Biblio
This work seeks to advance the state of the art in HPC I/O performance analysis and interpretation. In particular, we demonstrate effective techniques to: (1) model output performance in the presence of I/O interference from production loads; (2) build features from write patterns and key parameters of the system architecture and configurations; (3) employ suitable machine learning algorithms to improve model accuracy. We train models with five popular regression algorithms and conduct experiments on two distinct production HPC platforms. We find that the lasso and random forest models predict output performance with high accuracy on both of the target systems. We also explore use of the models to guide adaptation in I/O middleware systems, and show potential for improvements of at least 15% from model-guided adaptation on 70% of samples, and improvements up to 10 x on some samples for both of the target systems.
Controller area network is the serial communication protocol, which broadcasts the message on the CAN bus. The transmitted message is read by all the nodes which shares the CAN bus. The message can be eavesdropped and can be re-used by some other node by changing the information or send it by duplicate times. The message reused after some delay is replay attack. In this paper, the CAN network with three CAN nodes is implemented using the universal verification components and the replay attack is demonstrated by creating the faulty node. Two types of replay attack are implemented in this paper, one is to replay the entire message and the other one is to replay only the part of the frame. The faulty node uses the first replay attack method where it behaves like the other node in the network by duplicating the identifier. CAN frame except the identifier is reused in the second method which is hard to detect the attack as the faulty node uses its own identifier and duplicates only the data in the CAN frame.
Commodity I/O hardware often fails to separate I/O transfers of isolated OS and applications code. Even when using the best I/O hardware, commodity systems sometimes trade off separation assurance for increased performance. Remarkably, device firmware need not be malicious. Instead, any malicious driver, even if isolated in its own execution domain, can manipulate its device to breach I/O separation. To prevent such vulnerabilities with high assurance, a formal I/O separation model and its use in automatic generation of secure I/O kernel code is necessary.This paper presents a formal I/O separation model, which defines a separation policy based on authorization of I/O transfers and is hardware agnostic. The model, its refinement, and instantiation in the Wimpy kernel design, are formally specified and verified in Dafny. We then specify the kernel implementation and automatically generate verified-correct assembly code that enforces the I/O separation policies. Our formal modeling enables the discovery of heretofore unknown design and implementation vulnerabilities of the original Wimpy kernel. Finally, we outline how the model can be applied to other I/O kernels and conclude with the key lessons learned.