Biblio
To preserve the privacy of social networks, most existing methods are applied to satisfy different anonymity models, but there are some serious problems such as huge large information losses and great structural modifications of original social network. Therefore, an improved privacy protection method called k-subgraph is proposed, which is based on k-degree anonymous graph derived from k-anonymity to keep the network structure stable. The method firstly divides network nodes into several clusters by label propagation algorithm, and then reconstructs the sub-graph by means of moving edges to achieve k-degree anonymity. Experimental results show that our k-subgraph method can not only effectively improve the defense capability against malicious attacks based on node degrees, but also maintain stability of network structure. In addition, the cost of information losses due to anonymity is minimized ideally.
A process of critical transmission lines identification in presented here. The criticality is based on network flow, which is essential for power grid connectivity monitoring as well as vulnerability assessment. The proposed method can be utilized as a supplement of traditional situational awareness tool in the energy management system of the power grid control center. At first, a flow network is obtained from topological as well as functional features of the power grid. Then from the duality property of a linear programming problem, the maximum flow problem is converted to a minimum cut problem. Critical transmission lines are identified as a solution of the dual problem. An overall set of transmission lines are identified from the solution of the network flow problem. Simulation of standard IEEE test cases validates the application of the method in finding critical transmission lines of the power grid.
Traditionally, power grid vulnerability assessment methods are separated to the study of nodes vulnerability and edges vulnerability, resulting in the evaluation results are not accurate. A framework for vulnerability assessment is still required for power grid. Thus, this paper proposes a universal method for vulnerability assessment of power grid by establishing a complex network model with uniform weight of nodes and edges. The concept of virtual edge is introduced into the distinct weighted complex network model of power system, and the selection function of edge weight and virtual edge weight are constructed based on electrical and physical parameters. In addition, in order to reflect the electrical characteristics of power grids more accurately, a weighted betweenness evaluation index with transmission efficiency is defined. Finally, the method has been demonstrated on the IEEE 39 buses system, and the results prove the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Integrated cyber-physical systems (CPSs), such as the smart grid, are becoming the underpinning technology for major industries. A major concern regarding such systems are the seemingly unexpected large scale failures, which are often attributed to a small initial shock getting escalated due to intricate dependencies within and across the individual counterparts of the system. In this paper, we develop a novel interdependent system model to capture this phenomenon, also known as cascading failures. Our framework consists of two networks that have inherently different characteristics governing their intra-dependency: i) a cyber-network where a node is deemed to be functional as long as it belongs to the largest connected (i.e., giant) component; and ii) a physical network where nodes are given an initial flow and a capacity, and failure of a node results with redistribution of its flow to the remaining nodes, upon which further failures might take place due to overloading. Furthermore, it is assumed that these two networks are inter-dependent. For simplicity, we consider a one-to-one interdependency model where every node in the cyber-network is dependent upon and supports a single node in the physical network, and vice versa. We provide a thorough analysis of the dynamics of cascading failures in this interdependent system initiated with a random attack. The system robustness is quantified as the surviving fraction of nodes at the end of cascading failures, and is derived in terms of all network parameters involved. Analytic results are supported through an extensive numerical study. Among other things, these results demonstrate the ability of our model to capture the unexpected nature of large-scale failures, and provide insights on improving system robustness.
Resilient control systems should efficiently restore control into physical systems not only after the sabotage of themselves, but also after breaking physical systems. To enhance resilience of control systems, given an originally minimal-input controlled linear-time invariant(LTI) physical system, we address the problem of efficient control recovery into it after removing a known system vertex by finding the minimum number of inputs. According to the minimum input theorem, given a digraph embedded into LTI model and involving a precomputed maximum matching, this problem is modeled into recovering controllability of it after removing a known network vertex. Then, we recover controllability of the residual network by efficiently finding a maximum matching rather than recomputation. As a result, except for precomputing a maximum matching and the following removed vertex, the worst-case execution time of control recovery into the residual LTI physical system is linear.
Network connectivity is a primary attribute and a characteristic phenomenon of any networked system. A high connectivity is often desired within networks; for instance to increase robustness to failures, and resilience against attacks. A typical approach to increasing network connectivity is to strategically add links; however adding links is not always the most suitable option. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to improving network connectivity, that is by making a small subset of nodes and edges “trusted,” which means that such nodes and edges remain intact at all times and are insusceptible to failures. We then show that by controlling the number of trusted nodes and edges, any desired level of network connectivity can be obtained. Along with characterizing network connectivity with trusted nodes and edges, we present heuristics to compute a small number of such nodes and edges. Finally, we illustrate our results on various networks.
The heterogeneous SIS model for virus spread in any finite size graph characterizes the influence of factors of SIS model and could be analyzed by the extended N-Intertwined model introduced in [1]. We specifically focus on the heterogeneous virus spread in the star network in this paper. The epidemic threshold and the average meta-stable state fraction of infected nodes are derived for virus spread in the star network. Our results illustrate the effect of the factors of SIS model on the steady state infection.
Attack graph technique is a common tool for the evaluation of network security. However, attack graphs are generally too large and complex to be understood and interpreted by security administrators. This paper proposes an analysis framework for security attack graphs for a given IT infrastructure system. First, in order to facilitate the discovery of interconnectivities among vulnerabilities in a network, multi-host multi-stage vulnerability analysis (MulVAL) is employed to generate an attack graph for a given network topology. Then a novel algorithm is applied to refine the attack graph and generate a simplified graph called a transition graph. Next, a Markov model is used to project the future security posture of the system. Finally, the framework is evaluated by applying it on a typical IT network scenario with specific services, network configurations, and vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we describe an efficient methodology to guide investigators during network forensic analysis. To this end, we introduce the concept of core attack graph, a compact representation of the main routes an attacker can take towards specific network targets. Such compactness allows forensic investigators to focus their efforts on critical nodes that are more likely to be part of attack paths, thus reducing the overall number of nodes (devices, network privileges) that need to be examined. Nevertheless, core graphs also allow investigators to hierarchically explore the graph in order to retrieve different levels of summarised information. We have evaluated our approach over different network topologies varying parameters such as network size, density, and forensic evaluation threshold. Our results demonstrate that we can achieve the same level of accuracy provided by standard logical attack graphs while significantly reducing the exploration rate of the network.
Enhancing the security and resilience of interdependent infrastructures is crucial. In this paper, we establish a theoretical framework based on Markov decision processes (MDPs) to design optimal resiliency mechanisms for interdependent infrastructures. We use MDPs to capture the dynamics of the failure of constituent components of an infrastructure and their cyber-physical dependencies. Factored MDPs and approximate linear programming are adopted for an exponentially growing dimension of both state and action spaces. Under our approximation scheme, the optimally distributed policy is equivalent to the centralized one. Finally, case studies in a large-scale interdependent system demonstrate the effectiveness of the control strategy to enhance the network resilience to cascading failures.