| Title | Foiling Sybils with HAPS in Permissionless Systems: An Address-based Peer Sampling Service |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2020 |
| Authors | Pilet, A. B., Frey, D., Taïani, F. |
| Conference Name | 2020 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC) |
| Date Published | jul |
| Keywords | address-based peer sampling service, Blockchain mechanisms, Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols, Byzantine-tolerant peer-sampling service, composability, cryptocurrencies, decentralized systems, Distributed databases, distributed ledgers, epidemic protocols, fault tolerant computing, HAPS, malicious attacks, Metrics, open systems, Peer-to-peer computing, perfect peer-sampling service, permissionless systems, Probabilistic logic, proof-of-stake, proof-of-work, Protocols, pubcrawl, Resiliency, Resistance, Standards, sybil attacks, Sybils, Topology, Weight measurement |
| Abstract | Blockchains and distributed ledgers have brought renewed interest in Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols and decentralized systems, two domains studied for several decades. Recent promising works have in particular proposed to use epidemic protocols to overcome the limitations of popular Blockchain mechanisms, such as proof-of-stake or proof-of-work. These works unfortunately assume a perfect peer-sampling service, immune to malicious attacks, a property that is difficult and costly to achieve. We revisit this fundamental problem in this paper, and propose a novel Byzantine-tolerant peer-sampling service that is resilient to Sybil attacks in open systems by exploiting the underlying structure of wide-area networks. |
| DOI | 10.1109/ISCC50000.2020.9219606 |
| Citation Key | pilet_foiling_2020 |
Foiling Sybils with HAPS in Permissionless Systems: An Address-based Peer Sampling Service