A Cyber-Nuclear Deterrence Game
Title | A Cyber-Nuclear Deterrence Game |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2019 |
Authors | Soper, Braden C. |
Conference Name | 2019 57th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton) |
Keywords | asymmetric cyber capabilities, Bayes methods, complete information game, critical component, cyber capabilities conflict, cyber-nuclear deterrence game, cyberattack, deterrence, game theory, Games, incomplete information games, information structure, nuclear brinksmanship, nuclear command, nuclear states, Nuclear weapons, offensive cyber weaponry, opponent cyber capabilities, preemptive cyber attacks, reliability theory, security of data, Stability analysis, stabilizing destabilizing effects, standard game theoretic model, strategic stability |
Abstract | The reliability of nuclear command, control and communications has long been identified as a critical component of the strategic stability among nuclear states. Advances in offensive cyber weaponry have the potential to negatively impact this reliability, threatening strategic stability. In this paper we present a game theoretic model of preemptive cyber attacks against nuclear command, control and communications. The model is a modification of the classic two-player game of Chicken, a standard game theoretic model for nuclear brinksmanship. We fully characterize equilibria in both the complete information game and two distinct two-sided incomplete information games. We show that when both players have advanced cyber capabilities conflict is more likely in equilibrium, regardless of information structure. On the other hand, when at most one player has advanced cyber capabilities, strategic stability depends on the information structure. Under complete information, asymmetric cyber capabilities have a stabilizing effect in which the player with strong cyber has the resolve to stand firm in equilibrium. Under incomplete information, asymmetric cyber capabilities can have both stabilizing and destabilizing effects depending on prior beliefs over opponent cyber capabilities. |
URL | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8919910 |
DOI | 10.1109/ALLERTON.2019.8919910 |
Citation Key | soper_cyber-nuclear_2019 |
- nuclear brinksmanship
- strategic stability
- standard game theoretic model
- stabilizing destabilizing effects
- Stability analysis
- security of data
- reliability theory
- preemptive cyber attacks
- opponent cyber capabilities
- offensive cyber weaponry
- Nuclear weapons
- nuclear states
- nuclear command
- asymmetric cyber capabilities
- information structure
- incomplete information games
- Games
- game theory
- Deterrence
- cyberattack
- cyber-nuclear deterrence game
- cyber capabilities conflict
- critical component
- complete information game
- Bayes methods