privacy and non-repudiation of data communication. This article mainly elaborates the application of security protection methods using password-related protection technologies in car-side scenarios and summarizes the security protection recommendations of contemporary connected vehicles in combination with the secure communication architecture of the Internet of Vehicles.
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) has gained great success in solving several challenging problems in recent years. It is well known that training a DNN model from scratch requires a lot of data and computational resources. However, using a pre-trained model directly or using it to initialize weights cost less time and often gets better results. Therefore, well pre-trained DNN models are valuable intellectual property that we should protect. In this work, we propose DeepTrace, a framework for model owners to secretly fingerprinting the target DNN model using a special trigger set and verifying from outputs. An embedded fingerprint can be extracted to uniquely identify the information of model owner and authorized users. Our framework benefits from both white-box and black-box verification, which makes it useful whether we know the model details or not. We evaluate the performance of DeepTrace on two different datasets, with different DNN architectures. Our experiment shows that, with the advantages of combining white-box and black-box verification, our framework has very little effect on model accuracy, and is robust against different model modifications. It also consumes very little computing resources when extracting fingerprint.
In the crowdsourced testing system, due to the openness of crowdsourced testing platform and other factors, the security of crowdsourced testing intellectual property cannot be effectively protected. We proposed an attribute-based double encryption scheme, combined with the blockchain technology, to achieve the data access control method of the code to be tested. It can meet the privacy protection and traceability of specific intellectual property in the crowdsourced testing environment. Through the experimental verification, the access control method is feasible, and the performance test is good, which can meet the normal business requirements.
Discovering vulnerabilities is an information-intensive task that requires a developer to locate the defects in the code that have security implications. The task is difficult due to the growing code complexity and some developer's lack of security expertise. Although tools have been created to ease the difficulty, no single one is sufficient. In practice, developers often use a combination of tools to uncover vulnerabilities. Yet, the basis on which different tools are composed is under explored. In this paper, we examine the composition base by taking advantage of the tool design patterns informed by foraging theory. We follow a design science methodology and carry out a three-step empirical study: mapping 34 foraging-theoretic patterns in a specific vulnerability discovery tool, formulating hypotheses about the value and cost of foraging when considering two composition scenarios, and performing a human-subject study to test the hypotheses. Our work offers insights into guiding developers' tool usage in detecting software vulnerabilities.