Biblio
Emerging industrial platforms such as the Internet of Things (IoT), Industrial Internet (II) in the US and Industrie 4.0 in Europe have tremendously accelerated the development of new generations of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) that integrate humans and human organizations (H-CPS) with physical and computation processes and extend to societal-scale systems such as traffic networks, electric grids, or networks of autonomous systems where control is dynamically shifted between humans and machines. Although such societal-scale CPS can potentially affect many aspect of our lives, significant societal strains have emerged about the new technology trends and their impact on how we live. Emerging tensions extend to regulations, certification, insurance, and other societal constructs that are necessary for the widespread adoption of new technologies. If these systems evolve independently in different parts of the world, they will ‘hard-wire’ the social context in which they are created, making interoperation hard or impossible, decreasing reusability, and narrowing markets for products and services. While impacts of new technology trends on social policies have received attention, the other side of the coin – to make systems adaptable to social policies – is nearly absent from engineering and computer science design practice. This paper focuses on technologies that can be adapted to varying public policies and presents (1) hard problems and technical challenges and (2) some recent research approaches and opportunities. The central goal of this paper is to discuss the challenges and opportunities for constructing H-CPS that can be parameterized by social context. The focus in on three major application domains: connected vehicles, transactive energy systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles.Abbreviations: CPS: Cyber-physical systems; H-CPS: Human-cyber-physical systems; CV: Connected vehicle; II: Industrial Internet; IoT: Internet of Things
Unlike faults in classical systems, faults in Cyber-Physical Systems will often be caused by the system's interaction with its physical environment and social context, rendering these faults harder to diagnose. To complicate matters further, knowledge about the behavior and failure modes of a system are often collected in different models. We show how three of those models, namely attack trees, fault trees, and timed failure propagation graphs can be converted into Halpern-Pearl causal models, combined into a single holistic causal model, and analyzed with actual causality reasoning to detect and explain unwanted events. Halpern-Pearl models have several advantages over their source models, particularly that they allow for modeling preemption, consider the non-occurrence of events, and can incorporate additional domain knowledge. Furthermore, such holistic models allow for analysis across model boundaries, enabling detection and explanation of events that are beyond a single model. Our contribution here delineates a semi-automatic process to (1) convert different models into Halpern-Pearl causal models, (2) combine these models into a single holistic model, and (3) reason about system failures. We illustrate our approach with the help of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle case study.