Biblio

Recent attacks show that threats to cyber infrastructure are not only increasing in volume, but are getting more sophisticated. The attacks may comprise multiple actions that are hard to differentiate from benign activity, and therefore common detection techniques have to deal with high false positive rates. Because of the imperfect performance of automated detection techniques, responses to such attacks are highly dependent on human-driven decision-making processes. While game theory has been applied to many problems that require rational decisionmaking, we find limitation on applying such method on security games. In this work, we propose Q-Learning to react automatically to the adversarial behavior of a suspicious user to secure the system. This work compares variations of Q-Learning with a traditional stochastic game. Simulation results show the possibility of Naive Q-Learning, despite restricted information on opponents.

Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) assume increasingly importance in past decades as information systems become ubiquitous. Despite the abundance of intrusion detection algorithms developed so far, there is still no single detection algorithm or procedure that can catch all possible intrusions; also, simultaneously running all these algorithms may not be feasible for practical IDSs due to resource limitation. For these reasons, effective IDS configuration becomes crucial for real-time intrusion detection. However, the uncertainty in the intruder’s type and the (often unknown) dynamics involved with the target system pose challenges to IDS configuration. Considering these challenges, the IDS configuration problem is formulated as an incomplete information stochastic game in this work, and a new algorithm, Bayesian Nash-Q learning, that combines conventional reinforcement learning with a Bayesian type identification procedure is proposed. Numerical results show that the proposed algorithm can identify the intruder’s type with high fidelity and provide effective configuration.

We study the problem of aggregator’s mechanism design for controlling the amount of active, or reactive, power provided, or consumed, by a group of distributed energy resources (DERs). The aggregator interacts with the wholesale electricity market and through some market-clearing mechanism is incentivized to provide (or consume) a certain amount of active (or reactive) power over some period of time, for which it will be compensated. The objective is for the aggregator to design a pricing strategy for incentivizing DERs to modify their active (or reactive) power consumptions (or productions) so that they collectively provide the amount that the aggregator has agreed to provide. The aggregator and DERs’ strategic decision-making process can be cast as a Stackelberg game, in which aggregator acts as the leader and the DERs are the followers. In previous work [Gharesifard et al., 2013b,a], we have introduced a framework in which each DER uses the pricing information provided by the aggregator and some estimate of the average energy that neighboring DERs can provide to compute a Nash equilibrium solution in a distributed manner. Here, we focus on the interplay between the aggregator’s decision-making process and the DERs’ decision-making process. In particular, we propose a simple feedback-based privacy-preserving pricing control strategy that allows the aggregator to coordinate the DERs so that they collectively provide the amount of active (or reactive) power agreed upon, provided that there is enough capacity available among the DERs. We provide a formal analysis of the stability of the resulting closed-loop system. We also discuss the shortcomings of the proposed pricing strategy, and propose some avenues of future work. We illustrate the proposed strategy via numerical simulations.

Assuring communication integrity is a central problem in security. However, overhead costs associated with cryptographic primitives used towards this end introduce significant practical implementation challenges for resource-bounded systems, such as cyber-physical systems. For example, many control systems are built on legacy components which are computationally limited but have strict timing constraints. If integrity protection is a binary decision, it may simply be infeasible to introduce into such systems; without it, however, an adversary can forge malicious messages, which can cause signicant physical or financial harm. We propose a formal game-theoretic framework for optimal stochastic message authentication, providing provable integrity guarantees for resource-bounded systems based on an existing MAC scheme. We use our framework to investigate attacker deterrence, as well as optimal design of stochastic message authentication schemes when deterrence is impossible. Finally, we provide experimental results on the computational performance of our framework in practice.

Game theory can provide a useful tool to study the security problem in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Most of existing works on applying game theories to security only consider two players in the security game model: an attacker and a defender. While this assumption may be valid for a network with centralized administration, it is not realistic in MANETs, where centralized administration is not available. In this paper, using recent advances in mean field game theory, we propose a novel game theoretic approach with multiple players for security in MANETs. The mean field game theory provides a powerful mathematical tool for problems with a large number of players. The proposed scheme can enable an individual node in MANETs to make strategic security defence decisions without centralized administration. In addition, since security defence mechanisms consume precious system resources (e.g., energy), the proposed scheme considers not only the security requirement of MANETs but also the system resources. Moreover, each node in the proposed scheme only needs to know its own state information and the aggregate effect of the other nodes in the MANET. Therefore, the proposed scheme is a fully distributed scheme. Simulation results are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.

The growing popularity and development of data mining technologies bring serious threat to the security of individual,'s sensitive information. An emerging research topic in data mining, known as privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM), has been extensively studied in recent years. The basic idea of PPDM is to modify the data in such a way so as to perform data mining algorithms effectively without compromising the security of sensitive information contained in the data. Current studies of PPDM mainly focus on how to reduce the privacy risk brought by data mining operations, while in fact, unwanted disclosure of sensitive information may also happen in the process of data collecting, data publishing, and information (i.e., the data mining results) delivering. In this paper, we view the privacy issues related to data mining from a wider perspective and investigate various approaches that can help to protect sensitive information. In particular, we identify four different types of users involved in data mining applications, namely, data provider, data collector, data miner, and decision maker. For each type of user, we discuss his privacy concerns and the methods that can be adopted to protect sensitive information. We briefly introduce the basics of related research topics, review state-of-the-art approaches, and present some preliminary thoughts on future research directions. Besides exploring the privacy-preserving approaches for each type of user, we also review the game theoretical approaches, which are proposed for analyzing the interactions among different users in a data mining scenario, each of whom has his own valuation on the sensitive information. By differentiating the responsibilities of different users with respect to security of sensitive information, we would like to provide some useful insights into the study of PPDM.

More and more intelligent functions are proposed, designed and implemented in meters to make the power supply be smart. However, these complex functions also bring risks to the smart meters, and they become susceptible to vulnerabilities and attacks. We present the rat-group attack in this paper, which exploits the vulnerabilities of smart meters in the cyber world, but spreads in the physical world due to the direct economic benefits. To the best of our knowledge, no systematic work has been conducted on this attack. Game theory is then applied to analyze this attack, and two game models are proposed and compared under different assumptions. The analysis results suggest that the power company shall follow an open defense policy: disclosing the defense parameters to all users (i.e., the potential attackers), results in less loss in the attack.

We consider several challenging problems in complex networks (communication, control, social, economic, biological, hybrid) as problems in cooperative multi-agent systems. We describe a general model for cooperative multi-agent systems that involves several interacting dynamic multigraphs and identify three fundamental research challenges underlying these systems from a network science perspective. We show that the framework of constrained coalitional network games captures in a fundamental way the basic tradeoff of benefits vs. cost of collaboration, in multi-agent systems, and demonstrate that it can explain network formation and the emergence or not of collaboration. Multi-metric problems in such networks are analyzed via a novel multiple partially ordered semirings approach. We investigate the interrelationship between the collaboration and communication multigraphs in cooperative swarms and the role of the communication topology, among the collaborating agents, in improving the performance of distributed task execution. Expander graphs emerge as efficient communication topologies for collaborative control. We relate these models and approaches to statistical physics.