Biblio
According to the information security requirements of the industrial control system and the technical features of the existing defense measures, a dynamic security control strategy based on trusted computing is proposed. According to the strategy, the Industrial Cyber-Physical System system information security solution is proposed, and the linkage verification mechanism between the internal fire control wall of the industrial control system, the intrusion detection system and the trusted connection server is provided. The information exchange of multiple network security devices is realized, which improves the comprehensive defense capability of the industrial control system, and because the trusted platform module is based on the hardware encryption, storage, and control protection mode, It overcomes the common problem that the traditional repairing and stitching technique based on pure software leads to easy breakage, and achieves the goal of significantly improving the safety of the industrial control system . At the end of the paper, the system analyzes the implementation of the proposed secure industrial control information security system based on the trustworthy calculation.
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) and their Internet of Things (IoT) components are repeatedly subject to various attacks targeting weaknesses in their firmware. For that reason emerges an imminent demand for secure update mechanisms that not only include specific systems but cover all parts of the critical infrastructure. In this paper we introduce a theoretical concept for a secure CPS device update and verification mechanism and provide information on handling hardware-based security incorporating trusted platform modules (TPM) on those CPS devices. We will describe secure communication channels by state of the art technology and also integrity measurement mechanisms to ensure the system is in a known state. In addition, a multi-level fail-over concept is presented, ensuring continuous patching to minimize the necessity of restarting those systems.
Cyber physical systems are the key innovation driver for many domains such as automotive, avionics, industrial process control, and factory automation. However, their interconnection potentially provides adversaries easy access to sensitive data, code, and configurations. If attackers gain control, material damage or even harm to people must be expected. To counteract data theft, system manipulation and cyber-attacks, security mechanisms must be embedded in the cyber physical system. Adding hardware security in the form of the standardized Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a promising approach. At the same time, traditional dependability features such as safety, availability, and reliability have to be maintained. To determine the right balance between security and dependability it is essential to understand their interferences. This paper supports developers in identifying the implications of using TPMs on the dependability of their system.We highlight potential consequences of adding TPMs to cyber-physical systems by considering the resulting safety, reliability, and availability. Furthermore, we discuss the potential of enhancing the dependability of TPM services by applying traditional redundancy techniques.
Interactive environments are more and more entering our daily life. Our homes are becoming increasingly smart and so do our working environments. Aiming to provide assistance that is not only suitable to the current situation, but as well for the involved individuals usually comes along with an increased scale of personal data being collected/requested and processed. While this may not be exceptionally critical as long as data does not leave one's smart home, circumstances change dramatically once smart home data is processed by cloud services, and, all the more, as soon as an interactive assistance system is operated by our employer who may have interest in exploiting the data beyond its original purpose, e. g. for secretly evaluating the work performance of his personnel. In this paper we discuss how a federated identity management could be augmented with distributed usage control and trusted computing technology so as to reliably arrange and enforce privacy-related requirements in externally operated interactive environments.
Nowadays, the Internet is developed, so that the requirements for on- and offline data storage have increased. Large storage IT projects, are related to large costs and high level of business risk. A storage service provider (SSP) provides computer storage space and management. In addition to that, it offers also back-up and archiving. Despite this, many companies fears security, privacy and integrity of outsourced data. As a solution, File Assured Deletion (FADE) is a system built upon standard cryptographic issues. It aims to guarantee their privacy and integrity, and most importantly, assuredly deleted files to make them unrecoverable to anybody (including those who manage the cloud storage) upon revocations of file access policies, by encrypting outsourced data files. Unfortunately, This system remains weak, in case the key manager's security is compromised. Our work provides a new scheme that aims to improve the security of FADE by using the TPM (Trusted Platform Module) that stores safely keys, passwords and digital certificates.
Different organizations or countries maybe adopt different PKI trust model in real applications. On a large scale, all certification authorities (CA) and end entities construct a huge mesh network. PKI trust model exhibits unstructured mesh network as a whole. However, mesh trust model worsens computational complexity in certification path processing when the number of PKI domains increases. This paper proposes an enhanced mesh trust model for PKI. Keys generation and signature are fulfilled in Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for higher security level. An algorithm is suggested to improve the performance of certification path processing in this model. This trust model is less complex but more efficient and robust than the existing PKI trust models.
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an international standard for a security chip that can be used for the management of cryptographic keys and for remote attestation. The specification of the most recent TPM 2.0 interfaces for direct anonymous attestation unfortunately has a number of severe shortcomings. First of all, they do not allow for security proofs (indeed, the published proofs are incorrect). Second, they provide a Diffie-Hellman oracle w.r.t. the secret key of the TPM, weakening the security and preventing forward anonymity of attestations. Fixes to these problems have been proposed, but they create new issues: they enable a fraudulent TPM to encode information into an attestation signature, which could be used to break anonymity or to leak the secret key. Furthermore, all proposed ways to remove the Diffie-Hellman oracle either strongly limit the functionality of the TPM or would require significant changes to the TPM 2.0 interfaces. In this paper we provide a better specification of the TPM 2.0 interfaces that addresses these problems and requires only minimal changes to the current TPM 2.0 commands. We then show how to use the revised interfaces to build q-SDH-and LRSW-based anonymous attestation schemes, and prove their security. We finally discuss how to obtain other schemes addressing different use cases such as key-binding for U-Prove and e-cash.
The urgent task of the organization of confidential calculations in crucial objects of informatization on the basis of domestic TPM technologies (Trusted Platform Module) is considered. The corresponding recommendations and architectural concepts of the special hardware TPM module (Trusted Platform Module) which is built in a computing platform are proposed and realize a so-called ``root of trust''. As a result it gave the organization the confidential calculations on the basis of domestic electronic base.
The incorporation of security mechanisms to protect spacecraft's TT&c; payload links is becoming a constant requirement in many space missions. More advanced mission concepts will allow spacecrafts to have higher levels of autonomy, which includes performing key management operations independently of control centers. This is especially beneficial to support missions operating distantly from Earth. In order to support such levels of autonomy, key agreement is one approach that allows spacecrafts to establish new cryptographic keys as they deem necessary. This work introduces an approach based on a trusted platform module that allows for key agreement to be performed with minimal computational efforts and protocol iterations. Besides, it allows for opportunistic control center reporting while avoiding man-in-the-middle and replay attacks.
Ensuring security in the military applications of IoT is a big challenge. The main reasons for this state of affairs is that the sensor nodes of the network are usually mobile, use wireless links, have a small processing power and have a little energy resources. The paper presents the solution for cryptographic protection of transmission between sensor nodes in the data link layer and for cryptographic protection of data stored in the sensor node resources. For this purpose, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) was used. The proposed solution makes it possible to build secure and fault tolerant sensor network. The following aspects were presented in the paper: the model of such a network, applied security solutions, analysis of the security in the network and selected investigation results of such a network were presented.