Biblio
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies offer an appealing alternative to Fiat currencies, due to their decentralized and borderless nature. However the decentralized settings make the authentication process more challenging: Standard cryptographic methods often rely on the ability of users to reliably store a (large) secret information. What happens if one user's key is lost or stolen? Blockchain systems lack of fallback mechanisms that allow one to recover from such an event, whereas the traditional banking system has developed and deploys quite effective solutions. In this work, we develop new cryptographic techniques to integrate security policies (developed in the traditional banking domain) in the blockchain settings. We propose a system where a smart contract is given the custody of the user's funds and has the ability to invoke a two-factor authentication (2FA) procedure in case of an exceptional event (e.g., a particularly large transaction or a key recovery request). To enable this, the owner of the account secret-shares the answers of some security questions among a committee of users. When the 2FA mechanism is triggered, the committee members can provide the smart contract with enough information to check whether an attempt was successful, and nothing more. We then design a protocol that securely and efficiently implements such a functionality: The protocol is round-optimal, is robust to the corruption of a subset of committee members, supports low-entropy secrets, and is concretely efficient. As a stepping stone towards the design of this protocol, we introduce a new threshold homomorphic encryption scheme for linear predicates from bilinear maps, which might be of independent interest. To substantiate the practicality of our approach, we implement the above protocol as a smart contract in Ethereum and show that it can be used today as an additional safeguard for suspicious transactions, at minimal added cost. We also implement a second scheme where the smart contract additionally requests a signature from a physical hardware token, whose verification key is registered upfront by the owner of the funds. We show how to integrate the widely used universal two-factor authentication (U2F) tokens in blockchain environments, thus enabling the deployment of our system with available hardware.
Authenticating a person's identity has always been a challenge. While attempts are being made by government agencies to address this challenge, the citizens are being exposed to a new age problem of Identity management. The sharing of photocopies of identity cards in order to prove our identity is a common sight. From score-card to Aadhar-card, the details of our identity has reached many unauthorized hands during the years. In India the identity thefts accounts for 77% [1] of the fraud cases, and the threats are trending. Programs like e-Residency by Estonia[2], Bitnation using Ethereum[3] are being devised for an efficient Identity Management. Even the US Home Land Security is funding a research with an objective of “Design information security and privacy concepts on the Blockchain to support identity management capabilities that increase security and productivity while decreasing costs and security risks for the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE).” [4] This paper will discuss the challenges specific to India around Identity Management, and the possible solution that the Distributed ledger, hashing algorithms and smart contracts can offer. The logic of hashing the personal data, and controlling the distribution of identity using public-private keys with Blockchain technology will be discussed in this paper.
In the dawn of crypto-currencies the most talked currency is Bitcoin. Bitcoin is widely flourished digital currency and an exchange trading commodity implementing peer-to-peer payment network. No central athourity exists in Bitcoin. The users in network or pool of bitcoin need not to use real names, rather they use pseudo names for managing and verifying transactions. Due to the use of pseudo names bitcoin is apprehended to provide anonymity. However, the most transparent payment network is what bitcoin is. Here all the transactions are publicly open. To furnish wholeness and put a stop to double-spending, Blockchain is used, which actually works as a ledger for management of Bitcoins. Blockchain can be misused to monitor flow of bitcoins among multiple transactions. When data from external sources is amalgamated with insinuation acquired from the Blockchain, it may result to reveal user's identity and profile. In this way the activity of user may be traced to an extent to fraud that user. Along with the popularity of Bitcoins the number of adversarial attacks has also gain pace. All these activities are meant to exploit anonymity and privacy in Bitcoin. These acivities result in loss of bitcoins and unlawful profit to attackers. Here in this paper we tried to present analysis of major attacks such as malicious attack, greater than 52% attacks and block withholding attack. Also this paper aims to present analysis and improvements in Bitcoin's anonymity and privacy.
We investigate what we call the "Bitcoin Generator Scam" (BGS), a simple system in which the scammers promise to "generate" new bitcoins using the ones that were sent to them. A typical offer will suggest that, for a small fee, one could receive within minutes twice the amount of bitcoins submitted. BGS is clearly not a very sophisticated attack. The modus operandi is simply to put up some web page on which to find the address to send the money and wait for the payback. The pages are then indexed by search engines, and ready to find for victims looking for free bitcoins. We describe here a generic system to find and analyze scams such as BGS. We have trained a classifier to detect these pages, and we have a crawler searching for instances using a series of search engines. We then monitor the instances that we find to trace payments and bitcoin addresses that are being used over time. Unlike most bitcoin-based scam monitoring systems, we do not rely on analyzing transactions on the blockchain to find scam instances. Instead, we proactively find these instances through the web pages advertising the scam. Thus our system is able to find addresses with very few transactions, or even none at all. Indeed, over half of the addresses that have eventually received funds were detected before receiving any transactions. The data for this paper was collected over four months, from November 2019 to February 2020. We have found more than 1,300 addresses directly associated with the scam, hosted on over 500 domains. Overall, these addresses have received (at least) over 5 million USD to the scam, with an average of 47.3 USD per transaction.
Payment channel networks have been introduced to mitigate the scalability issues inherent to permissionless decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Launched in 2018, the Lightning Network (LN) has been gaining popularity and consists today of more than 5000 nodes and 35000 payment channels that jointly hold 965 bitcoins (9.2M USD as of June 2020). This adoption has motivated research from both academia and industryPayment channels suffer from security vulnerabilities, such as the wormhole attack [39], anonymity issues [38], and scalability limitations related to the upper bound on the number of concurrent payments per channel [28], which have been pointed out by the scientific community but never quantitatively analyzedIn this work, we first analyze the proneness of the LN to the wormhole attack and attacks against anonymity. We observe that an adversary needs to control only 2% of nodes to learn sensitive payment information (e.g., sender, receiver, and amount) or to carry out the wormhole attack. Second, we study the management of concurrent payments in the LN and quantify its negative effect on scalability. We observe that for micropayments, the forwarding capability of up to 50% of channels is restricted to a value smaller than the channel capacity. This phenomenon hinders scalability and opens the door for denial-of-service attacks: we estimate that a network-wide DoS attack costs within 1.6M USD, while isolating the biggest community costs only 238k USDOur findings should prompt the LN community to consider the issues studied in this work when educating users about path selection algorithms, as well as to adopt multi-hop payment protocols that provide stronger security, privacy and scalability guarantees.
Bitcoin is gaining traction as an alternative store of value. Its market capitalization transcends all other cryptocurrencies in the market. But its high monetary value also makes it an attractive target to cyber criminal actors. Hacking campaigns usually target the weakest points in an ecosystem. In Bitcoin, these are currently the exchange platforms. As each exchange breach potentially decreases Bitcoin's market value by billions, it is a threat not only to direct victims, but to everyone owning Bitcoin. Based on an extensive analysis of 36 breaches of Bitcoin exchanges, we show the attack patterns used to exploit Bitcoin exchange platforms using an industry standard for reporting intelligence on cyber security breaches. Based on this we are able to provide an overview of the most common attack vectors, showing that all except three hacks were possible due to relatively lax security. We also show that while the security regimen of Bitcoin exchanges is not on par with other financial service providers, the use of stolen credentials, which does not require any hacking, is decreasing. We also show that the amount of BTC taken during a breach is decreasing, as well as the exchanges that terminate after being breached. With exchanges being targeted by nation-state hacking groups, security needs to be a first concern.
Distributed banking platforms and services forgo centralized banks to process financial transactions. For example, M-Pesa provides distributed banking service in the developing regions so that the people without a bank account can deposit, withdraw, or transfer money. The current distributed banking systems lack the transparency in monitoring and tracking of distributed banking transactions and thus do not support auditing of distributed banking transactions for accountability. To address this issue, this paper proposes a blockchain-based distributed banking (BDB) scheme, which uses blockchain technology to leverage its built-in properties to record and track immutable transactions. BDB supports distributed financial transaction processing but is significantly different from cryptocurrencies in its design properties, simplicity, and computational efficiency. We implement a prototype of BDB using smart contract and conduct experiments to show BDB's effectiveness and performance. We further compare our prototype with the Ethereum cryptocurrency to highlight the fundamental differences and demonstrate the BDB's superior computational efficiency.
Cryptocurrencies are the digital currencies designed to replace the regular cash money while taking place in our daily lives especially for the last couple of years. Mining cryptocurrencies are one of the popular ways to have them and make a profit due to unstable values in the market. This attracts attackers to utilize malware on internet users' computer resources, also known as cryptojacking, to mine cryptocurrencies. Cryptojacking started to be a major issue in the internet world. In this case, we developed MiNo, a web browser add-on application to detect these malicious mining activities running without the user's permission or knowledge. This add-on provides security and efficiency for the computer resources of the internet users. MiNo designed and developed with double-layer protection which makes it ahead of its competitors in the market.
The use of public key cryptosystems ranges from securely encrypting bitcoin transactions and creating digital signatures for non-repudiation. The cryptographic systems security of public key depends on the complexity in solving mathematical problems. Quantum computers pose a threat to the current day algorithms used. This research presents analysis of two Hash-based Signature Schemes (MSS and W-OTS) and provides a comparative analysis of them. The comparisons are based on their efficiency as regards to their key generation, signature generation and verification time. These algorithms are compared with two classical algorithms (RSA and ECDSA) used in bitcoin transaction security. The results as shown in table II indicates that RSA key generation takes 0.2012s, signature generation takes 0.0778s and signature verification is 0.0040s. ECDSA key generation is 0.1378s, signature generation takes 0.0187s, and verification time for the signature is 0.0164s. The W-OTS key generation is 0.002s. To generate a signature in W-OTS, it takes 0.001s and verification time for the signature is 0.0002s. Lastly MSS Key generation, signature generation and verification has high values which are 16.290s, 17.474s, and 13.494s respectively. Based on the results, W-OTS is recommended for bitcoin transaction security because of its efficiency and ability to resist quantum computer attacks on the bitcoin network.
Advertisement sharing in vehicular network through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication is a fascinating in-vehicle service for advertisers and the users due to multiple reasons. It enable advertisers to promote their product or services in the region of their interest. Also the users get to receive more relevant ads. Usually, users tend to contribute in dissemination of ads if their privacy is preserved and if some incentive is provided. Recent researches have focused on enabling both of the parameters for the users by developing fair incentive mechanism which preserves privacy by using Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPoK) (Ming et al., 2019). However, the anonymity provided by ZKPoK can introduce internal attacker scenarios in the network due to which authenticated users can disseminate fake ads in the network without payment. As the existing scheme uses certificate-less cryptography, due to which malicious users cannot be removed from the network. In order to resolve these challenges, we employed conditional anonymity and introduced Monitoring Authority (MA) in the system. In our proposed scheme, the pseudonyms are assigned to the vehicles while their real identities are stored in Certification Authority (CA) in encrypted form. The pseudonyms are updated after a pre-defined time threshold to prevent behavioural privacy leakage. We performed security and performance analysis to show the efficiency of our proposed system.
Internet of Things (IoT) technology is emerging to advance the modern defense and warfare applications because the battlefield things, such as combat equipment, warfighters, and vehicles, can sense and disseminate information from the battlefield to enable real-time decision making on military operations and enhance autonomy in the battlefield. Since this Internet-of-Battlefield Things (IoBT) environment is highly heterogeneous in terms of devices, network standards, platforms, connectivity, and so on, it introduces trust, security, and privacy challenges when battlefield entities exchange information with each other. To address these issues, we propose a Blockchain-empowered auditable platform for IoBT and describe its architectural components, such as battlefield-sensing layer, network layer, and consensus and service layer, in depth. In addition to the proposed layered architecture, this paper also presents several open research challenges involved in each layer to realize the Blockchain-enabled IoBT platform.