Biblio
Machine learning is widely used in security-sensitive settings like spam and malware detection, although it has been shown that malicious data can be carefully modified at test time to evade detection. To overcome this limitation, adversary-aware learning algorithms have been developed, exploiting robust optimization and game-theoretical models to incorporate knowledge of potential adversarial data manipulations into the learning algorithm. Despite these techniques have been shown to be effective in some adversarial learning tasks, their adoption in practice is hindered by different factors, including the difficulty of meeting specific theoretical requirements, the complexity of implementation, and scalability issues, in terms of computational time and space required during training. In this work, we aim to develop secure kernel machines against evasion attacks that are not computationally more demanding than their non-secure counterparts. In particular, leveraging recent work on robustness and regularization, we show that the security of a linear classifier can be drastically improved by selecting a proper regularizer, depending on the kind of evasion attack, as well as unbalancing the cost of classification errors. We then discuss the security of nonlinear kernel machines, and show that a proper choice of the kernel function is crucial. We also show that unbalancing the cost of classification errors and varying some kernel parameters can further improve classifier security, yielding decision functions that better enclose the legitimate data. Our results on spam and PDF malware detection corroborate our analysis.
The secure two-party computation (S2PC) protocols SHADE and GSHADE have been introduced by Bringer et al. in the last two years. The protocol GSHADE permits to compute different distances (Hamming, Euclidean, Mahalanobis) quite efficiently and is one of the most efficient compared to other S2PC methods. Thus this protocol can be used to efficiently compute one-to-many identification for several biometrics data (iris, face, fingerprint). In this paper, we introduce two extensions of GSHADE. The first one enables us to evaluate new multiplicative functions. This way, we show how to apply GSHADE to a classical machine learning algorithm. The second one is a new proposal to secure GSHADE against malicious adversaries following the recent dual execution and cut-and-choose strategies. The additional cost is very small. By preserving the GSHADE's structure, our extensions are very efficient compared to other S2PC methods.
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) techniques have been the subject of increased attention for underwater acoustic communication for its ability to significantly improve the channel capabilities. Recently, an under-ice MIMO acoustic communication experiment was conducted in shallow water which differs from previous works in that the water column was covered by about 40 centimeters thick sea ice. In this experiment, high frequency MIMO signals centered at 10 kHz were transmitted from a two-element source array to a four-element vertical receive array at 1km range. The unique under-ice acoustic propagation environment in shallow water seems naturally separate data streams from different transducers, but there is still co-channel interference. Time reversal followed by a single channel decision feedback equalizer is used in this paper to compensate for the inter-symbol interference and co-channel interference. It is demonstrated that this simple receiver scheme is good enough to realize robust performance using fewer hydrophones (i.e. 2) without the explicit use of complex co-channel interference cancelation algorithms such as parallel interference cancelation or serial interference cancelation. Two channel estimation algorithms based on least square and least mean square are also studied for MIMO communications in this paper and their performance are compared using experimental data.
TLS has the potential to provide strong protection against network-based attackers and mass surveillance, but many implementations take security shortcuts in order to reduce the costs of cryptographic computations and network round trips. We report the results of a nine-week study that measures the use and security impact of these shortcuts for HTTPS sites among Alexa Top Million domains. We find widespread deployment of DHE and ECDHE private value reuse, TLS session resumption, and TLS session tickets. These practices greatly reduce the protection afforded by forward secrecy: connections to 38% of Top Million HTTPS sites are vulnerable to decryption if the server is compromised up to 24 hours later, and 10% up to 30 days later, regardless of the selected cipher suite. We also investigate the practice of TLS secrets and session state being shared across domains, finding that in some cases, the theft of a single secret value can compromise connections to tens of thousands of sites. These results suggest that site operators need to better understand the tradeoffs between optimizing TLS performance and providing strong security, particularly when faced with nation-state attackers with a history of aggressive, large-scale surveillance.