Biblio
We consider a cloud based multiserver system consisting of a set of replica application servers behind a set of proxy (indirection) servers which interact directly with clients over the Internet. We study a proactive moving-target defense to thwart a DDoS attacker's reconnaissance phase and consequently reduce the attack's impact. The defense is effectively a moving-target (motag) technique in which the proxies dynamically change. The system is evaluated using an AWS prototype of HTTP redirection and by numerical evaluations of an “adversarial” coupon-collector mathematical model, the latter allowing larger-scale extrapolations.
Moving target defense (MTD) is becoming popular with the advancements in Software Defined Networking (SDN) technologies. With centralized management through SDN, changing the network attributes such as routes to escape from attacks is simple and fast. Yet, the available alternate routes are bounded by the network topology, and a persistent attacker that continuously perform the reconnaissance can extract the whole link-map of the network. To address this issue, we propose to use virtual shadow networks (VSNs) by applying Network Function Virtualization (NFV) abilities to the network in order to deceive attacker with the fake topology information and not reveal the actual network topology and characteristics. We design this approach under a formal framework for Internet Service Provider (ISP) networks and apply it to the recently emerged indirect DDoS attacks, namely Crossfire, for evaluation. The results show that attacker spends more time to figure out the network behavior while the costs on the defender and network operations are negligible until reaching a certain network size.
Traditional address scanning attacks mainly rely on the naive 'brute forcing' approach, where the entire IPv4 address space is exhaustively searched by enumerating different possibilities. However, such an approach is inefficient for IPv6 due to its vast subnet size (i.e., 264). As a result, it is widely assumed that address scanning attacks are less feasible in IPv6 networks. In this paper, we evaluate new IPv6 reconnaissance techniques in real IPv6 networks and expose how to leverage the Domain Name System (DNS) for IPv6 network reconnaissance. We collected IPv6 addresses from 5 regions and 100,000 domains by exploiting DNS reverse zone and DNSSEC records. We propose a DNS Guard (DNSG) to efficiently detect DNS reconnaissance attacks in IPv6 networks. DNSG is a plug and play component that could be added to the existing infrastructure. We implement DNSG using Bro and Suricata. Our results demonstrate that DNSG could effectively block DNS reconnaissance attacks.
Moving target defense (MTD) is a proactive defense mechanism of changing the attack surface to increase an attacker's confusion and/or uncertainty, which invalidates its intelligence gained through reconnaissance and/or network scanning attacks. In this work, we propose software-defined networking (SDN)-based MTD technique using the shuffling of IP addresses and port numbers aiming to obfuscate both network and transport layers' real identities of the host and the service for defending against the network reconnaissance and scanning attacks. We call our proposed MTD technique Random Host and Service Multiplexing, namely RHSM. RHSM allows each host to use random, multiple virtual IP addresses to be dynamically and periodically shuffled. In addition, it uses short-lived, multiple virtual port numbers for an active service running on the host. Our proposed RHSM is novel in that we employ multiplexing (or de-multiplexing) to dynamically change and remap from all the virtual IPs of the host to the real IP or the virtual ports of the services to the real port, respectively. Via extensive simulation experiments, we prove how effectively and efficiently RHSM outperforms a baseline counterpart (i.e., a static network without RHSM) in terms of the attack success probability and defense cost.
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is a fusion of industrial automation systems and IoT systems. It features comprehensive sensing, interconnected transmission, intelligent processing, self-organization and self-maintenance. Its applications span intelligent transportation, smart factories, and intelligence. Many areas such as power grid and intelligent environment detection. With the widespread application of IIoT technology, the cyber security threats to industrial IoT systems are increasing day by day, and information security issues have become a major challenge in the development process. In order to protect the industrial IoT system from network attacks, this paper aims to study the industrial IoT information security protection technology, and the typical architecture of industrial Internet of things system, and analyzes the network security threats faced by industrial Internet of things system according to the different levels of the architecture, and designs the security protection strategies applied to different levels of structures based on the specific means of network attack.
The widespread adoption of social networking and cloud computing has transformed today's Internet to a trove of personal information. As a consequence, data breaches are expected to increase in gravity and occurrence. To counteract unintended data disclosure, a great deal of effort has been dedicated in devising methods for uncovering privacy leaks. Existing solutions, however, have not addressed the time- and data-intensive nature of leak detection. The shift from hardware-specific implementation to software-based solutions is the core idea behind the concept of Network Function Virtualization (NFV). On the other hand, the Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm is characterized by the decoupling of the forwarding and control planes. In this paper, an SDN/NFV-enabled architecture is proposed for improving the efficiency of leak detection systems. Employing a previously developed identification strategy, Personally Identifiable Information detector (PIID) and load balancer VNFs are packaged and deployed in OpenStack through an NFV MANO. Meanwhile, SDN controllers permit the load balancer to dynamically redistribute traffic among the PIID instances. In a physical testbed, tests are conducted to evaluate the proposed architecture. Experimental results indicate that the proportions of forwarding and parsing on total overhead is influenced by the traffic intensity. Furthermore, an NFV-enabled system with scalability features was found to outperform a non-virtualized implementation in terms of latency (85.1%), packet loss (98.3%) and throughput (8.41%).
With the rapid development of the contemporary society, wide use of smart phone and vehicle sensing devices brings a huge influence on the extensive data collection. Network coding can only provide weak security privacy protection. Aiming at weak secure feature of network coding, this paper proposes an information transfer mechanism, Weak Security Network Coding with Homomorphic Encryption (HE-WSNC), and it is integrated into routing policy. In this mechanism, a movement model is designed, which allows information transmission process under Wi-Fi and Bluetooth environment rather than consuming 4G data flow. Not only does this application reduce the cost, but also improve reliability of data transmission. Moreover, it attracts more users to participate.
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have been a serious security concern, as no service is, in principle, protected against them. Although a Dolev-Yao intruder with unlimited resources can trivially render any service unavailable, DoS attacks do not necessarily have to be carried out by such (extremely) powerful intruders. It is useful in practice and more challenging for formal protocol verification to determine whether a service is vulnerable even to resource-bounded intruders that cannot generate or intercept arbitrary large volumes of traffic. This paper proposes a novel, more refined intruder model where the intruder can only consume at most some specified amount of resources in any given time window. Additionally, we propose protocol theories that may contain timeouts and specify service resource usage during protocol execution. In contrast to the existing resource-conscious protocol verification models, our model allows finer and more subtle analysis of DoS problems. We illustrate the power of our approach by representing a number of classes of DoS attacks, such as, Slow, Asymmetric and Amplification DoS attacks, exhausting different types of resources of the target, such as, number of workers, processing power, memory, and network bandwidth. We show that the proposed DoS problem is undecidable in general and is PSPACE-complete for the class of resource-bounded, balanced systems. Finally, we implemented our formal verification model in the rewriting logic tool Maude and analyzed a number of DoS attacks in Maude using Rewriting Modulo SMT in an automated fashion.
Load balancing and IP anycast are traffic routing algorithms used to speed up delivery of the Domain Name System. In case of a DDoS attack or an overload condition, the value of these protocols is critical, as they can provide intrinsic DDoS mitigation with the failover alternatives. In this paper, we present a methodology for predicting the next DNS response in the light of a potential redirection to less busy servers, in order to mitigate the size of the attack. Our experiments were conducted using data from the Nov. 2015 attack of the Root DNS servers and Logistic Regression, k-Nearest Neighbors, Support Vector Machines and Random Forest as our primary classifiers. The models were able to successfully predict up to 83% of responses for Root Letters that operated on a small number of sites and consequently suffered the most during the attacks. On the other hand, regarding DNS requests coming from more distributed Root servers, the models demonstrated lower accuracy. Our analysis showed a correlation between the True Positive Rate metric and the number of sites, as well as a clear need for intelligent management of traffic in load balancing practices.
Since cyber-physical systems are inherently vulnerable to information leaks, software architects need to reason about security policies to define desired and undesired information flow through a system. The microservice architectural style requires the architects to refine a macro-level security policy into micro-level policies for individual microservices. However, when policies are refined in an ill-formed way, information leaks can emerge on composition of microservices. Related approaches to prevent such leaks do not take into account characteristics of cyber-physical systems like real-time behavior or message passing communication. In this paper, we enable the refinement and verification of information-flow security policies for cyber-physical microservice architectures. We provide architects with a set of well-formedness rules for refining a macro-level policy in a way that enforces its security restrictions. Based on the resulting micro-level policies, we present a verification technique to check if the real-time message passing of microservices is secure. In combination, our contributions prevent information leaks from emerging on composition. We evaluate the accuracy of our approach using an extension of the CoCoME case study.