| Title | Cyber Attack Resilient Distance Protection and Circuit Breaker Control for Digital Substations |
| Publication Type | Journal Article |
| Year of Publication | 2019 |
| Authors | Hong, Junho, Nuqui, Reynaldo F., Kondabathini, Anil, Ishchenko, Dmitry, Martin, Aaron |
| Journal | IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics |
| Volume | 15 |
| Pagination | 4332—4341 |
| Date Published | jul |
| ISSN | 1941-0050 |
| Keywords | circuit breaker control, circuit breakers, Collaborative cyber defense models, command injection attacks, composability, cyber attack resilient distance protection, cyber intrusions, cyber–physical security test bed, cyberattack, data injection attack, digital substation, digital substations, distributed security domain layer, domain-based cyber-physical security solutions, domain-based mitigation, hardware-in-the loop simulation, hardware-in-the-loop simulation, Integrated circuit modeling, Metrics, power engineering computing, power grid, power grids, power system control, Power system protection, power system security, protection devices, pubcrawl, real-time digital simulator, real-time power system analysis, relay protection, resilience, Resiliency, security of data, smart grid cybersecurity, substation automation, substation automation systems, substation cybersecurity, Substations, transient fault signature-based cross-correlation coefficient algorithm |
| Abstract | This paper proposes new concepts for detecting and mitigating cyber attacks on substation automation systems by domain-based cyber-physical security solutions. The proposed methods form the basis of a distributed security domain layer that enables protection devices to collaboratively defend against cyber attacks at substations. The methods utilize protection coordination principles to cross check protection setting changes and can run real-time power system analysis to evaluate the impact of the control commands. The transient fault signature (TFS)-based cross-correlation coefficient algorithm has been proposed to detect the false sampled values data injection attack. The proposed functions were verified in a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation using commercial relays and a real-time digital simulator (RTDS). Various types of cyber intrusions are tested using this test bed to evaluate the consequences and impacts of cyber attacks to power grid as well as to validate the performance of the proposed research-grade cyber attack mitigation functions. |
| DOI | 10.1109/TII.2018.2884728 |
| Citation Key | hong_cyber_2019 |
Cyber Attack Resilient Distance Protection and Circuit Breaker Control for Digital Substations