Secure Memory for Embedded Tamper-Proof Systems

Data leakage and disclosure to attackers is a significant problem in embedded systems, considering the ability of attackers to get physical access to the systems. We present methods to protect memory data leakage in tamper-proof embedded systems. We present methods that exploit memory supply voltage manipulation to change the memory contents, leading to an operational and reusable memory or to destroy memory cell circuitry. For the case of memory data change, we present scenaria for data change to a known state and to a random state. The data change scenaria are effective against attackers who cannot detect the existence of the protection circuitry; furthermore, original data can be calculated in the case of data change to a known state, if the attacker identifies the protection circuitry and its operation. The methods that change memory contents to a random state or destroy memory cell circuitry lead to irreversible loss of the original data. However, since the known state can be used to calculate the original data.