Visible to the public Regaining Insight and Control on SMGW-based Secure Communication in Smart Grids

TitleRegaining Insight and Control on SMGW-based Secure Communication in Smart Grids
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsHiller, Jens, Komanns, Karsten, Dahlmanns, Markus, Wehrle, Klaus
Conference Name2019 AEIT International Annual Conference (AEIT)
Date Publishedsep
Keywordscase-specific security settings, communication protection, communication security, communication security control, critical smart grid infrastructure, data protection, Internet of Things, internetworking, Logic gates, Metrics, network servers, performance evaluation, policy language, power engineering computing, power system security, privacy, proxy, pubcrawl, Receivers, Resiliency, Scalability, security, Smart grid, smart grid security, Smart grids, smart meter gateway, smart meter gateways, smart meters, smart power grids, SMGW-based secure communication control, telecommunication security, TLS
AbstractSmart Grids require extensive communication to enable safe and stable energy supply in the age of decentralized and dynamic energy production and consumption. To protect the communication in this critical infrastructure, public authorities mandate smart meter gateways (SMGWs) to be in control of the communication security. To this end, the SMGW intercepts all inbound and outbound communication of its premise, e.g., a factory or smart home, and forwards it on secure channels that the SMGW established itself. However, using the SMGW as proxy, local devices can neither review the security of these remote connections established by the SMGW nor enforce higher security guarantees than established by the all in one configuration of the SMGW which does not allow for use case-specific security settings. We present mechanisms that enable local devices to regain this insight and control over the full connection, i.e., up to the final receiver, while retaining the SMGW's ability to ensure a suitable security level. Our evaluation shows modest computation and transmission overheads for this increased security in the critical smart grid infrastructure.
DOI10.23919/AEIT.2019.8893406
Citation Keyhiller_regaining_2019