Xin, Wu, Shen, Qingni, Feng, Ke, Xia, Yutang, Wu, Zhonghai, Lin, Zhenghao.
2022.
Personalized User Profiles-based Insider Threat Detection for Distributed File System. 2022 IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom). :1441—1446.
In recent years, data security incidents caused by insider threats in distributed file systems have attracted the attention of academia and industry. The most common way to detect insider threats is based on user profiles. Through analysis, we realize that based on existing user profiles are not efficient enough, and there are many false positives when a stable user profile has not yet been formed. In this work, we propose personalized user profiles and design an insider threat detection framework, which can intelligently detect insider threats for securing distributed file systems in real-time. To generate personalized user profiles, we come up with a time window-based clustering algorithm and a weighted kernel density estimation algorithm. Compared with non-personalized user profiles, both the Recall and Precision of insider threat detection based on personalized user profiles have been improved, resulting in their harmonic mean F1 increased to 96.52%. Meanwhile, to reduce the false positives of insider threat detection, we put forward operation recommendations based on user similarity to predict new operations that users will produce in the future, which can reduce the false positive rate (FPR). The FPR is reduced to 1.54% and the false positive identification rate (FPIR) is as high as 92.62%. Furthermore, to mitigate the risks caused by inaccurate authorization for users, we present user tags based on operation content and permission. The experimental results show that our proposed framework can detect insider threats more effectively and precisely, with lower FPR and high FPIR.
Wang, Juan, Ma, Chenjun, Li, Ziang, Yuan, Huanyu, Wang, Jie.
2022.
ProcGuard: Process Injection Behaviours Detection Using Fine-grained Analysis of API Call Chain with Deep Learning. 2022 IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom). :778—785.
New malware increasingly adopts novel fileless techniques to evade detection from antivirus programs. Process injection is one of the most popular fileless attack techniques. This technique makes malware more stealthy by writing malicious code into memory space and reusing the name and port of the host process. It is difficult for traditional security software to detect and intercept process injections due to the stealthiness of its behavior. We propose a novel framework called ProcGuard for detecting process injection behaviors. This framework collects sensitive function call information of typical process injection. Then we perform a fine-grained analysis of process injection behavior based on the function call chain characteristics of the program, and we also use the improved RCNN network to enhance API analysis on the tampered memory segments. We combine API analysis with deep learning to determine whether a process injection attack has been executed. We collect a large number of malicious samples with process injection behavior and construct a dataset for evaluating the effectiveness of ProcGuard. The experimental results demonstrate that it achieves an accuracy of 81.58% with a lower false-positive rate compared to other systems. In addition, we also evaluate the detection time and runtime performance loss metrics of ProcGuard, both of which are improved compared to previous detection tools.