Biblio

The emergence of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is a potential paradigm shift for the usage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). From predominantly a facilitator of information and communication services, the role of ICT in the present age has expanded to the management of objects and resources in the physical world. Thus, it is imperative to devise mechanisms to ensure the trustworthiness of data to secure vulnerable devices against security threats. This work presents an analytical framework based on non-cooperative game theory to evaluate the trustworthiness of individual sensor nodes that constitute the CPS. The proposed game-theoretic model captures the factors impacting the trustworthiness of CPS sensor nodes. Further, the model is used to estimate the Nash equilibrium solution of the game, to derive a trust threshold criterion. The trust threshold represents the minimum trust score required to be maintained by individual sensor nodes during CPS operation. Sensor nodes with trust scores below the threshold are potentially malicious and may be removed or isolated to ensure the secure operation of CPS.

Complex CPS such as UAS got rapid development these years, but also became vulnerable to GPS spoofing, packets injection, buffer-overflow and other malicious attacks. Ensuring the behaviors of UAS always keeping secure no matter how the environment changes, would be a prospective direction for UAS security. This paper aims at presenting a reactive synthesis-based approach to implement the automatic generation of secure UAS controller. First, we study the operating mechanism of UAS and construct a high-Ievel model consisting of actuator and monitor. Besides, we analyze the security threats of UAS from the perspective of hardware, software and data transmission, and then extract the corresponding specifications of security properties with LTL formulas. Based on the UAS model and security specifications, the controller can be constructed by GR(1) synthesis algorithm, which is a two-player game process between UAV and Environment. Finally, we expand the function of LTLMoP platform to construct the automatons for controller in multi-robots system, which provides secure behavior strategies under several typical UAS attack scenarios.

Jamming attacks target a wireless network creating an unwanted denial of service. 5G is vulnerable to these attacks despite its resilience prompted by the use of millimeter wave bands. Over the last decade, several types of jamming detection techniques have been proposed, including fuzzy logic, game theory, channel surfing, and time series. Most of these techniques are inefficient in detecting smart jammers. Thus, there is a great need for efficient and fast jamming detection techniques with high accuracy. In this paper, we compare the efficiency of several machine learning models in detecting jamming signals. We investigated the types of signal features that identify jamming signals, and generated a large dataset using these parameters. Using this dataset, the machine learning algorithms were trained, evaluated, and tested. These algorithms are random forest, support vector machine, and neural network. The performance of these algorithms was evaluated and compared using the probability of detection, probability of false alarm, probability of miss detection, and accuracy. The simulation results show that jamming detection based random forest algorithm can detect jammers with a high accuracy, high detection probability and low probability of false alarm.

Trusted collaboration satisfying the requirements of (a) adequate transparency and (b) preservation of privacy of business sensitive information is a key factor to ensure the success and adoption of online business-to-business (B2B) collaboration platforms. Our work proposes novel ways of stringing together game theoretic modeling, blockchain technology, and cryptographic techniques to build such a platform for B2B collaboration involving enterprise buyers and sellers who may be strategic. The B2B platform builds upon three ideas. The first is to use a permissioned blockchain with smart contracts as the technical infrastructure for building the platform. Second, the above smart contracts implement deep business logic which is derived using a rigorous analysis of a repeated game model of the strategic interactions between buyers and sellers to devise strategies to induce honest behavior from buyers and sellers. Third, we present a formal framework that captures the essential requirements for secure and private B2B collaboration, and, in this direction, we develop cryptographic regulation protocols that, in conjunction with the blockchain, help implement such a framework. We believe our work is an important first step in the direction of building a platform that enables B2B collaboration among strategic and competitive agents while maximizing social welfare and addressing the privacy concerns of the agents.

In this paper, we propose a robust Nash strategy for a class of uncertain Markov jump delay stochastic systems (UMJDSSs) via static output feedback (SOF). After establishing the extended bounded real lemma for UMJDSS, the conditions for the existence of a robust Nash strategy set are determined by means of cross coupled stochastic matrix inequalities (CCSMIs). In order to solve the SOF problem, an heuristic algorithm is developed based on the algebraic equations and the linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). In particular, it is shown that robust convergence is guaranteed under a new convergence condition. Finally, a practical numerical example based on the congestion control for active queue management is provided to demonstrate the reliability and usefulness of the proposed design scheme.

Increasing number of Internet-scale applications, such as video streaming, incur huge amount of wide area traffic. Such traffic over the unreliable Internet without bandwidth guarantee suffers unpredictable network performance. This result, however, is unappealing to the application providers. Fortunately, Internet giants like Google and Microsoft are increasingly deploying their private wide area networks (WANs) to connect their global datacenters. Such high-speed private WANs are reliable, and can provide predictable network performance. In this paper, we propose a new type of service-inter-datacenter network as a service (iDaaS), where traditional application providers can reserve bandwidth from those Internet giants to guarantee their wide area traffic. Specifically, we design a bandwidth trading market among multiple iDaaS providers and application providers, and concentrate on the essential bandwidth pricing problem. The involved challenging issue is that the bandwidth price of each iDaaS provider is not only influenced by other iDaaS providers, but also affected by the application providers. To address this issue, we characterize the interaction between iDaaS providers and application providers using a Stackelberg game model, and analyze the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. We further present an efficient bandwidth pricing algorithm by blending the advantage of a geometrical Nash bargaining solution and the demand segmentation method. For comparison, we present two bandwidth reservation algorithms, where each iDaaS provider's bandwidth is reserved in a weighted fair manner and a max-min fair manner, respectively. Finally, we conduct comprehensive trace-driven experiments. The evaluation results show that our proposed algorithms not only ensure the revenue of iDaaS providers, but also provide bandwidth guarantee for application providers with lower bandwidth price per unit.

Humans often assume that robots are rational. We believe robots take optimal actions given their objective; hence, when we are uncertain about what the robot's objective is, we interpret the robot's actions as optimal with respect to our estimate of its objective. This approach makes sense when robots straightforwardly optimize their objective, and enables humans to learn what the robot is trying to achieve. However, our insight is that-when robots are aware that humans learn by trusting that the robot actions are rational-intelligent robots do not act as the human expects; instead, they take advantage of the human's trust, and exploit this trust to more efficiently optimize their own objective. In this paper, we formally model instances of human-robot interaction (HRI) where the human does not know the robot's objective using a two-player game. We formulate different ways in which the robot can model the uncertain human, and compare solutions of this game when the robot has conservative, optimistic, rational, and trusting human models. In an offline linear-quadratic case study and a real-time user study, we show that trusting human models can naturally lead to communicative robot behavior, which influences end-users and increases their involvement.

When a robot breaks a person's trust by making a mistake or failing, continued interaction will depend heavily on how the robot repairs the trust that was broken. Prior work in psychology has demonstrated that both the trust violation framing and the trust repair strategy influence how effectively trust can be restored. We investigate trust repair between a human and a robot in the context of a competitive game, where a robot tries to restore a human's trust after a broken promise, using either a competence or integrity trust violation framing and either an apology or denial trust repair strategy. Results from a 2×2 between-subjects study ( n=82) show that participants interacting with a robot employing the integrity trust violation framing and the denial trust repair strategy are significantly more likely to exhibit behavioral retaliation toward the robot. In the Dyadic Trust Scale survey, an interaction between trust violation framing and trust repair strategy was observed. Our results demonstrate the importance of considering both trust violation framing and trust repair strategy choice when designing robots to repair trust. We also discuss the influence of human-to-robot promises and ethical considerations when framing and repairing trust between a human and robot.

With the development of big data and machine learning techniques, medical data sharing for the use of disease diagnosis has received considerable attention. Blockchain, as an emerging technology, has been widely used to resolve the efficiency and security issues in medical data sharing. However, the existing studies on blockchain-based medical data sharing have rarely concerned about the reasonable incentive mechanism. In this paper, we propose a cooperation model where medical data is shared via blockchain. We derive the topological relationships among the participants consisting of data owners, miners and third parties, and gradually develop the computational process of Shapley value revenue distribution. Specifically, we explore the revenue distribution under different consensuses of blockchain. Finally, we demonstrate the incentive effect and rationality of the proposed solution by analyzing the revenue distribution.

In this paper, the problem of misinformation propagation is studied for an Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) system in which an attacker seeks to inject false information in the IoBT nodes in order to compromise the IoBT operations. In the considered model, each IoBT node seeks to counter the misinformation attack by finding the optimal probability of accepting a given information that minimizes its cost at each time instant. The cost is expressed in terms of the quality of information received as well as the infection cost. The problem is formulated as a mean-field game with multiclass agents which is suitable to model a massive heterogeneous IoBT system. For this game, the mean-field equilibrium is characterized, and an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep method is proposed. Then, the finite IoBT case is considered, and the conditions of convergence of the equilibria in the finite case to the mean-field equilibrium are presented. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme can achieve a two-fold increase in the quality of information (QoI) compared to the baseline when the nodes are always transmitting.

Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) devices such as actuators, sensors, wearable devises, robots, drones, and autonomous vehicles, facilitate the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to Command and Control and battlefield services. IoBT devices have the ability to collect operational field data, to compute on the data, and to upload its information to the network. Securing the IoBT presents additional challenges compared with traditional information technology (IT) systems. First, IoBT devices are mass produced rapidly to be low-cost commodity items without security protection in their original design. Second, IoBT devices are highly dynamic, mobile, and heterogeneous without common standards. Third, it is imperative to understand the natural world, the physical process(es) under IoBT control, and how these real-world processes can be compromised before recommending any relevant security counter measure. Moreover, unprotected IoBT devices can be used as “stepping stones” by attackers to launch more sophisticated attacks such as advanced persistent threats (APTs). As a result of these challenges, IoBT systems are the frequent targets of sophisticated cyber attack that aim to disrupt mission effectiveness.

In this paper, the problem of misinformation propagation is studied for an Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) system, in which an attacker seeks to inject false information in the IoBT nodes in order to compromise the IoBT operations. In the considered model, each IoBT node seeks to counter the misinformation attack by finding the optimal probability of accepting given information that minimizes its cost at each time instant. The cost is expressed in terms of the quality of information received as well as the infection cost. The problem is formulated as a mean-field game with multiclass agents, which is suitable to model a massive heterogeneous IoBT system. For this game, the mean-field equilibrium is characterized, and an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep method is proposed to find the mean-field equilibrium. Then, the finite-IoBT case is considered, and the conditions of convergence of the equilibria in the finite case to the mean-field equilibrium are presented. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme can achieve a 1.2-fold increase in the quality of information compared with a baseline scheme, in which the IoBT nodes are always transmitting. The results also show that the proposed scheme can reduce the proportion of infected nodes by 99% compared with the baseline.

In this paper, decentralized dynamic power allocation problem has been investigated for mobile ad hoc network (MANET) at tactical edge. Due to the mobility and self-organizing features in MANET and environmental uncertainties in the battlefield, many existing optimal power allocation algorithms are neither efficient nor practical. Furthermore, the continuously increasing large scale of the wireless connection population in emerging Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) introduces additional challenges for optimal power allocation due to the “Curse of Dimensionality”. In order to address these challenges, a novel Actor-Critic-Mass algorithm is proposed by integrating the emerging Mean Field game theory with online reinforcement learning. The proposed approach is able to not only learn the optimal power allocation for IoBT in a decentralized manner, but also effectively handle uncertainties from harsh environment at tactical edge. In the developed scheme, each agent in IoBT has three neural networks (NN), i.e., 1) Critic NN learns the optimal cost function that minimizes the Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), 2) Actor NN estimates the optimal transmitter power adjustment rate, and 3) Mass NN learns the probability density function of all agents' transmitting power in IoBT. The three NNs are tuned based on the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) and Hamiltonian-Jacobian-Bellman (HJB) equation given in the Mean Field game theory. An IoBT wireless network has been simulated to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. The results demonstrate that the actor-critic-mass algorithm can effectively approximate the probability distribution of all agents' transmission power and converge to the target SINR. Moreover, the optimal decentralized power allocation is obtained through integrated mean-field game theory with reinforcement learning.

In this paper, a novel anti-jamming mechanism is proposed to analyze and enhance the security of adversarial Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) systems. In particular, the problem is formulated as a dynamic psychological game between a soldier and an attacker. In this game, the soldier seeks to accomplish a time-critical mission by traversing a battlefield within a certain amount of time, while maintaining its connectivity with an IoBT network. The attacker, on the other hand, seeks to find the optimal opportunity to compromise the IoBT network and maximize the delay of the soldier's IoBT transmission link. The soldier and the attacker's psychological behavior are captured using tools from psychological game theory, with which the soldier's and attacker's intentions to harm one another are considered in their utilities. To solve this game, a novel learning algorithm based on Bayesian updating is proposed to find an ∈ -like psychological self-confirming equilibrium of the game.

Cloud systems are becoming more complex and vulnerable to attacks. Cyber attacks are also becoming more sophisticated and harder to detect. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult for a single cloud-based intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect all attacks, because of limited and incomplete knowledge about attacks. The recent researches in cyber-security have shown that a co-operation among IDSs can bring higher detection accuracy in such complex computer systems. Through collaboration, a cloud-based IDS can consult other IDSs about suspicious intrusions and increase the decision accuracy. The problem of existing cooperative IDS approaches is that they overlook having untrusted (malicious or not) IDSs that may negatively effect the decision about suspicious intrusions in the cloud. Moreover, they rely on a centralized architecture in which a central agent regulates the cooperation, which contradicts the distributed nature of the cloud. In this paper, we propose a framework that enables IDSs to distributively form trustworthy IDSs communities. We devise a novel decentralized algorithm, based on coalitional game theory, that allows a set of cloud-based IDSs to cooperatively set up their coalition in such a way to make their individual detection accuracy increase, even in the presence of untrusted IDSs.

Fog computing faces various security and privacy threats. Internet of Things (IoTs) devices have limited computing, storage, and other resources. They are vulnerable to attack by adversaries. Although the existing privacy-preserving solutions in fog computing can be migrated to address some privacy issues, specific privacy challenges still exist because of the unique features of fog computing, such as the decentralized and hierarchical infrastructure, mobility, location and content-aware applications. Unfortunately, privacy-preserving issues and resources in fog computing have not been systematically identified, especially the privacy preservation in multiple fog node communication with end users. In this paper, we propose a dynamic MDP-based privacy-preserving model in zero-sum game to identify the efficiency of the privacy loss and payoff changes to preserve sensitive content in a fog computing environment. First, we develop a new dynamic model with MDP-based comprehensive algorithms. Then, extensive experimental results identify the significance of the proposed model compared with others in more effectively and feasibly solving the discussed issues.

The behavior of a differentially private system is governed by a parameter epsilon which sets a balance between protecting the privacy of individuals and returning accurate results. While a system owner may use a number of heuristics to select epsilon, existing techniques may be unresponsive to the needs of the users who's data is at risk. A promising alternative is to allow users to express their preferences for epsilon. In a system we call epsilon voting, users report the parameter values they want to a chooser mechanism, which aggregates them into a single value. We apply techniques from mechanism design to ask whether such a chooser mechanism can itself be truthful, private, anonymous, and also responsive to users. Without imposing restrictions on user preferences, the only feasible mechanisms belong to a class we call randomized dictatorships with phantoms. This is a restrictive class in which at most one user has any effect on the chosen epsilon. On the other hand, when users exhibit single-peaked preferences, a broader class of mechanisms - ones that generalize the median and other order statistics - becomes possible.

Collaborative trajectory privacy preservation (CTPP) scheme is an effective method for continuous queries. However, collaborating with other users need pay some cost. Therefore, some rational and selfish users will not choose collaboration, which will result in users' privacy disclosing. To solve the problem, this paper proposes a collaboration incentive mechanism by rewarding collaborative users and punishing non-collaborative users. The paper models the interactions of users participating in CTPP as a repeated game and analysis the utility of participated users. The analytical results show that CTPP with the proposed incentive mechanism can maximize user's payoffs. Experiments show that the proposed mechanism can effectively encourage users' collaboration behavior and effectively preserve the trajectory privacy for continuous query users.

Thanks to the development and popularity of context-aware applications, the quality of users' life has been improved through a wide variety of customized services. Meanwhile, users are suffering severe risk of privacy leakage and their privacy concerns are growing over time. To tackle the contradiction between the serious privacy issues and the growing privacy concerns in context-aware applications, in this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving data collection scheme by incorporating the complicated interactions among user, attacker, and service provider into a three-antithetic-party game. Under such a novel game model, we identify and rigorously prove the best strategies of the three parties and the equilibriums of the games. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of our proposed data collection game by performing extensive numerical experiments, confirming that the user's data privacy can be effective preserved.

We study a model where a data collector obtains data from users through a payment mechanism to learn the underlying state from the elicited data. The private signal of each user represents her individual knowledge about the state. Through social interactions, each user can also learn noisy versions of her friends' signals, which is called group signals. Based on both her private signal and group signals, each user makes strategic decisions to report a privacy-preserved version of her data to the data collector. We develop a Bayesian game theoretic framework to study the impact of social learning on users' data reporting strategies and devise the payment mechanism for the data collector accordingly. Our findings reveal that, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium can be in the form of either a symmetric randomized response (SR) strategy or an informative non-disclosive (ND) strategy. A generalized majority voting rule is applied by each user to her noisy group signals to determine which strategy to follow. When a user plays the ND strategy, she reports privacy-preserving data completely based on her group signals, independent of her private signal, which indicates that her privacy cost is zero. Both the data collector and the users can benefit from social learning which drives down the privacy costs and helps to improve the state estimation at a given payment budget. We derive bounds on the minimum total payment required to achieve a given level of state estimation accuracy.

With the popularity of Internet applications and rapid development, data using and sharing process may lead to the sensitive information divulgence. To deal with the privacy protection issue more effectively, in this paper, we propose the associated data sets protection model based on game theory from the point of view of realizing benefits from the access of privacy is about happen, quantify the extent to which visitors gain sensitive information, then compares the tolerance of the sensitive information owner and finally decides whether to allow the visitor to make an access request.

More and more security and privacy issues are arising as new technologies, such as big data and cloud computing, are widely applied in nowadays. For decreasing the privacy breaches in access control system under opening and cross-domain environment. In this paper, we suggest a game and risk based access model for privacy preserving by employing Shannon information and game theory. After defining the notions of Privacy Risk and Privacy Violation Access, a high-level framework of game theoretical risk based access control is proposed. Further, we present formulas for estimating the risk value of access request and user, construct and analyze the game model of the proposed access control by using a multi-stage two player game. There exists sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium each stage in the risk based access control and it's suitable to protect the privacy by limiting the privacy violation access requests.

Transacting IoT data must be different in many from traditional approaches in order to build much-needed trust in data marketplaces, trust that will be the key to their sustainability. Data generated internally to an organization is usually not enough to remain competitive, enhance customer experiences, or improve strategic decision-making. In this paper, we propose a decentralized and trustless architecture through the posting of trade records while including the transaction process on distributed ledgers. This approach can efficiently enhance the degree of transparency, as all contract-oriented interactions will be written on-chain. Storage via an end-to-end encrypted message channel allows transmitting and accessing trusted data streams over distributed ledgers regardless of the size or cost of the device, while simultaneously making a verifiable Auth-compliant request to the platform. Furthermore, the platform will complete matching, trading and refunding processes with-out human intervention, and it also protects the rights of data providers and consumers through trading policies which apply revolutionary game theory to the machine economy.

Hypergame theory has been used to model advantages in decision making. This research provides a formal representation of deception to further extend the hypergame model. In order to extend the model, we propose a hypergame theoretic framework based on temporal logic to model decision making under the potential for trust and deception. Using the temporal hypergame model, the concept of trust is defined within the constraints of the model. With a formal definition of trust in hypergame theory, the concepts of distrust, mistrust, misperception, and deception are then constructed. These formal definitions are then applied to an Attacker-Defender hypergame to show how the deception within the game can be formally modeled; the model is presented. This demonstrates how hypergame theory can be used to model trust, mistrust, misperception, and deception using a formal model.

Computer-aided cryptography increases the rigour of cryptographic proofs by mechanizing their verification. Existing tools focus mainly on game-based proofs, and efforts to formalize composable frameworks such as Universal Composability have met with limited success. In this paper, we formalize an instance of Constructive Cryptography, a generic theory allowing for clean, composable cryptographic security statements. Namely, we extend CryptHOL, a framework for game-based proofs, with an abstract model of Random Systems and provide proof rules for their equality and composition. We formalize security as a special kind of system construction in which a complex system is built from simpler ones. As a simple case study, we formalize the construction of an information-theoretically secure channel from a key, a random function, and an insecure channel.