Visible to the public Detecting Filter List Evasion with Event-Loop-Turn Granularity JavaScript Signatures

TitleDetecting Filter List Evasion with Event-Loop-Turn Granularity JavaScript Signatures
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2021
AuthorsChen, Quan, Snyder, Peter, Livshits, Ben, Kapravelos, Alexandros
Conference Name2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Date PublishedMay 2021
PublisherIEEE
ISBN Number978-1-7281-8934-5
KeywordsBuildings, Current measurement, Instruments, privacy, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Runtime, Scalability, signature based defense, Uniform resource locators, Virtual assistants
Abstract

Content blocking is an important part of a per-formant, user-serving, privacy respecting web. Current content blockers work by building trust labels over URLs. While useful, this approach has many well understood shortcomings. Attackers may avoid detection by changing URLs or domains, bundling unwanted code with benign code, or inlining code in pages.The common flaw in existing approaches is that they evaluate code based on its delivery mechanism, not its behavior. In this work we address this problem by building a system for generating signatures of the privacy-and-security relevant behavior of executed JavaScript. Our system uses as the unit of analysis each script's behavior during each turn on the JavaScript event loop. Focusing on event loop turns allows us to build highly identifying signatures for JavaScript code that are robust against code obfuscation, code bundling, URL modification, and other common evasions, as well as handle unique aspects of web applications.This work makes the following contributions to the problem of measuring and improving content blocking on the web: First, we design and implement a novel system to build per-event-loop-turn signatures of JavaScript behavior through deep instrumentation of the Blink and V8 runtimes. Second, we apply these signatures to measure how much privacy-and-security harming code is missed by current content blockers, by using EasyList and EasyPrivacy as ground truth and finding scripts that have the same privacy and security harming patterns. We build 1,995,444 signatures of privacy-and-security relevant behaviors from 11,212 unique scripts blocked by filter lists, and find 3,589 unique scripts hosting known harmful code, but missed by filter lists, affecting 12.48% of websites measured. Third, we provide a taxonomy of ways scripts avoid detection and quantify the occurrence of each. Finally, we present defenses against these evasions, in the form of filter list additions where possible, and through a proposed, signature based system in other cases.As part of this work, we share the implementation of our signature-generation system, the data gathered by applying that system to the Alexa 100K, and 586 AdBlock Plus compatible filter list rules to block instances of currently blocked code being moved to new URLs.

URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9519497
DOI10.1109/SP40001.2021.00007
Citation Keychen_detecting_2021