Biblio
Recently, the novel networking technology Software-Defined Networking(SDN) and Service Function Chaining(SFC) are rapidly growing, and security issues are also emerging for SDN and SFC. However, the research about security and safety on a novel networking environment is still unsatisfactory, and the vulnerabilities have been revealed continuously. Among these security issues, this paper addresses the ARP Poisoning attack to exploit SFC vulnerability, and proposes a method to defend the attack. The proposed method recognizes the repetitive ARP reply which is a feature of ARP Poisoning attack, and detects ARP Poisoning attack. The proposed method overcomes the limitations of the existing detection methods. The proposed method also detects the presence of an attack more accurately.
Moving target defense (MTD) is a proactive defense mechanism of changing the attack surface to increase an attacker's confusion and/or uncertainty, which invalidates its intelligence gained through reconnaissance and/or network scanning attacks. In this work, we propose software-defined networking (SDN)-based MTD technique using the shuffling of IP addresses and port numbers aiming to obfuscate both network and transport layers' real identities of the host and the service for defending against the network reconnaissance and scanning attacks. We call our proposed MTD technique Random Host and Service Multiplexing, namely RHSM. RHSM allows each host to use random, multiple virtual IP addresses to be dynamically and periodically shuffled. In addition, it uses short-lived, multiple virtual port numbers for an active service running on the host. Our proposed RHSM is novel in that we employ multiplexing (or de-multiplexing) to dynamically change and remap from all the virtual IPs of the host to the real IP or the virtual ports of the services to the real port, respectively. Via extensive simulation experiments, we prove how effectively and efficiently RHSM outperforms a baseline counterpart (i.e., a static network without RHSM) in terms of the attack success probability and defense cost.
Traditional network routing protocol exhibits high statics and singleness, which provide significant advantages for the attacker. There are two kinds of attacks on the network: active attacks and passive attacks. Existing solutions for those attacks are based on replication or detection, which can deal with active attacks; but are helpless to passive attacks. In this paper, we adopt the theory of network coding to fragment the data in the Software-Defined Networks and propose a network coding-based resilient multipath routing scheme. First, we present a new metric named expected eavesdropping ratio to measure the resilience in the presence of passive attacks. Then, we formulate the network coding-based resilient multipath routing problem as an integer-programming optimization problem by using expected eavesdropping ratio. Since the problem is NP-hard, we design a Simulated Annealing-based algorithm to efficiently solve the problem. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithms improve the defense performance against passive attacks by about 20% when compared with baseline algorithms.
As an extension of Network Function Virtualization, microservice architectures are a promising way to design future network services. At the same time, Information-Centric Networking architectures like NDN would benefit from this paradigm to offer more design choices for the network architect while facilitating the deployment and the operation of the network. We propose $μ$NDN, an orchestrated suite of microservices as an alternative way to implement NDN forwarding and support functions. We describe seven essential micro-services we developed, explain the design choices behind our solution and how it is orchestrated. We evaluate each service in isolation and the entire microservice architecture through two realistic scenarios to show its ability to react and mitigate some performance and security issues thanks to the orchestration. Our results show that $μ$NDN can replace a monolithic NDN forwarder while being more powerful and scalable.
SDN networks rely mainly on a set of software defined modules, running on generic hardware platforms, and managed by a central SDN controller. The tight coupling and lack of isolation between the controller and the underlying host limit the controller resilience against host-based attacks and failures. That controller is a single point of failure and a target for attackers. ``Linux-containers'' is a successful thin virtualization technique that enables encapsulated, host-isolated execution-environments for running applications. In this paper we present PAFR, a controller sandboxing mechanism based on Linux-containers. PAFR enables controller/host isolation, plug-and-play operation, failure-and-attack-resilient execution, and fast recovery. PAFR employs and manages live remote checkpointing and migration between different hosts to evade failures and attacks. Experiments and simulations show that the frequent employment of PAFR's live-migration minimizes the chance of successful attack/failure with limited to no impact on network performance.
Software-defined networks provide new facilities for deploying security mechanisms dynamically. In particular, it is possible to build and adjust security chains to protect the infrastructures, by combining different security functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and services for preventing data leakage. It is important to ensure that these security chains, in view of their complexity and dynamics, are consistent and do not include security violations. We propose in this paper an automated strategy for supporting the verification of security chains in software-defined networks. It relies on an architecture integrating formal verification methods for checking both the control and data planes of these chains, before their deployment. We describe algorithms for translating specifications of security chains into formal models that can then be verified by SMT1 solving or model checking. Our solution is prototyped as a package, named Synaptic, built as an extension of the Frenetic family of SDN programming languages. The performances of our approach are evaluated through extensive experimentations based on the CVC4, veriT, and nuXmv checkers.
Software-defined networking (SDN) separates the control plane from underlying devices, and allows it to control the data plane from a global view. While SDN brings conveniences to management, it also introduces new security threats. Knowing reactive rules, attackers can launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by sending numerous rule-matched packets which trigger packet-in packets to overburden the controller. In this work, we present a novel method ``INferring SDN by Probing and Rule Extraction'' (INSPIRE) to discover the flow rules in SDN from probing packets. We evaluate the delay time from probing packets, classify them into defined classes, and infer the rules. This method involves three relevant steps: probing, clustering and rule inference. First, forged packets with various header fields are sent to measure processing and propagation time in the path. Second, it classifies the packets into multiple classes by using k-means clustering based on packet delay time. Finally, the apriori algorithm will find common header fields in the classes to infer the rules. We show how INSPIRE is able to infer flow rules via simulation, and the accuracy of inference can be up to 98.41% with very low false-positive rates.
Software-defined networks offer a promising framework for the implementation of cross-layer data-centric security policies in military systems. An important aspect of the design process for such advanced security solutions is the thorough experimental assessment and validation of proposed technical concepts prior to their deployment in operational military systems. In this paper, we describe an OpenFlow-based testbed, which was developed with a specific focus on validation of SDN security mechanisms - including both the mechanisms for protecting the software-defined network layer and the cross-layer enforcement of higher level policies, such as data-centric security policies. We also present initial experimentation results obtained using the testbed, which confirm its ability to validate simulation and analytic predictions. Our objective is to provide a sufficiently detailed description of the configuration used in our testbed so that it can be easily re-plicated and re-used by other security researchers in their experiments.
The unauthorized access or theft of sensitive, personal information is becoming a weekly news item. The illegal dissemination of proprietary information to media outlets or competitors costs industry untold millions in remediation costs and losses every year. The 2013 data breach at Target, Inc. that impacted 70 million customers is estimated to cost upwards of 1 billion dollars. Stolen information is also being used to damage political figures and adversely influence foreign and domestic policy. In this paper, we offer some techniques for better understanding the health and security of our networks. This understanding will help professionals to identify network behavior, anomalies and other latent, systematic issues in their networks. Software-Defined Networks (SDN) enable the collection of network operation and configuration metrics that are not readily available, if available at all, in traditional networks. SDN also enables the development of software protocols and tools that increases visibility into the network. By accumulating and analyzing a time series data repository (TSDR) of SDN and traditional metrics along with data gathered from our tools we can establish behavior and security patterns for SDN and SDN hybrid networks. Our research helps provide a framework for a range of techniques for administrators and automated system protection services that give insight into the health and security of the network. To narrow the scope of our research, this paper focuses on a subset of those techniques as they apply to the confidence analysis of a specific network path at the time of use or inspection. This confidence analysis allows users, administrators and autonomous systems to decide whether a network path is secure enough for sending their sensitive information. Our testing shows that malicious activity can be identified quickly as a single metric indicator and consistently within a multi-factor indicator analysis. Our research includes the implementation of - hese techniques in a network path confidence analysis service, called Confidence Assessment as a Service. Using our behavior and security patterns, this service evaluates a specific network path and provides a confidence score for that path before, during and after the transmission of sensitive data. Our research and tools give administrators and autonomous systems a much better understanding of the internal operation and configuration of their networks. Our framework will also provide other services that will focus on detecting latent, systemic network problems. By providing a better understanding of network configuration and operation our research enables a more secure and dependable network and helps prevent the theft of information by malicious actors.
The state of network security today is quite abysmal. Security breaches and downtime of critical infrastructures continue to be the norm rather than the exception, despite the dramatic rise in spending on network security. Attackers today can easily leverage a distributed and programmable infrastructure of compromised machines (or botnets) to launch large-scale and sophisticated attack campaigns. In contrast, the defenders of our critical infrastructures are fundamentally crippled as they rely on fixed capacity, inflexible, and expensive hardware appliances deployed at designated "chokepoints". These primitive defense capabilities force defenders into adopting weak and static security postures configured for simple and known attacks, or otherwise risk user revolt, as they face unpleasant tradeoffs between false positives and false negatives. Unfortunately, attacks can easily evade these defenses; e.g., piggybacking on popular services (e.g., drive-by-downloads) and by overloading the appliances. Continuing along this trajectory means that attackers will always hold the upper hand as defenders are stifled by the inflexible and impotent tools in their arsenal. An overarching goal of my work is to change the dynamics of this attack-defense equation. Instead of taking a conventional approach of developing attack-specific defenses, I argue that we can leverage recent trends in software-defined networking and network functions virtualization to better empower defenders with the right tools and abstractions to tackle the constantly evolving attack landscape. To this end, I envision a new software-defined approach to network security, where we can rapidly develop and deploy novel in-depth defenses and dynamically customize the network's security posture to the current operating context. In this talk, I will give an overview of our recent work on the basic building blocks to enable this vision as well as some early security capabilities we have developed. Using anecdotes from this specific exercise, I will also try to highlight lessons and experiences in the overall research process (e.g., how to pick and formulate problems, the role of serendipity, and the benefits of finding ``bridges'' to other subdomains).
Recent findings have shown that network and system attacks in Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) have been caused by malicious network applications that misuse APIs in an SDN controller. Such attacks can both crash the controller and change the internal data structure in the controller, causing serious damage to the infrastructure of SDN-based networks. To address this critical security issue, we introduce a security framework called AEGIS to prevent controller APIs from being misused by malicious network applications. Through the run-time verification of API calls, AEGIS performs a fine-grained access control for important controller APIs that can be misused by malicious applications. The usage of API calls is verified in real time by sophisticated security access rules that are defined based on the relationships between applications and data in the SDN controller. We also present a prototypical implementation of AEGIS and demonstrate its effectiveness and efficiency by performing six different controller attacks including new attacks we have recently discovered.
OpenFlow, as the prevailing technique for Software-Defined Networks (SDNs), introduces significant programmability, granularity, and flexibility for many network applications to effectively manage and process network flows. However, because OpenFlow attempts to keep the SDN data plane simple and efficient, it focuses solely on L2/L3 network transport and consequently lacks the fundamental ability of stateful forwarding for the data plane. Also, OpenFlow provides a very limited access to connection-level information in the SDN controller. In particular, for any network access management applications on SDNs that require comprehensive network state information, these inherent limitations of OpenFlow pose significant challenges in supporting network services. To address these challenges, we propose an innovative connection tracking framework called STATEMON that introduces a global state-awareness to provide better access control in SDNs. STATEMON is based on a lightweight extension of OpenFlow for programming the stateful SDN data plane, while keeping the underlying network devices as simple as possible. To demonstrate the practicality and feasibility of STATEMON, we implement and evaluate a stateful network firewall and port knocking applications for SDNs, using the APIs provided by STATEMON. Our evaluations show that STATEMON introduces minimal message exchanges for monitoring active connections in SDNs with manageable overhead (3.27% throughput degradation).