Biblio

Edge computing promises higher bandwidth and lower latency to end-users. However, edge servers usually have limited computing resources and are geographically distributed over the edge. This imposes new challenges for efficient system monitoring and control of edge servers.In this paper, we propose EdgeVMI, a framework to monitor and control services running on edge servers with lightweight virtual machine introspection(VMI). The key of our technique is to run the monitor in a lightweight virtual machine which can leverage hardware events for monitoring memory read and writes. In addition, the small binary size and memory footprints of the monitor could reduce the start/stop time of service, the runtime overhead, as well as the deployment efforts.Inspired by unikernels, we build our monitor with only the necessary system modules, libraries, and functionalities of a specific monitor task. To reduce the security risk of the monitoring behavior, we separate the monitor into two isolated modules: one acts as a sensor to collect security information and another acts as an actuator to conduct control commands. Our evaluation shows the effectiveness and the efficiency of the monitoring system, with an average performance overhead of 2.7%.

Smart grid architecture and Software-defined Networking (SDN) have evolved into a centrally controlled infrastructure that captures and extracts data in real-time through sensors, smart-meters, and virtual machines. These advances pose a risk and increase the vulnerabilities of these infrastructures to sophisticated cyberattacks like distributed denial of service (DDoS), false data injection attack (FDIA), and Data replay. Integrating machine learning with a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) can improve the system's accuracy and precision when detecting suspicious signatures and network anomalies. Analyzing data in real-time using trained and tested hyperparameters on a network traffic dataset applies to most network infrastructures. The NSL-KDD dataset implemented holds various classes, attack types, protocol suites like TCP, HTTP, and POP, which are critical to packet transmission on a smart grid network. In this paper, we leveraged existing machine learning (ML) algorithms, Support vector machine (SVM), K-nearest neighbor (KNN), Random Forest (RF), Naïve Bayes (NB), and Bagging; to perform a detailed performance comparison of selected classifiers. We propose a multi-level hybrid model of SVM integrated with RF for improved accuracy and precision during network filtering. The hybrid model SVM-RF returned an average accuracy of 94% in 10-fold cross-validation and 92.75%in an 80-20% split during class classification.

Modern enterprises increasingly take advantage of cloud infrastructures. Yet, outsourcing code and data into the cloud requires enterprises to trust cloud providers not to meddle with their data. To reduce the level of trust towards cloud providers, AMD has introduced Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). By encrypting Virtual Machines (VMs), SEV aims to ensure data confidentiality, despite a compromised or curious Hypervisor. The SEV Encrypted State (SEV-ES) extension additionally protects the VM’s register state from unauthorized access. Yet, both extensions do not provide integrity of the VM’s memory, which has already been abused to leak the protected data or to alter the VM’s control-flow. In this paper, we introduce the SEVerity attack; a missing puzzle piece in the series of attacks against the AMD SEV family. Specifically, we abuse the system’s lack of memory integrity protection to inject and execute arbitrary code within SEV-ES-protected VMs. Contrary to previous code execution attacks against the AMD SEV family, SEVerity neither relies on a specific CPU version nor on any code gadgets inside the VM. Instead, SEVerity abuses the fact that SEV-ES prohibits direct memory access into the encrypted memory. Specifically, SEVerity injects arbitrary code into the encrypted VM through I/O channels and uses the Hypervisor to locate and trigger the execution of the encrypted payload. This allows us to sidestep the protection mechanisms of SEV-ES. Overall, our results demonstrate a success rate of 100% and hence highlight that memory integrity protection is an obligation when encrypting VMs. Consequently, our work presents the final stroke in a series of attacks against AMD SEV and SEV-ES and renders the present implementation as incapable of protecting against a curious, vulnerable, or malicious Hypervisor.

Commodity hypervisors are widely deployed to support virtual machines (VMs) on multiprocessor hardware. Their growing complexity poses a security risk. To enable formal verification over such a large codebase, we introduce microverification, a new approach that decomposes a commodity hypervisor into a small core and a set of untrusted services so that we can prove security properties of the entire hypervisor by verifying the core alone. To verify the multiprocessor hypervisor core, we introduce security-preserving layers to modularize the proof without hiding information leakage so we can prove each layer of the implementation refines its specification, and the top layer specification is refined by all layers of the core implementation. To verify commodity hypervisor features that require dynamically changing information flow, we introduce data oracles to mask intentional information flow. We can then prove noninterference at the top layer specification and guarantee the resulting security properties hold for the entire hypervisor implementation. Using microverification, we retrofitted the Linux KVM hypervisor with only modest modifications to its codebase. Using Coq, we proved that the hypervisor protects the confidentiality and integrity of VM data, while retaining KVM’s functionality and performance. Our work is the first machine-checked security proof for a commodity multiprocessor hypervisor.

Containers that can be easily created, transported and scaled with the use of container-based virtualization technologies work better than classical virtualization technologies and provide efficient resource usage. The Docker platform is one of the most widely used solutions among container-based virtualization technologies. The OS-level virtualization of the Docker platform and the container’s use of the host operating system kernel may cause security problems. In this study, a method including static and dynamic analysis has been proposed to ensure Docker image and container security. In the static analysis phase of the method, the packages of the images are scanned for vulnerabilities and malware. In the dynamic analysis phase, Docker containers are run for a certain period of time, after the open port scanning, network traffic is analyzed with the Snort3. Seven Docker images are analyzed and the results are shared.

In order to improve the continuity of cryptographic services and ensure the quality of services in the cloud environment, a dynamic migration framework of cryptographic service virtual machines based on the network shared storage system is proposed. Based on the study of the security threats in the migration process, a dynamic migration attack model is established, and the security requirement of dynamic migration is analyzed. It designs and implements the dynamic security migration management software, which includes a dynamic migration security enhancement module based on the Libvirt API, role-based access control policy, and transmission channel protection module. A cryptographic service virtual machine migration environment is built, and the designed management software and security mechanism are verified and tested. The experimental results show that the method proposed in the paper can effectively improve the security of cryptographic service virtual machine migration.

Cloud computing systems (CCSs) enable the sharing of physical computing resources through virtualisation, where a group of virtual machines (VMs) can share the same physical resources of a given machine. However, this sharing can lead to a so-called side-channel attack (SCA), widely recognised as a potential threat to CCSs. Specifically, malicious VMs can capture information from (target) VMs, i.e., those with sensitive information, by merely co-located with them on the same physical machine. As such, a VM allocation algorithm needs to be cognizant of this issue and attempts to allocate the malicious and target VMs onto different machines, i.e., the allocation algorithm needs to be security-aware. This paper investigates the allocation patterns of VM allocation algorithms that are more likely to lead to a secure allocation. A driving objective is to reduce the number of VM migrations during allocation. We also propose a graph-based secure VMs allocation algorithm (GbSRS) to minimise SCA threats. Our results show that algorithms following a stacking-based behaviour are more likely to produce secure VMs allocation than those following spreading or random behaviours.

Computer network and virtual machine security is very essential in today's era. Various architectures have been proposed for network security or prevent malicious access of internal or external users. Various existing systems have already developed to detect malicious activity on victim machines; sometimes any external user creates some malicious behavior and gets unauthorized access of victim machines to such a behavior system considered as malicious activities or Intruder. Numerous machine learning and soft computing techniques design to detect the activities in real-time network log audit data. KKDDCUP99 and NLSKDD most utilized data set to detect the Intruder on benchmark data set. In this paper, we proposed the identification of intruders using machine learning algorithms. Two different techniques have been proposed like a signature with detection and anomaly-based detection. In the experimental analysis, demonstrates SVM, Naïve Bayes and ANN algorithm with various data sets and demonstrate system performance on the real-time network environment.

Cloud computing is one of the greatest innovations and emerging technologies of the century. It incorporates networks, databases, operating systems, and virtualization technologies thereby bringing the security challenges associated with these technologies. Security Measures such as two-factor authentication, intrusion detection systems, and data backup are already in place to handle most of the security threats and vulnerabilities associated with these technologies but there are still other threats that may not be easily detected. Such a threat is a malicious user gaining access to the Virtual Machines (VMs) of other genuine users and using the Virtual Machine resources for their benefits without the knowledge of the user or the cloud service provider. This research proposes a model for proactive monitoring and detection of anomalies in VM resource usage. The proposed model can detect and pinpoint the time such anomaly occurred. Isolation Forest and One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) machine learning algorithms were used to train and test the model on sampled virtual machine workload trace using a combination of VM resource metrics together. OCSVM recorded an average F1-score of 0.97 and 0.89 for hourly and daily time series respectively while Isolation Forest has an average of 0.93 and 0.80 for hourly and daily time series. This result shows that both algorithms work for the model however OCSVM had a higher classification success rate than Isolation Forest.

Nowadays is becoming trivial to have multiple virtual machines working in parallel on hardware platforms with high processing power. This appropriate cost effective approach can be found at Internet Service Providers, in cloud service providers’ environments, in research and development lab testing environment (for example Universities’ student’s lab), in virtual application for security evaluation and in many other places. In the aforementioned cases, it is often necessary to start and/or stop virtual machines on the fly. In cloud service providers all the creation / tear down actions are triggered by a customer request and cannot be postponed or delayed for later evaluation. When a new virtual machine is created, it is imperative to assign unique IP addresses to all network interfaces and also domain name system DNS records that contain text based data, IP addresses, etc. Even worse, if a virtual machine has to be stopped or torn down, the critical network resources such as IP addresses and DNS records have to be carefully controlled in order to avoid IP addresses conflicts and name resolution problems between an old virtual machine and a newly created virtual machine. This paper proposes a provisioning mechanism to avoid both DNS records and IP addresses conflicts due to human misconfiguration, problems that can cause networking operation service disruptions.

To secure a guest operating system running on a virtual machine (VM), a monitoring method using hardware breakpoints by a virtual machine monitor is required. However, debug registers are visible to guest operating systems; thus, malicious programs on a guest operating system can detect or disable the monitoring method. This paper presents a method to hide access to debug registers from programs running on a VM. Our proposed method detects programs' access to debug registers and disguises the access as having succeeded. The register's actual value is not visible or modifiable to programs, so the monitoring method is hidden. This paper presents the basic design and evaluation results of our method.

Designing an authentication method is a crucial component to secure privacy in information systems. Virtual Reality (VR) is a new interaction platform, in which the users can interact with natural behaviours (e.g. hand, gaze, head, etc.). In this work, we propose a novel authentication method in which user can perform hand motion in an eyes-free manner. We evaluate the usability and security between eyes-engage and eyes-free input with a pilot study. The initial result revealed our purposed method can achieve a trade-off between usability and security, showing a new way to behaviour-based authentication in VR.

This paper presents SWAT - System-Wide Analysis Toolkit. It is based on open source emulation and debugging projects and implements the approaches for non-intrusive system-wide analysis and debugging: lightweight OS-agnostic virtual machine introspection, full system execution replay, non-intrusive debugging with WinDbg, and full system reverse debugging. These features are based on novel non-intrusive introspection and reverse debugging methods. They are useful for stealth debugging and analysis of the platforms with custom kernels. SWAT includes multi-platform emulator QEMU with additional instrumentation and debugging features, GUI for convenient QEMU setup and execution, QEMU plugin for non-intrusive introspection, and modified version of GDB. Our toolkit may be useful for the developers of the virtual platforms, emulators, and firmwares/drivers/operating systems. Virtual machine intospection approach does not require loading any guest agents and source code of the OS. Therefore it may be applied to ROM-based guest systems and enables using of record/replay of the system execution. This paper includes the description of SWAT components, analysis methods, and some SWAT use cases.

Cloud-based infrastructures have grown in popularity over the last decade leveraging virtualisation, server, storage, compute power and network components to develop flexible applications. The requirements for instantaneous deployment and reduced costs have led the shift from virtual machine deployment to containerisation, increasing the overall flexibility of applications and increasing performances. However, containers require a fully fleshed operating system to execute, increasing the attack surface of an application. Unikernels, on the other hand, provide a lightweight memory footprint, ease of application packaging and reduced start-up times. Moreover, Unikernels reduce the attack surface due to the self-contained environment only enabling low-level features. In this work, we provide an exhaustive description of the unikernel ecosystem; we demonstrate unikernel vulnerabilities and further discuss the security implications of Unikernel-enabled environments through different use-cases.

We focus on policy-aware data centers (PADCs), wherein virtual machine (VM) traffic traverses a sequence of middleboxes (MBs) for security and performance purposes, and propose two new VM placement and migration problems. We first study PAL: policy-aware virtual machine placement. Given a PADC with a data center policy that communicating VM pairs must satisfy, the goal of PAL is to place the VMs into the PADC to minimize their total communication cost. Due to dynamic traffic loads in PADCs, however, above VM placement may no longer be optimal after some time. We thus study PAM: policy-aware virtual machine migration. Given an existing VM placement in the PADC and dynamic traffic rates among communicating VMs, PAM migrates VMs in order to minimize the total cost of migration and communication of the VM pairs. We design optimal, approximation, and heuristic policyaware VM placement and migration algorithms. Our experiments show that i) VM migration is an effective technique, reducing total communication cost of VM pairs by 25%, ii) our PAL algorithms outperform state-of-the-art VM placement algorithm that is oblivious to data center policies by 40-50%, and iii) our PAM algorithms outperform the only existing policy-aware VM migration scheme by 30%.

This paper proposes and analyzes a new virtual machine (VM) placement technique called Group Instance to deal with co-location attacks in public Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds. Specifically, Group Instance organizes cloud users into groups with pre-determined sizes set by the cloud provider. Our empirical results obtained via experiments with real-world data sets containing million of VM requests have demonstrated the effectiveness of the new technique. In particular, the advantages of Group Instance are three-fold: 1) it is simple and highly configurable to suit the financial and security needs of cloud providers, 2) it produces better or at least similar performance compared to more complicated, state-of-the-art algorithms in terms of resource utilization and co-location security, and 3) it does not require any modifications to the underlying infrastructures of existing public cloud services.

{With the widespread use of cloud computing, energy consumption of cloud data centers is increasing which mainly comes from IT equipment and cooling equipment. This paper argues that once the number of virtual machines on the physical machines reaches a certain level, resource competition occurs, resulting in a performance loss of the virtual machines. Unlike most papers, we do not impose placement constraints on virtual machines by giving a CPU cap to achieve the purpose of energy savings in cloud data centers. Instead, we use the measure of performance loss to weigh. We propose a reinforcement learning-based virtual machine placement strategy(RLVMP) for energy savings in cloud data centers. The strategy considers the weight of virtual machine performance loss and energy consumption, which is finally solved with the greedy strategy. Simulation experiments show that our strategy has a certain improvement in energy savings compared with the other algorithms.

There is very significant role of Virtualization in cloud computing. The physical hardware in the cloud computing reside with the host machine and the virtualization software runs on it. The virtualization allows virtual machines to exist. The host machine shares its physical components such as memory, storage, and processor ultimately to handle the needs of the virtual machines. If an attacker effectively compromises one VM, it could outbreak others on the same host on the network over long periods of time. This is an gradually more popular method for cross-virtual-machine attacks, since traffic between VMs cannot be examined by standard IDS/IPS software programs. As we know that the cloud environment is distributed in nature and hence more susceptible to various types of intrusion attacks which include installing malicious software and generating backdoors. In a cloud environment, where organizations have hosted important and critical data, the security of underlying technologies becomes critical. To alleviate the hazard to cloud environments, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are a cover of defense. In this paper, we are proposing an innovative model for Intrusion Detection System for securing Host machines in cloud infrastructure. This proposed IDS has two important features: (1) signature based and (2) prompt alert system.

Cloud computing dominates the information communication and technology landscape despite the presence of lingering security issues such as the interdependency problem. The latter is a co-residence conundrum where the attacker successfully compromises his target virtual machine by first exploiting the weakest (in terms of security) virtual machine that is hosted in the same server. To tackle this issue, we propose a novel virtual machine allocation policy that is based on the attacker's efficiency and coverage. By default, our allocation policy considers all legitimate users as attackers and then proceeds to host the users' virtual machines to the server where their efficiency and/or coverage are the smallest. Our simulation results show that our proposal performs better than the existing allocation policies that were proposed to tackle the same issue, by reducing the attacker's possibilities to zero and by using between 30 - 48% less hosts.

Existing cyber security solutions have been basically developed using knowledge-based models that often cannot trigger new cyber-attack families. With the boom of Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially Deep Learning (DL) algorithms, those security solutions have been plugged-in with AI models to discover, trace, mitigate or respond to incidents of new security events. The algorithms demand a large number of heterogeneous data sources to train and validate new security systems. This paper presents the description of new datasets, the so-called ToNİoT, which involve federated data sources collected from Telemetry datasets of IoT services, Operating system datasets of Windows and Linux, and datasets of Network traffic. The paper introduces the testbed and description of TONİoT datasets for Windows operating systems. The testbed was implemented in three layers: edge, fog and cloud. The edge layer involves IoT and network devices, the fog layer contains virtual machines and gateways, and the cloud layer involves cloud services, such as data analytics, linked to the other two layers. These layers were dynamically managed using the platforms of software-Defined Network (SDN) and Network-Function Virtualization (NFV) using the VMware NSX and vCloud NFV platform. The Windows datasets were collected from audit traces of memories, processors, networks, processes and hard disks. The datasets would be used to evaluate various AI-based cyber security solutions, including intrusion detection, threat intelligence and hunting, privacy preservation and digital forensics. This is because the datasets have a wide range of recent normal and attack features and observations, as well as authentic ground truth events. The datasets can be publicly accessed from this link [1].

Cross-site scripting (XSS) is an often-occurring major attack that developers should consider when developing web applications. We develop a system that can provide practical exercises for learning how to create web applications that are secure against XSS. Our system utilizes free software and virtual machines, allowing low-cost, safe, and practical exercises. By using two virtual machines as the web server and the attacker host, the learner can conduct exercises demonstrating both XSS countermeasures and XSS attacks. In our system, learners use a web browser to learn and perform exercises related to XSS. Experimental evaluations confirm that the proposed system can support learning of XSS countermeasures.

Security of VMs is now becoming a hot topic due to their outsourcing in cloud computing paradigm. All VMs present on the network are connected to each other, making exploited VMs danger to other VMs. and threats to organization. Rejuvenation of virtualization brought the emergence of hyper-visor based security services like VMI (Virtual machine introspection). As there is a greater chance for any intrusion detection system running on the same system, of being dis-abled by the malware or attacker. Monitoring of VMs using VMI, is one of the most researched and accepted technique, that is used to ensure computer systems security mostly in the paradigm of cloud computing. This thesis presents a work that is to integrate LibVMI with Volatility on a KVM, a Linux based hypervisor, to introspect memory of VMs. Both of these tools are used to monitor the state of live VMs. VMI capability of monitoring VMs is combined with the malware analysis and virtual honeypots to achieve the objective of this project. A testing environment is deployed, where a network of VMs is used to be introspected using Volatility plug-ins. Time execution of each plug-in executed on live VMs is calculated to observe the performance of Volatility plug-ins. All these VMs are deployed as Virtual Honeypots having honey-pots configured on them, which is used as a detection mechanism to trigger alerts when some malware attack the VMs. Using STIX (Structure Threat Information Expression), extracted IOCs are converted into the understandable, flexible, structured and shareable format.

Cloud Management Platforms (CMP) have been developed in recent years to set up cloud computing architecture. Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) is a cloud-delivered model designed by the provider to gather a set of IT resources which are furnished as services for user Virtual Machine Image (VMI) provisioning and management. Openstack is one of the most useful CMP which has been developed for industry and academic researches to simulate IaaS classical processes such as launch and store user VMI instance. In this paper, the main purpose is to adopt a security policy for a secure launch user VMI across a trust cloud environment founded on a combination of enhanced TPM remote attestation and cryptographic techniques to ensure confidentiality and integrity of user VMI requirements.

Recent studies have shown that co-resident attacks have aroused great security threat in cloud. Since hardware is shared among different tenants, malicious tenants can launch various co-resident attacks, such as side channel attacks, covert channel attacks and resource interference attacks. Existing countermeasures have their limitations and can not provide comprehensive defense against co-resident attacks. This paper combines the advantages of various countermeasures and proposes a complete co-resident threat defense solution which consists of co-resident-resistant VM allocation (CRRVA), analytic hierarchy process-based threat score mechanism (AHPTSM) and attack-aware VM reallocation (AAVR). CRRVA securely allocates VMs and also takes load balance and power consumption into consideration to make the allocation policy more practical. According to the intrinsic characteristics of co-resident attacks, AHPTSM evaluates VM's threat score which denotes the probability that a VM is suffering or conducting co-resident attacks based on analytic hierarchy process. And AAVR further migrates VMs with extremely high threat scores and separates VM pairs which are likely to be malicious to each other. Extensive experiments in CloudSim have shown that CRRVA can greatly reduce the allocation co-resident threat as well as balancing the load for both CSPs and tenants with little impact on power consumption. In addition, guided by threat score distribution, AAVR can effectively guarantee runtime co-resident security by migrating high threat score VMs with less migration cost.

In Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds, there exist many virtual machines (VMs) that are not used for a long time. For such VMs, many vulnerabilities are often found in installed software while VMs are suspended. If security updates are applied to such VMs after the VMs are resumed, the VMs easily suffer from attacks via the Internet. To solve this problem, offline update of VMs has been proposed, but some approaches have to permit cloud administrators to resume users' VMs. The others are applicable only to completely stopped VMs and often corrupt virtual disks if they are applied to suspended VMs. In addition, it is sometimes difficult to accurately emulate security updates offline. In this paper, we propose OUassister, which enables consistent offline update of suspended VMs. OUassister emulates security updates of VMs offline in a non-intrusive manner and applies the emulation results to the VMs online. This separation prevents virtual disks of even suspended VMs from being corrupted. For more accurate emulation of security updates, OUassister provides an emulation environment using a technique called VM introspection. Using this environment, it automatically extracts updated files and executed scripts. We have implemented OUassister in Xen and confirmed that the time for critical online update was largely reduced.