Biblio

The occurrences of accidents in mining industries owing to the fragile health conditions of mine workers are reportedly increasing. Health conditions measured as heart rate or pulse, glycemic index, and blood pressure are often crucial parameters that lead to failure in proper reasoning when not within acceptable ranges. These parameters, such as heartbeat rate can be measured continuously using sensors. The data can be monitored remotely and, when found to be of concern, can send necessary alarms to the mine manager. The early alarm notification enables the mine manager with better preparedness for managing the reach of first aid to the accident spot and thereby reduce mine fatalities drastically. This paper presents a framework for deterring accidents in mines with the help of the Grey Wolf Optimization approach.

In NATO, an attack on one is an attack on all. In recent years, this tenet has been extended to mean that a cyberattack on one is a cyberattack on all. But does what makes sense in the physical world also make sense if extended into cyberspace? And if there is virtue in collective cyberspace defense, is NATO necessarily the right grouping - in a world where, as far as the United States and the United Kingdom are concerned, more of what constitutes cyber defense circulates within the Five Eyes coalition rather than within NATO? To explore these issues, this essay moots the creation of a Baltic-area cyberspace alliance, considers what it would do, assesses its costs and benefits for its members, and concludes by considering whether such an alliance would be also be in the interest of the U.S. Keys to this discussion are (1) the distinction between what constitutes an “attack” in a medium where occupation may result and actions in media where occupation is (currently) meaningless and effects almost always reversible, (2) what collective defense should mean in cyberspace - and where responsibilities may be best discharged within the mix of hardness, pre-emption, and deterrence that constitute defense, (3) the relationship between cyberspace defense and information warfare defense, and (4) the relevance to alliance formation of the fact that while war is dull, dirty, and dangerous, cyber war is none of these three.

Witnessing the increasingly pervasive deployment of security video surveillance systems(VSS), more and more individuals have become concerned with the issues of privacy violations. While the majority of the public have a favorable view of surveillance in terms of crime deterrence, individuals do not accept the invasive monitoring of their private life. To date, however, there is not a lightweight and secure privacy-preserving solution for video surveillance systems. The recent success of blockchain (BC) technologies and their applications in the Internet of Things (IoT) shed a light on this challenging issue. In this paper, we propose a Lightweight, Blockchain-based Privacy protection (Lib-Pri) scheme for surveillance cameras at the edge. It enables the VSS to perform surveillance without compromising the privacy of people captured in the videos. The Lib-Pri system transforms the deployed VSS into a system that functions as a federated blockchain network capable of carrying out integrity checking, blurring keys management, feature sharing, and video access sanctioning. The policy-based enforcement of privacy measures is carried out at the edge devices for real-time video analytics without cluttering the network.

Federated learning (shorted as FL) recently proposed by Google is a privacy-preserving method to integrate distributed data trainers. FL is extremely useful due to its ensuring privacy, lower latency, less power consumption and smarter models, but it could fail if multiple trainers abort training or send malformed messages to its partners. Such misbehavior are not auditable and parameter server may compute incorrectly due to single point failure. Furthermore, FL has no incentive to attract sufficient distributed training data and computation power. In this paper, we propose FLChain to build a decentralized, public auditable and healthy FL ecosystem with trust and incentive. FLChain replace traditional FL parameter server whose computation result must be consensual on-chain. Our work is not trivial when it is vital and hard to provide enough incentive and deterrence to distributed trainers. We achieve model commercialization by providing a healthy marketplace for collaborative-training models. Honest trainer can gain fairly partitioned profit from well-trained model according to its contribution and the malicious can be timely detected and heavily punished. To reduce the time cost of misbehavior detecting and model query, we design DDCBF for accelerating the query of blockchain-documented information. Finally, we implement a prototype of our work and measure the cost of various operations.

Modulation classification is an important component of cognitive self-driving networks. Recently many ML-based modulation classification methods have been proposed. We have evaluated the robustness of 9 ML-based modulation classifiers against the powerful Carlini & Wagner (C-W) attack and showed that the current ML-based modulation classifiers do not provide any deterrence against adversarial ML examples. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to report the results of the application of the C-W attack for creating adversarial examples against various ML models for modulation classification.

Mutual assured destruction is a Cold War era principle of deterrence through causing your enemy to fear that you can destroy them to at least the same extent that they can destroy you. It is based on the threat of retaliation and requires systems that can either be triggered after an enemy attack is launched and before the destructive capability is destroyed or systems that can survive an initial attack and be launched in response. During the Cold War, the weapons of mutual assured destructions were nuclear. However, with the incredible reliance on computers for everything from power generation control to banking to agriculture logistics, a cyber attack mutual assured destruction scenario is plausible. This paper presents this concept and considers the deterrent need, to prevent such a crippling attack from ever being launched, from a system of systems perspective.

Intentional interference presents a major threat to the operation of the Global Navigation Satellite Systems. Adaptive notch filtering provides an excellent countermeasure and deterrence against narrowband interference. This paper presents a comparative performance analysis of two adaptive notch filtering algorithms for GPS specific applications which are based on Direct form Second Order and Lattice-Based notch filter structures. Performance of each algorithm is evaluated considering the ratio of jamming to noise density against the effective signal to noise ratio at the output of the correlator. A fully adaptive lattice notch filter is proposed, which is able to simultaneously adapt its coefficients to alter the notch frequency along with the bandwidth of the notch filter. The filter demonstrated a superior tracking performance and convergence rate in comparison to an existing algorithm taken from the literature. Moreover, this paper describes the complete GPS modelling platform implemented in Simulink too.

The unprecedented transparency shown by the Netherlands intelligence services in exposing Russian GRU officers in October 2018 is indicative of a number of new trends in state handling of cyber conflict. US public indictments of foreign state intelligence officials, and the UK's deliberate provision of information allowing the global media to “dox” GRU officers implicated in the Salisbury poison attack in early 2018, set a precedent for revealing information that previously would have been confidential. This is a major departure from previous practice where the details of state-sponsored cyber attacks would only be discovered through lengthy investigative journalism (as with Stuxnet) or through the efforts of cybersecurity corporations (as with Red October). This paper uses case studies to illustrate the nature of this departure and consider its impact, including potentially substantial implications for state handling of cyber conflict. The paper examines these implications, including: · The effect of transparency on perception of conflict. Greater public knowledge of attacks will lead to greater public acceptance that countermeasures should be taken. This may extend to public preparedness to accept that a state of declared or undeclared war exists with a cyber aggressor. · The resulting effect on legality. This adds a new element to the long-running debates on the legality of cyber attacks or counter-attacks, by affecting the point at which a state of conflict is politically and socially, even if not legally, judged to exist. · The further resulting effect on permissions and authorities to conduct cyber attacks, in the form of adjustment to the glaring imbalance between the means and methods available to aggressors (especially those who believe themselves already to be in conflict) and defenders. Greater openness has already intensified public and political questioning of the restraint shown by NATO and EU nations in responding to Russian actions; this trend will continue. · Consequences for deterrence, both specifically within cyber conflict and also more broadly deterring hostile actions. In sum, the paper brings together the direct and immediate policy implications, for a range of nations and for NATO, of the new apparent policy of transparency.

The reliability of nuclear command, control and communications has long been identified as a critical component of the strategic stability among nuclear states. Advances in offensive cyber weaponry have the potential to negatively impact this reliability, threatening strategic stability. In this paper we present a game theoretic model of preemptive cyber attacks against nuclear command, control and communications. The model is a modification of the classic two-player game of Chicken, a standard game theoretic model for nuclear brinksmanship. We fully characterize equilibria in both the complete information game and two distinct two-sided incomplete information games. We show that when both players have advanced cyber capabilities conflict is more likely in equilibrium, regardless of information structure. On the other hand, when at most one player has advanced cyber capabilities, strategic stability depends on the information structure. Under complete information, asymmetric cyber capabilities have a stabilizing effect in which the player with strong cyber has the resolve to stand firm in equilibrium. Under incomplete information, asymmetric cyber capabilities can have both stabilizing and destabilizing effects depending on prior beliefs over opponent cyber capabilities.

This paper addresses the recent shift in the United States' policy that emphasizes forward defense and deterrence and to “intercept and halt” adversary cyber operations. Supporters believe these actions should significantly reduce attacks against the United States, while critics worry that they may incite more adversary activity. As there is no standard methodology to measure which is the case, this paper introduces a transparent framework to better assess whether the new U.S. policy and actions are suppressing or encouraging attacks1. Determining correlation and causation will be difficult due to the hidden nature of cyber attacks, the veiled motivations of differing actors, and other factors. However even if causation may never be clear, changes in the direction and magnitude of cyber attacks can be suggestive of the success or failure of these new policies, especially as their proponents suggest they should be especially effective. Rough-and-ready metrics can be helpful to assess the impacts of policymaking, can lay the groundwork for more comprehensive measurements, and may also provide insight into academic theories of persistent engagement and deterrence.

Information Technology (IT) security is a growing concern for governments around the world. Cyber terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the nations' critical infrastructures and ITs as a low-cost asymmetric warfare element. Most of these nations are aware of the vulnerability of the information technologies and the significance of protecting critical infrastructures. To counteract the threat of potentially disastrous cyber attacks, nations' policy makers are increasingly pondering on the use of deterrence strategies to supplement cyber defense. Nations create their own national policies and strategies which cover cyber security countermeasures including cyber defense and deterrence against cyber threats. But it is rather hard to cope with the threat by means of merely `national' cyber defense policies and strategies, since the cyberspace spans worldwide and attack's origin can even be overseas. The term “cyber terrorism” is another source of controversy. An agreement on a common definition of cyber terrorism among the nations is needed. However, the international community has not been able to succeed in developing a commonly accepted comprehensive definition of “terrorism” itself. This paper evaluates the importance of building international cooperation on cyber defense and deterrence against cyber terrorism. It aims to improve and further existing contents and definitions of cyber terrorism; discusses the attractiveness of cyber attacks for terrorists and past experiences on cyber terrorism. It emphasizes establishing international legal measures and cooperation between nations against cyber terrorism in order to maintain the international stability and prosperity. In accordance with NATO's new strategic concept, it focuses on developing the member nations' ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber attacks to enhance and coordinate national cyber defense capabilities. It provides necessary steps that have to be taken globally in order to counter cyber terrorism.

This study looks at the question of how to reduce/eliminate employee Internet Abuse. Companies have used acceptable use policies (AUP) and technology in an attempt to mitigate employees' personal use of company resources. Research shows that AUPs do not do a good job at this but that technology does. Research also shows that while technology can be used to greatly restrict personal use of the internet in the workplace, employee satisfaction with the workplace suffers when this is done. In this research experiment we used technology not to restrict employee use of company resources for personal use, but to make the employees more aware of the current Acceptable Use Policy, and measured the decrease in employee internet abuse. The results show that this method can result in a drop from 27 to 21 percent personal use of the company networks.

The installation of a protection system can provide protection by either deterring or stopping an attacker. Both modes of effectiveness-deterring and stopping-are uncertain. Some have guessed that deterrence plays a much bigger role than stopping force. The force of deterrence should therefore be of considerable interest, especially if its effect could be estimated and incorporated into a larger risk analysis and business case for developing and buying new systems, but nowhere has it been estimated quantitatively. The effect of one type of deterrence, namely, influencing an attacker's choice of targets-or target shifting, biasing an attacker away from some targets toward others-is assessed quantitatively here using a game-theoretic approach. It is shown that its positive effects are significant. It features as a force multiplier on the order of magnitude or more, even for low-performance security countermeasures whose effectiveness may be compromised somewhat, of necessity, in order to keep the number of false alarms serviceably low. The analysis furthermore implies that there are certain minimum levels of stopping performance that a protection should provide in order to avoid attracting the choice of attackers (under deterrence). Nothing in the analysis argues for complacency in security. Developers must still design the best affordable systems. The analysis enters into the middle ground of security, between no protection and impossibly perfect protection. It counters the criticisms that some raise about lower-level, affordable, sustainable measures that security providers naturally gravitate toward. Although these measures might in some places be defeated in ways that a non-expert can imagine, the measures are not for that reason irresponsible or to be dismissed. Their effectiveness can be much greater than they first appear.

Protecting critical infrastructure from cyberattacks by other nations is a matter of considerable concern. Can deterrence play a role in such protection? Can lessons from nuclear deterrence-the most elaborated and successful version of deterrence-be adapted to the cyber case? Currently, little overlap exists between the two, although that might change in the aftermath of an extensive, destructive cyberattack. The most effective way to protect the cyber-dependent infrastructure is a comprehensive defense (deterrence by denial), which was impractical in the nuclear regime. However, this approach presents challenges. Existing legal norms, particularly those related to controlling collateral damage, might provide some deterrence. Another option might be a new international agreement, but that would involve several difficult issues.

The question of whether strategic deterrence in cyberspace is achievable given the challenges of detection, attribution and credible retaliation is a topic of contention among military and civilian defense strategists. This paper examines the traditional strategic deterrence theory and its application to deterrence in cyberspace (the newly defined 5th battlespace domain, following land, air, sea and space domains), which is being used increasingly by nation-states and their proxies to achieve information dominance and to gain tactical and strategic economic and military advantage. It presents a taxonomy of cyberattacks that identifies which types of threats in the confidentiality, integrity, availability cybersecurity model triad present the greatest risk to nation-state economic and military security, including their political and social facets. The argument is presented that attacks on confidentiality cannot be subject to deterrence in the current international legal framework and that the focus of strategy needs to be applied to integrity and availability attacks. A potential cyberdeterrence strategy is put forth that can enhance national security against devastating cyberattacks through a credible declaratory retaliation capability that establishes red lines which may trigger a counter-strike against all identifiable responsible parties. The author believes such strategy can credibly influence nation-state threat actors who themselves exhibit serious vulnerabilities to cyber attacks from launching a devastating cyber first strike.

The advent of the cyber domain has introduced a new dimension into warfare and complicated existing strategic concepts, provoking divergent responses within different national contexts and strategic cultures. Although current theories regarding cyber deterrence remain relatively nascent, a comparison of U.S. and Chinese strategic thinking highlights notable asymmetries between their respective approaches. While U.S. debates on cyber deterrence have primarily focused on the deterrence of cyber threats, Chinese theorists have also emphasized the potential importance of cyber capabilities to enhance strategic deterrence. Whereas the U.S. government has maintained a consistent declaratory policy for response, Beijing has yet to progress toward transparency regarding its cyber strategy or capabilities. However, certain PLA strategists, informed by a conceptualization of deterrence as integrated with warfighting, have advocated for the actualization of deterrence through engaging in cyber attacks. Regardless of whether these major cyber powers' evolving strategic thinking on cyber deterrence will prove logically consistent or feasibly operational, their respective perspectives will certainly shape their attempts to achieve cyber deterrence. Ultimately, cyber deterrence may continue to be "what states make of it," given conditions of "cyber anarchy" and prevailing uncertainties regarding cyber conflict. Looking forward, future strategic stability in Sino-U.S. cyber interactions will require mitigation of the misperceptions and heightened risks of escalation that could be exacerbated by these divergent strategic approaches.

Cyber-has often been considered as a coordination and control, as opposed to collaborative influence, media. This conceptual-design paper, uniquely, builds upon a number of entangled, cross disciplinary research strands – integrating engineering and conflict studies – and a detailed literature review to propose a new paradigm of assurance and deterrence models. We consider an ontology for Cyber-sûréte, which combines both the social trusts necessary for [knowledge &, information] assurance such as collaboration by social influence (CSI) and the technological controls and rules for secure information management referred as coordination by rule and control (CRC). We posit Cyber-sûréte as enabling both a 'safe-to-fail' ecology (in which learning, testing and adaptation can take place) within a fail-safe supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA type) system, e.g. in a nuclear power plant. Building upon traditional state-based threat analysis, we consider Warning Time and the Threat equation with relation to policies for managing Cyber-Deterrence. We examine how the goods of Cyber-might be galvanised so as to encourage virtuous behaviour and deter and / or dissuade ne'er-do-wells through multiple transparencies. We consider how the Deterrence-escalator may be managed by identifying both weak influence and strong control signals so as to create a more benign and responsive cyber-ecology, in which strengths can be exploited and weaknesses identified. Finally, we consider declaratory / mutual transparencies as opposed to legalistic / controlled transparency.

Deterrence is badly needed in the cyber domain but it is hard to be achieved. Why is conventional deterrence not working effectively in the cyber domain? What specific characteristics should be considered when deterrence strategies are developed in this man-made domain? These are the questions that this paper intends to address. The research conducted helps to reveal what cyber deterrence can do and what it cannot do so that focus can be put on the enhancement of what it can do. To include varied perspectives, literature review is conducted. Some research works are specifically examined. Based on these studies, this research proposes a holistic approach in cyber deterrence that is empowered by artificial intelligence and machine learning. This approach is capable of making sudden, dynamic, stealthy, and random changes initiated by different contexts. It is able to catch attackers by surprise. The surprising and changing impact inflicts a cost on attackers and makes them to re-calculate the benefits that they might gain through further attacks, thus discouraging or defeating adversaries both mentally and virtually, and eventually controlling escalation of cyber conflicts.

Computer crime is a topic prevalent in both the research literature and in industry, due to a number of recent high-profile cyber attacks on e-commerce organizations. While technical means for defending against internal and external hackers have been discussed at great length, researchers have shown a distinct preference towards understanding deterrence of the internal threat and have paid little attention to external deterrence. This paper uses the criminological thesis known as Broken Windows Theory to understand how external computer criminals might be deterred from attacking a particular organization. The theory's focus upon disorder as a precursor to crime is discussed, and the notion of decreasing public IS disorder to create the illusion of strong information systems security is examined. A case study of a victim e-commerce organization is reviewed in light of the theory and implications for research and practice are discussed.

What is the role of deterrence in an age where adept hackers can credibly hold strategic assets at risk? Do conventional frameworks of deterrence maintain their applicability and meaning against state actors in cyberspace? Is it possible to demonstrate credibility with either in-domain or cross-domain signaling or is cyberspace fundamentally ill-suited to the application of deterrence frameworks? Building on concepts from both rational deterrence theory and cognitive theories of deterrence this work attempts to leverage relevant examples from both within and beyond cyberspace to examine applicability of deterrence in the digital age and for digital tools in an effort to shift the conversation from Atoms to Bits and Bytes.

The process for determining how to respond to a cyberattack involves evaluating many factors, including some with competing risks. Consequentially, decision makers in the private sector and policymakers in the U.S. government (USG) need a framework in order to make effective response decisions. The authors' research identified two competing risks: 1) the risk of not responding forcefully enough to deter a suspected attacker, and 2) responding in a manner that escalates a situation with an attacker. The authors also identified three primary factors that influence these risks: attribution confidence/time, the scale of the attack, and the relationship with the suspected attacker. This paper provides a framework to help decision makers understand how these factors interact to influence the risks associated with potential response options to cyberattacks. The views expressed do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or the U.S. Government.

HB+ is a lightweight authentication scheme, which is secure against passive attacks if the Learning Parity with Noise Problem (LPN) is hard. However, HB+ is vulnerable to a key-recovery, man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack dubbed GRS. The HB+DB protocol added a distance-bounding dimension to HB+, and was experimentally proven to resist the GRS attack. We exhibit several security flaws in HB+DB. First, we refine the GRS strategy to induce a different key-recovery MiM attack, not deterred by HB+DB's distancebounding. Second, we prove HB+DB impractical as a secure distance-bounding (DB) protocol, as its DB security-levels scale poorly compared to other DB protocols. Third, we refute that HB+DB's security against passive attackers relies on the hardness of LPN; moreover, (erroneously) requiring such hardness lowers HB+DB's efficiency and security. We also propose anew distance-bounding protocol called BLOG. It retains parts of HB+DB, yet BLOG is provably secure and enjoys better (asymptotical) security.

Every 98 seconds an American is sexually assaulted. Our work explores the use of on-body sensors to detect, communicate and prevent sexual assault. We present a stick-on clothing sensor which responds to initial signs of sexual assault such as disrobing to deter sexual abuse. The smart clothing operates in two modes: an active mode for instances when the victim is unconscious, and a passive mode where the victim can self-actuate the safety mechanism. Both modes alert the victim's friends and family, actuate an auditory alarm, activate odor-emitting capsules to create an immediate repulsion effect, and call emergency services. Our design is based on input from sexual assault survivors and college students who evaluated the clothing for aesthetic appeal, functionality, cultural sensitivity and their sense of personal safety. We show the practicality of our unobtrusive design with two user studies to demonstrate that our techno-social approach can help improve user safety and prevent sexual assault.

Recently, both academia and industry have recognized the need for leveraging real-time information for the purposes of specifying, enforcing and maintaining rich and flexible authorization policies. In such a context, security-related properties, a.k.a., attributes, have been recognized as a convenient abstraction for providing a well-defined representation of such information, allowing for them to be created and exchanged by different independently-run organizational domains for authorization purposes. However, attackers may attempt to compromise the way attributes are generated and communicated by recurring to hacking techniques, e.g., forgery, in an effort to bypass authorization policies and their corresponding enforcement mechanisms and gain unintended access to sensitive resources as a result. In this paper, we propose a novel technique that allows for enterprises to pro-actively collect attributes from the different entities involved in the access request process, e.g., users, subjects, protected resources, and running environments. After the collection, we aim to carefully select the attributes that uniquely identify the aforementioned entities, and randomly mutate the original access policies over time by adding additional policy rules constructed from the newly-identified attributes. This way, even when attackers are able to compromise the original attributes, our mutated policies may offer an additional layer of protection to deter ongoing and future attacks. We present the rationale and experimental results supporting our proposal, which provide evidence of its suitability for being deployed in practice.

By migrating their data and operations to the cloud, enterprises are able to gain significant benefits in terms of cost savings, increased availability, agility and productivity. Yet, the shared and on-demand nature of the cloud paradigm introduces a new breed of security threats that generally deter stakeholders from relinquishing control of their critical assets to third-party cloud providers. One way to thwart these threats is to instill suitable access control policies into cloud services that protect these assets. Nevertheless, the dynamic nature of cloud environments calls for policies that are able to incorporate a potentially complex body of contextual knowledge. This complexity is further amplified by the interplay that inevitably occurs between the different policies, as well as by the dynamically-evolving nature of an organisation's business and security needs. We argue that one way to tame this complexity is to devise a generic framework that facilitates the governance of policies. This paper presents a particular aspect of such a framework, namely an approach to determining the repercussions that policy retirement actions have on the overall protection of critical assets in the cloud.