Visible to the public AASR: Authenticated Anonymous Secure Routing for MANETs in Adversarial Environments

TitleAASR: Authenticated Anonymous Secure Routing for MANETs in Adversarial Environments
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2014
AuthorsWei Liu, Ming Yu
JournalVehicular Technology, IEEE Transactions on
Volume63
Pagination4585-4593
Date PublishedNov
ISSN0018-9545
KeywordsAASR protocol, Ad hoc networks, adversarial environments, anonymous routing, authenticated anonymous secure routing protocols, authenticated routing, cryptographic protocols, denial-of-service broadcasting, fake routing packets, key-encrypted onion routing, MANET, mobile ad hoc networks, Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), mobile computing, mobile nodes, onion routing, Public key, Routing, Routing protocols, secret verification message routing, telecommunication security, telecommunication traffic
Abstract

Anonymous communications are important for many of the applications of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) deployed in adversary environments. A major requirement on the network is the ability to provide unidentifiability and unlinkability for mobile nodes and their traffic. Although a number of anonymous secure routing protocols have been proposed, the requirement is not fully satisfied. The existing protocols are vulnerable to the attacks of fake routing packets or denial-of-service broadcasting, even the node identities are protected by pseudonyms. In this paper, we propose a new routing protocol, i.e., authenticated anonymous secure routing (AASR), to satisfy the requirement and defend against the attacks. More specifically, the route request packets are authenticated by a group signature, to defend against potential active attacks without unveiling the node identities. The key-encrypted onion routing with a route secret verification message is designed to prevent intermediate nodes from inferring a real destination. Simulation results have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed AASR protocol with improved performance as compared with the existing protocols.

URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6777291/
DOI10.1109/TVT.2014.2313180
Citation Key6777291