Biblio
The chances of cyber-attacks have been increased because of incorporation of communication networks and information technology in power system. Main objective of the paper is to prove that attacker can launch the attack vector without the knowledge of complete network information and the injected false data can't be detected by power system operator. This paper also deals with analyzing the impact of multi-attacking strategy on the power system. This false data attacks incurs lot of damage to power system, as it misguides the power system operator. Here, we demonstrate the construction of attack vector and later we have demonstrated multiple attacking regions in IEEE 14 bus system. Impact of attack vector on the power system can be observed and it is proved that the attack cannot be detected by power system operator with the help of residue check method.
Identifying cyberattack vectors on cyber supply chains (CSC) in the event of cyberattacks are very important in mitigating cybercrimes effectively on Cyber Physical Systems CPS. However, in the cyber security domain, the invincibility nature of cybercrimes makes it difficult and challenging to predict the threat probability and impact of cyber attacks. Although cybercrime phenomenon, risks, and treats contain a lot of unpredictability's, uncertainties and fuzziness, cyberattack detection should be practical, methodical and reasonable to be implemented. We explore Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) as knowledge representation in artificial intelligence to be able to be formally applied probabilistic inference in the cyber security domain. The aim of this paper is to use Bayesian Belief Networks to detect cyberattacks on CSC in the CPS domain. We model cyberattacks using DAG method to determine the attack propagation. Further, we use a smart grid case study to demonstrate the applicability of attack and the cascading effects. The results show that BBN could be adapted to determine uncertainties in the event of cyberattacks in the CSC domain.
As the power grid becomes more interconnected the attack surface increases and determining the causes of anomalies becomes more complex. Automated responses are a mechanism which can provide resilience in a power system by responding to anomalies. An automated response system can make intelligent decisions when paired with an automated health assessment system which includes a human in the loop for making critical decisions. Effective responses can be determined by developing a matrix which considers the likely impacts on resilience if a response is taken. A testbed assists to analyze these responses and determine their effects on system resilience.
Modern cyber-physical systems are increasingly complex and vulnerable to attacks like false data injection aimed at destabilizing and confusing the systems. We develop and evaluate an attack-detection framework aimed at learning a dynamic invariant network, data-driven temporal causal relationships between components of cyber-physical systems. We evaluate the relative performance in attack detection of the proposed model relative to traditional anomaly detection approaches. In this paper, we introduce Granger Causality based Kalman Filter with Adaptive Robust Thresholding (G-KART) as a framework for anomaly detection based on data-driven functional relationships between components in cyber-physical systems. In particular, we select power systems as a critical infrastructure with complex cyber-physical systems whose protection is an essential facet of national security. The system presented is capable of learning with or without network topology the task of detection of false data injection attacks in power systems. Kalman filters are used to learn and update the dynamic state of each component in the power system and in-turn monitor the component for malicious activity. The ego network for each node in the invariant graph is treated as an ensemble model of Kalman filters, each of which captures a subset of the node's interactions with other parts of the network. We finally also introduce an alerting mechanism to surface alerts about compromised nodes.
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network in a smart grid requires to be reliable and efficient to transmit real-time data to the controller. Introducing SDN into a SCADA network helps in deploying novel grid control operations, as well as, their management. As the overall network cannot be transformed to have only SDN-enabled devices overnight because of budget constraints, a systematic deployment methodology is needed. In this work, we present a framework, named SDNSynth, that can design a hybrid network consisting of both legacy forwarding devices and programmable SDN-enabled switches. The design satisfies the resiliency requirements of the SCADA network, which are specified with respect to a set of identified threat vectors. The deployment plan primarily includes the best placements of the SDN-enabled switches. The plan may include one or more links to be installed newly. We model and implement the SDNSynth framework that includes the satisfaction of several requirements and constraints involved in resilient operation of the SCADA. It uses satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) for encoding the synthesis model and solving it. We demonstrate SDNSynth on a case study and evaluate its performance on different synthetic SCADA systems.
With the tighter integration of power system and Information and Communication Technology (ICT), power grid is becoming a typical cyber physical system (CPS). It is important to analyze the impact of the cyber event on power system, so that it is necessary to build a co-simulation system for studying the interaction between power system and ICT. In this paper, a cyber physical power system (CPPS) co-simulation platform is proposed, which includes the hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation function. By using flexible interface, various simulation software for power system and ICT can be interconnected into the platform to build co-simulation tools for various simulation purposes. To demonstrate it as a proof, one simulation framework for real life cyber-attack on power system control is introduced. In this case, the real life denial-of-service attack on a router in automatic voltage control (AVC) is simulated to demonstrate impact of cyber-attack on power system.
The smart grid is a complex cyber-physical system (CPS) that poses challenges related to scale, integration, interoperability, processes, governance, and human elements. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and its government, university and industry collaborators, developed an approach, called CPS Framework, to reasoning about CPS across multiple levels of concern and competency, including trustworthiness, privacy, reliability, and regulatory. The approach uses ontology and reasoning techniques to achieve a greater understanding of the interdependencies among the elements of the CPS Framework model applied to use cases. This paper demonstrates that the approach extends naturally to automated and manual decision-making for smart grids: we apply it to smart grid use cases, and illustrate how it can be used to analyze grid topologies and address concerns about the smart grid. Smart grid stakeholders, whose decision making may be assisted by this approach, include planners, designers and operators.
In this paper we report preliminary results from the novel coupling of cyber-physical emulation and interdiction optimization to better understand the impact of a CrashOverride malware attack on a notional electric system. We conduct cyber experiments where CrashOverride issues commands to remote terminal units (RTUs) that are controlling substations within a power control area. We identify worst-case loss of load outcomes with cyber interdiction optimization; the proposed approach is a bilevel formulation that incorporates RTU mappings to controllable loads, transmission lines, and generators in the upper-level (attacker model), and a DC optimal power flow (DCOPF) in the lower-level (defender model). Overall, our preliminary results indicate that the interdiction optimization can guide the design of experiments instead of performing a “full factorial” approach. Likewise, for systems where there are important dependencies between SCADA/ICS controls and power grid operations, the cyber-physical emulations should drive improved parameterization and surrogate models that are applied in scalable optimization techniques.
This paper presents a methodology for utilizing Phasor Measurement units (PMUs) for procuring real time synchronized measurements for assessing the security of the power system dynamically. The concept of wide-area dynamic security assessment considers transient instability in the proposed methodology. Intelligent framework based approach for online dynamic security assessment has been suggested wherein the database consisting of critical features associated with the system is generated for a wide range of contingencies, which is utilized to build the data mining model. This data mining model along with the synchronized phasor measurements is expected to assist the system operator in assessing the security of the system pertaining to a particular contingency, thereby also creating possibility of incorporating control and preventive measures in order to avoid any unforeseen instability in the system. The proposed technique has been implemented on IEEE 39 bus system for accurately indicating the security of the system and is found to be quite robust in the case of noise in the measurement data obtained from the PMUs.