Biblio
In January 2017 encrypted Internet traffic surpassed non-encrypted traffic. Although encryption increases security, it also masks intrusions and attacks by blocking the access to packet contents and traffic features, therefore making data analysis unfeasible. In spite of the strong effect of encryption, its impact has been scarcely investigated in the field. In this paper we study how encryption affects flow feature spaces and machine learning-based attack detection. We propose a new cross-layer feature vector that simultaneously represents traffic at three different levels: application, conversation, and endpoint behavior. We analyze its behavior under TLS and IPSec encryption and evaluate the efficacy with recent network traffic datasets and by using Random Forests classifiers. The cross-layer multi-key approach shows excellent attack detection in spite of TLS encryption. When IPsec is applied, the reduced variant obtains satisfactory detection for botnets, yet considerable performance drops for other types of attacks. The high complexity of network traffic is unfeasible for monolithic data analysis solutions, therefore requiring cross-layer analysis for which the multi-key vector becomes a powerful profiling core.
In the Internet of Things (IoT), it is feasible to interconnect networks of different devices and all these different devices, such as smartphones, sensor devices, and vehicles, are controlled according to a particular user. These different devices are delivered and accept the information on the network. This thing is to motivate us to do work on IoT and the devices used are sensor nodes. The validation of data delivery completely depends on the checks of count data forwarding in each node. In this research, we propose the Link Hop Value-based Intrusion Detection System (L-IDS) against the blackhole attack in the IoT with the assist of WSN. The sensor nodes are connected to other nodes through the wireless link and exchange data routing, as well as data packets. The LHV value is identified as the attacker's presence by integrating the data delivery in each hop. The LHV is always equivalent to the Actual Value (AV). The RPL routing protocol is used IPv6 to address the concept of routing. The Routing procedure is interrupted by an attacker by creating routing loops. The performance of the proposed L-IDS is compared to the RPL routing security scheme based on existing trust. The proposed L-IDS procedure is validating the presence of the attacker at every source to destination data delivery. and also disables the presence of the attacker in the network. Network performance provides better results in the existence of a security scheme and also fully represents the inoperative presence of black hole attackers in the network. Performance metrics show better results in the presence of expected IDS and improve network reliability.
Network adversaries, such as malicious transit autonomous systems (ASes), have been shown to be capable of partitioning the Bitcoin's peer-to-peer network via routing-level attacks; e.g., a network adversary exploits a BGP vulnerability and performs a prefix hijacking attack (viz. Apostolaki et al. [3]). Due to the nature of BGP operation, such a hijacking is globally observable and thus enables immediate detection of the attack and the identification of the perpetrator. In this paper, we present a stealthier attack, which we call the EREBUS attack, that partitions the Bitcoin network without any routing manipulations, which makes the attack undetectable to control-plane and even to data-plane detectors. The novel aspect of EREBUS is that it makes the adversary AS a natural man-in-the-middle network of all the peer connections of one or more targeted Bitcoin nodes by patiently influencing the targeted nodes' peering decision. We show that affecting the peering decision of a Bitcoin node, which is believed to be infeasible after a series of bug patches against the earlier Eclipse attack [29], is possible for the network adversary that can use abundant network address resources (e.g., spoofing millions of IP addresses in many other ASes) reliably for an extended period of time at a negligible cost. The EREBUS attack is readily available for large ASes, such as Tier-1 and large Tier-2 ASes, against the vast majority of 10K public Bitcoin nodes with only about 520 bit/s of attack traffic rate per targeted Bitcoin node and a modest (e.g., 5-6 weeks) attack execution period. The EREBUS attack can be mounted by nation-state adversaries who would be willing to execute sophisticated attack strategies patiently to compromise cryptocurrencies (e.g., control the consensus, take down a cryptocurrency, censor transactions). As the attack exploits the topological advantage of being a network adversary but not the specific vulnerabilities of Bitcoin core, no quick patches seem to be available. We discuss that some naive solutions (e.g., whitelisting, rate-limiting) are ineffective and third-party proxy solutions may worsen the Bitcoin's centralization problem. We provide some suggested modifications to the Bitcoin core and show that they effectively make the EREBUS attack significantly harder; yet, their non-trivial changes to the Bitcoin's network operation (e.g., peering dynamics, propagation delays) should be examined thoroughly before their wide deployment.