Biblio
Along with technological developments in the mobile environment, mobile devices are used in many areas like banking, social media and communication. The common characteristic of applications in these fields is that they contain personal or financial information of users. These types of applications are developed for Android or IOS operating systems and have become the target of attackers. To detect weakness, security analysts, perform mobile penetration tests using security analysis tools. These analysis tools have advantages and disadvantages to each other. Some tools can prioritize static or dynamic analysis, others not including these types of tests. Within the scope of the current model, we are aim to gather security analysis tools under the penetration testing framework, also contributing analysis results by data fusion algorithm. With the suggested model, security analysts will be able to use these types of analysis tools in addition to using the advantage of fusion algorithms fed by analysis tools outputs.
Mobile security remains a concern for multiple stakeholders. Safe user behavior is crucial key to avoid and mitigate mobile threats. The research used a survey design to capture key constructs of mobile user threat avoidance behavior. Analysis revealed that there is no significant difference between the two key drivers of secure behavior, threat appraisal and coping appraisal, for Android and iOS users. However, statistically significant differences in avoidance motivation and avoidance behavior of users of the two operating systems were displayed. This indicates that existing threat avoidance models may be insufficient to comprehensively deal with factors that affect mobile user behavior. A newly introduced variable, perceived security, shows a difference in the perceptions of their level of protection among the users of the two operating systems, providing a new direction for research into mobile security.
The Android application market will conduct various security analysis on each application to predict its potential harm before put it online. Since almost all the static analysis tools can only detect malicious behaviors in the Java layer, more and more malwares try to avoid static analysis by taking the malicious codes to the Native layer. To provide a solution for the above situation, there's a new research aspect proposed in this paper and defined as Inter-language Static Analysis. As all the involved technologies are introduced, the current research results of them will be captured in this paper, such as static analysis in Java layer, binary analysis in Native layer, Java-Native penetration technology, etc.
The rapid development of mobile networks has revolutionized the way of accessing the Internet. The exponential growth of mobile subscribers, devices and various applications frequently brings about excessive traffic in mobile networks. The demand for higher data rates, lower latency and seamless handover further drive the demand for the improved mobile network design. However, traditional methods can no longer offer cost-efficient solutions for better user quality of experience with fast time-to-market. Recent work adopts SDN in LTE core networks to meet the requirement. In these software defined LTE core networks, scalability and security become important design issues that must be considered seriously. In this paper, we propose a scalable channel security scheme for the software defined LTE core network. It applies the VxLAN for scalable tunnel establishment and MACsec for security enhancement. According to our evaluation, the proposed scheme not only enhances the security of the channel communication between different network components, but also improves the flexibility and scalability of the core network with little performance penalty. Moreover, it can also shed light on the design of the next generation cellular network.
Biometric authentication offers promise for mobile security, but its adoption can be controversial, both from a usability and security perspective. We describe a preliminary study, comparing recollections of biometric adoption by computer security experts and non-experts collected in semi-structured interviews. Initial decisions and thought processes around biometric adoption were recalled, as well as changes in those views over time. These findings should serve to better inform security education across differing levels of technical experience. Preliminary findings indicate that both user groups were influenced by similar sources of information; however, expert users differed in having more professional requirements affecting choices (e.g., BYOD). Furthermore, experts often added biometric authentication methods opportunistically during device updates, despite describing higher security concern and caution. Non-experts struggled with the setting up fingerprint biometrics, leading to poor adoption. Further interviews are still being conducted.
Modern operating systems, such as iOS, use multiple access control policies to define an overall protection system. However, the complexity of these policies and their interactions can hide policy flaws that compromise the security of the protection system. We propose iOracle, a framework that logically models the iOS protection system such that queries can be made to automatically detect policy flaws. iOracle models policies and runtime context extracted from iOS firmware images, developer resources, and jailbroken devices, and iOracle significantly reduces the complexity of queries by modeling policy semantics. We evaluate iOracle by using it to successfully triage executables likely to have policy flaws and comparing our results to the executables exploited in four recent jailbreaks. When applied to iOS 10, iOracle identifies previously unknown policy flaws that allow attackers to modify or bypass access control policies. For compromised system processes, consequences of these policy flaws include sandbox escapes (with respect to read/write file access) and changing the ownership of arbitrary files. By automating the evaluation of iOS access control policies, iOracle provides a practical approach to hardening iOS security by identifying policy flaws before they are exploited.
Smartphones have become ubiquitous in our everyday lives, providing diverse functionalities via millions of applications (apps) that are readily available. To achieve these functionalities, apps need to access and utilize potentially sensitive data, stored in the user's device. This can pose a serious threat to users' security and privacy, when considering malicious or underskilled developers. While application marketplaces, like Google Play store and Apple App store, provide factors like ratings, user reviews, and number of downloads to distinguish benign from risky apps, studies have shown that these metrics are not adequately effective. The security and privacy health of an application should also be considered to generate a more reliable and transparent trustworthiness score. In order to automate the trustworthiness assessment of mobile applications, we introduce the Trust4App framework, which not only considers the publicly available factors mentioned above, but also takes into account the Security and Privacy (S&P) health of an application. Additionally, it considers the S&P posture of a user, and provides an holistic personalized trustworthiness score. While existing automatic trustworthiness frameworks only consider trustworthiness indicators (e.g. permission usage, privacy leaks) individually, Trust4App is, to the best of our knowledge, the first framework to combine these indicators. We also implement a proof-of-concept realization of our framework and demonstrate that Trust4App provides a more comprehensive, intuitive and actionable trustworthiness assessment compared to existing approaches.
First standardized by the IETF in the 1990's, SSL/TLS is the most widely-used encryption protocol on the Internet. This makes it imperative to study its usage across different platforms and applications to ensure proper usage and robustness against attacks and vulnerabilities. While previous efforts have focused on the usage of TLS in the desktop ecosystem, there have been no studies of TLS usage by mobile apps at scale. In our study, we use anonymized data collected by the Lumen mobile measurement app to analyze TLS usage by Android apps in the wild. We analyze and fingerprint handshake messages to characterize the TLS APIs and libraries that apps use, and evaluate their weaknesses. We find that 84% of apps use the default TLS libraries provided by the operating system, and the remaining apps use other TLS libraries for various reasons such as using TLS extensions and features that are not supported by the Android TLS libraries, some of which are also not standardized by the IETF. Our analysis reveals the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, demonstrating that the path to improving TLS security in the mobile platform is not straightforward. Based on work published at: Abbas Razaghpanah, Arian Akhavan Niaki, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, Srikanth Sundaresan, Johanna Amann, and Phillipa Gill. 2017. Studying TLS Usage in Android Apps. In Proceedings of CoNEXT '17. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 13 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3143361.3143400
We introduce MobiCeal, the first practical Plausibly Deniable Encryption (PDE) system for mobile devices that can defend against strong coercive multi-snapshot adversaries, who may examine the storage medium of a user's mobile device at different points of time and force the user to decrypt data. MobiCeal relies on "dummy write" to obfuscate the differences between multiple snapshots of storage medium due to existence of hidden data. By incorporating PDE in block layer, MobiCeal supports a broad deployment of any block-based file systems on mobile devices. More importantly, MobiCeal is secure against side channel attacks which pose a serious threat to existing PDE schemes. A proof of concept implementation of MobiCeal is provided on an LG Nexus 4 Android phone using Android 4.2.2. It is shown that the performance of MobiCeal is significantly better than prior PDE systems against multi-snapshot adversaries.
The reality of today's computing landscape already suffers from a shortage of cybersecurity professionals, and this gap only expected to grow. We need to generate interest in this STEM topic early in our student's careers and provide teachers the resources they need to succeed in addressing this gap. To address this shortfall we present Practical LAbs in Security for Mobile Applications (PLASMA), a public set of educational security labs to enable instruction in creation of secure Android apps. These labs include example vulnerable applications, information about each vulnerability, steps for how to repair the vulnerabilities, and information about how to confirm that the vulnerability has been properly repaired. Our goal is for instructors to use these activities in their mobile, security, and general computing courses ranging from secondary school to university settings. Another goal of this project is to foster interest in security and computing through demonstrating its importance. Initial feedback demonstrates the labs' positive effects in enhancing student interest in cybersecurity and acclaim from instructors. All project activities may be found on the project website: http://www.TeachingMobileSecurity.com
Android applications are vulnerable to reverse engineering which could result in tampering and repackaging of applications. Even though there are many off the shelf obfuscation tools that hardens Android applications, they are limited to basic obfuscation techniques. Obfuscation techniques that transform the code segments drastically are difficult to implement on Android because of the Android runtime verifier which validates the loaded code. In this paper, we introduce a novel obfuscation technique, Android Encryption based Obfuscation (AEON), which can encrypt code segments and perform runtime decryption during execution. The encrypted code is running outside of the normal Android virtual machine, in an embeddable Java source interpreter and thereby circumventing the scrutiny of Android runtime verifier. Our obfuscation technique works well with Android source code and Dalvik bytecode.