Biblio
Algorithms for unsupervised anomaly detection have proven their effectiveness and flexibility, however, first it is necessary to calculate with what ratio a certain class begins to be considered anomalous by the autoencoder. For this reason, we propose to conduct a study of the efficiency of autoencoders depending on the ratio of anomalous and non-anomalous classes. The emergence of high-speed networks in electric power systems creates a tight interaction of cyberinfrastructure with the physical infrastructure and makes the power system susceptible to cyber penetration and attacks. To address this problem, this paper proposes an innovative approach to develop a specification-based intrusion detection framework that leverages available information provided by components in a contemporary power system. An autoencoder is used to encode the causal relations among the available information to create patterns with temporal state transitions, which are used as features in the proposed intrusion detection. This allows the proposed method to detect anomalies and cyber attacks.
with the continuous growing threat of cyber terrorism, the vulnerability of the industrial control systems (ICS) is the most common subject for security researchers now. Attacks on ICS systems keep increasing and their impact leads to human safety issues, equipment damage, system down, unusual output, loss of visibility and control, and various other catastrophic failures. Many of the industrial control systems are relatively insecure with chronic and pervasive vulnerabilities. Modbus-Tcpis one of the widely used communication protocols in the ICS/ Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system to transmit signals from instrumentation and control devices to the main controller of the control center. Modbus is a plain text protocol without any built-in security mechanisms, and Modbus is a standard communication protocol, widely used in critical infrastructure applications such as power systems, water, oil & gas, etc.. This paper proposes a passive security solution called Deep-security-scanner (DSS) tailored to Modbus-Tcpcommunication based Industrial control system (ICS). DSS solution detects attacks on Modbus-TcpIcs networks in a passive manner without disturbing the availability requirements of the system.
With the continuous emergence of cyber attacks, the security of industrial control system (ICS) has become a hot issue in academia and industry. Intrusion detection technology plays an irreplaceable role in protecting industrial system from attacks. However, the imbalance between normal samples and attack samples seriously affects the performance of intrusion detection algorithms. This paper proposes SE-IDS, which uses generative adversarial networks (GAN) to expand the minority to make the number of normal samples and attack samples relatively balanced, adopts particle swarm optimization (PSO) to optimize the parameters of LightGBM. Finally, we evaluated the performance of the proposed model on the industrial network dataset.
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks provide high situational awareness and automation control for industrial control systems, whilst introducing a wide range of access points for cyber attackers. To address these issues, a line of machine learning or deep learning based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been presented in the literature, where a large number of attack examples are usually demanded. However, in real-world SCADA networks, attack examples are not always sufficient, having only a few shots in many cases. In this paper, we propose a novel few-shot learning based IDS, named FS-IDS, to detect cyber attacks against SCADA networks, especially when having only a few attack examples in the defenders’ hands. Specifically, a new method by orchestrating one-hot encoding and principal component analysis is developed, to preprocess SCADA datasets containing sufficient examples for frequent cyber attacks. Then, a few-shot learning based preliminary IDS model is designed and trained using the preprocessed data. Last, a complete FS-IDS model for SCADA networks is established by further training the preliminary IDS model with a few examples for cyber attacks of interest. The high effectiveness of the proposed FS-IDS, in detecting cyber attacks against SCADA networks with only a few examples, is demonstrated by extensive experiments on a real SCADA dataset.
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it makes the case for incorporating cybersecurity principles into undergraduate Engineering Technology Education and for incorporating Industrial Control Systems (ICS) principles into undergraduate Information Technology (IT)/Cybersecurity Education. Specifically, the paper highlights the knowledge/skill gap between engineers and IT/Cybersecurity professionals with respect to the cybersecurity of the ICS. Secondly, it identifies several areas where traditional IT systems and ICS intercept. This interception not only implies that ICS are susceptible to the same cyber threats as traditional IT/IS but also to threats that are unique to ICS. Subsequently, the paper identifies several areas where cybersecurity principles can be applied to ICS. By incorporating cybersecurity principles into Engineering Technology Education, the paper hopes to provide IT/Cybersecurity and Engineering Students with (a) the theoretical knowledge of the cybersecurity issues associated with administering and operating ICS and (b) the applied technical skills necessary to manage and mitigate the cyber risks against these systems. Overall, the paper holds the promise of contributing to the ongoing effort aimed at bridging the knowledge/skill gap with respect to securing ICS against cyber threats and attacks.
The ability to advance the state of the art in automated cybersecurity protections for industrial control systems (ICS) has as a prerequisite of understanding the trade-off space. That is, to enable a cyber feedback loop in a control system environment you must first consider both the security mitigation available, the benefits and the impacts to the control system functionality when the mitigation is used. More damaging impacts could be precipitated that the mitigation was intended to rectify. This paper details networked ICS that controls a simulation of the frequency response represented with the swing equation. The microgrid loads and base generation can be balanced through the control of an emulated battery and power inverter. The simulated plant, which is implemented in Raspberry Pi computers, provides an inexpensive platform to realize the physical effects of cyber attacks to show the trade-offs of available mitigating actions. This network design can include a commercial ICS controller and simple plant or emulated plant to introduce real world implementation of feedback controls, and provides a scalable, physical effects measurable microgrid for cyber resilience analysis (SPEMMCRA).