| Title | SigAttack: New High-level SAT-based Attack on Logic Encryptions |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2019 |
| Authors | Shen, Yuanqi, Li, You, Kong, Shuyu, Rezaei, Amin, Zhou, Hai |
| Conference Name | 2019 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE) |
| Date Published | mar |
| Keywords | attacks, Complexity theory, cryptography, DIP-generation attack, distinguishing input pattern generation, Electronics packaging, Error analysis, Hardware, hardware protection technique, high-level SAT-based attack, Human Behavior, key-revealing signature, logic design, logic encryption design, Logic gates, pattern locks, piracy, pubcrawl, Resiliency, SAT-resilient encryptions, Scalability, SigAttack |
| Abstract | Logic encryption is a powerful hardware protection technique that uses extra key inputs to lock a circuit from piracy or unauthorized use. The recent discovery of the SAT-based attack with Distinguishing Input Pattern (DIP) generation has rendered all traditional logic encryptions vulnerable, and thus the creation of new encryption methods. However, a critical question for any new encryption method is whether security against the DIP-generation attack means security against all other attacks. In this paper, a new high-level SAT-based attack called SigAttack has been discovered and thoroughly investigated. It is based on extracting a key-revealing signature in the encryption. A majority of all known SAT-resilient encryptions are shown to be vulnerable to SigAttack. By formulating the condition under which SigAttack is effective, the paper also provides guidance for the future logic encryption design. |
| DOI | 10.23919/DATE.2019.8714924 |
| Citation Key | shen_sigattack_2019 |
SigAttack: New High-level SAT-based Attack on Logic Encryptions