Biblio
NDN has been widely regarded as a promising representation and implementation of information- centric networking (ICN) and serves as a potential candidate for the future Internet architecture. However, the security of NDN is threatened by a significant safety hazard known as an IFA, which is an evolution of DoS and distributed DoS attacks on IP-based networks. The IFA attackers can create numerous malicious interest packets into a named data network to quickly exhaust the bandwidth of communication channels and cache capacity of NDN routers, thereby seriously affecting the routers' ability to receive and forward packets for normal users. Accurate detection of the IFAs is the most critical issue in the design of a countermeasure. To the best of our knowledge, the existing IFA countermeasures still have limitations in terms of detection accuracy, especially for rapidly volatile attacks. This article proposes a TC to detect the distributions of normal and malicious interest packets in the NDN routers to further identify the IFA. The trace back method is used to prevent further attempts. The simulation results show the efficiency of the TC for mitigating the IFAs and its advantages over other typical IFA countermeasures.
Nowadays network applications have more focus on content distribution which is hard to tackle in IP based Internet. Information Centric Network (ICN) have the ability to overcome this problem for various scenarios, specifically for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). Conventional IP based system have issues like mobility management hence ICN solve this issue because data fetching is not dependent on a particular node or physical location. Many initial investigations have performed on an instance of ICN commonly known as Named Data Networking (NDN). However, NDN exposes the new type of security susceptibilities, poisoning cache attack, flooding Interest attack, and violation of privacy because the content in the network is called by the name. This paper focused on mitigation of Interest flooding attack by proposing new scheme, named Interest Flooding Attack Mitigation Scheme (IFAMS) in Vehicular Named Data Network (VNDN). Simulation results depict that proposed IFAMS scheme mitigates the Interest flooding attack in the network.
Statistics suggests, proceeding towards IoT generation, is increasing IoT devices at a drastic rate. This will be very challenging for our present-day network infrastructure to manage, this much of data. This may risk, both security and traffic collapsing. We have proposed an infrastructure with Fog Computing. The Fog layer consists two layers, using the concepts of Service oriented Architecture (SOA) and the Agent based composition model which ensures the traffic usage reduction. In order to have a robust and secured system, we have modified the Fog based agent model by replacing the SOA with secured Named Data Network (NDN) protocol. Knowing the fact that NDN has the caching layer, we are combining NDN and with Fog, as it can overcome the forwarding strategy limitation and memory constraints of NDN by the Agent Society, in the Middle layer along with Trust management.
Although Vehicle Named Data Network (VNDN) possess the communication benefits of Named Data Network and Vehicle Opportunity Network, it also introduces some new privacy problems, including the identity security of Data Requesters and Data Providers. Data providers in VNDN need to sign data packets directly, which will leak the identity information of the providers, while the vicinity malicious nodes can access the sensitive information of Data Requesters by analyzing the relationship between Data Requesters and the data names in Interest Packages that are sent directly in plaintext. In order to solve the above privacy problems, this paper presents an identity privacy protection strategy for Data Requesters and Data Providers in VNDN. A ring signature scheme is used to hide the correlation between the signature and the data provider and the anonymous proxy idea is used to protect the real identity of the data requester in the proposed strategy. Security Analysis and experiments in the ONE-based VNDN platform indicate that the proposed strategy is effective and practical.
Reconnaissance might be the longest phase, sometimes take weeks or months. The black hat makes use of passive information gathering techniques. Once the attacker has sufficient statistics, then the attacker starts the technique of scanning perimeter and internal network devices seeking out open ports and related services. In this paper we are showing traffic accountability and time to complete the specific task during reconnaissance phase active scanning with nmap tool and proposed strategies that how to deal with large volumes of hosts and conserve network traffic as well as time of the specific task.
Lack of effective accountability mechanisms brings a series of security problems for Internet today. In Next Generation Internet based on IPv6, the system of identity authentication and IP verification is the key to accounting ability. Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) can protect IP source addresses from being faked. But without identity authentication mechanism and certain relationship between IP and accountable identity, the accountability is still unreliable. To solve this problem, most research focus on embedding accountable identity into IP address which need either changing DHCP client or twice DHCP request process due to the separate process of user authentication and address assignment. Different from previous research, this paper first analyzes the problems and requirements of combining Web Portal or 802.1X, two main identity authentication mechanism (AAA), with the accountable address assignment in SAVI frame-work. Then a novel Cooperative mechanism for Accountable IP address assignment (CAIP) is proposed based on 802.1X and SAVI, which takes into account the validation of IP address, the authenticity and accountability of identity at the same time. Finally, we build up prototype system for both Fat AP and Thin AP wireless scenarios and simulate the performance of CAIP through large-scale campus networks' data logs. The experiment result shows that the IP addresses and identities in CAIP are protective and accountable. Compared with other previous research, CAIP is not only transparent to the terminals and networks, but also low impact on network equipment, which makes CAIP easy deployment with high compatibility and low cost.
Through time inference attacks, adversaries fingerprint SDN controllers, estimate switches flow-table size, and perform flow state reconnaissance. In fact, timing a SDN and analyzing its results can expose information which later empowers SDN resource-consumption or saturation attacks. In the real world, however, launching such attacks is not easy. This is due to some challenges attackers may encounter while attacking an actual SDN deployment. These challenges, which are not addressed adequately in the related literature, are investigated in this paper. Accordingly, practical solutions to mitigate such attacks are also proposed. Discussed challenges are clarified by means of conducting extensive experiments on an actual cloud data center testbed. Moreover, mitigation schemes have been implemented and examined in details. Experimental results show that proposed countermeasures effectively block time inference attacks.
In this paper we investigate deceptive defense strategies for web servers. Web servers are widely exploited resources in the modern cyber threat landscape. Often these servers are exposed in the Internet and accessible for a broad range of valid as well as malicious users. Common security strategies like firewalls are not sufficient to protect web servers. Deception based Information Security enables a large set of counter measures to decrease the efficiency of intrusions. In this work we depict several techniques out of the reconnaissance process of an attacker. We match these with deceptive counter measures. All proposed measures are implemented in an experimental web server with deceptive counter measure abilities. We also conducted an experiment with honeytokens and evaluated delay strategies against automated scanner tools.
We consider a cloud based multiserver system consisting of a set of replica application servers behind a set of proxy (indirection) servers which interact directly with clients over the Internet. We study a proactive moving-target defense to thwart a DDoS attacker's reconnaissance phase and consequently reduce the attack's impact. The defense is effectively a moving-target (motag) technique in which the proxies dynamically change. The system is evaluated using an AWS prototype of HTTP redirection and by numerical evaluations of an “adversarial” coupon-collector mathematical model, the latter allowing larger-scale extrapolations.
The quantitative security effectiveness analysis is a difficult problem for the research of network address randomization techniques. In this paper, a system model and an attack model are proposed based on general attacks' attack processes and network address randomization's technical principle. Based on the models, the network address randomization's security effectiveness is quantitatively analyzed from the perspective of the attacker's attack time and attack cost in both static network address and network address randomization cases. The results of the analysis show that the security effectiveness of network address randomization is determined by the randomization frequency, the randomization space, the states of hosts in the target network, and the capabilities of the attacker.
Cyber reconnaissance is the process of gathering information about a target network for the purpose of compromising systems within that network. Network-based deception has emerged as a promising approach to disrupt attackers' reconnaissance efforts. However, limited work has been done so far on measuring the effectiveness of network-based deception. Furthermore, given that Software-Defined Networking (SDN) facilitates cyber deception by allowing network traffic to be modified and injected on-the-fly, understanding the effectiveness of employing different cyber deception strategies is critical. In this paper, we present a model to study the reconnaissance surface of a network and model the process of gathering information by attackers as interactions with a cyber defensive system that may use deception. To capture the evolution of the attackers' knowledge during reconnaissance, we design a belief system that is updated by using a Bayesian inference method. For the proposed model, we present two metrics based on KL-divergence to quantify the effectiveness of network deception. We tested the model and the two metrics by conducting experiments with a simulated attacker in an SDN-based deception system. The results of the experiments match our expectations, providing support for the model and proposed metrics.
Moving target defense (MTD) is becoming popular with the advancements in Software Defined Networking (SDN) technologies. With centralized management through SDN, changing the network attributes such as routes to escape from attacks is simple and fast. Yet, the available alternate routes are bounded by the network topology, and a persistent attacker that continuously perform the reconnaissance can extract the whole link-map of the network. To address this issue, we propose to use virtual shadow networks (VSNs) by applying Network Function Virtualization (NFV) abilities to the network in order to deceive attacker with the fake topology information and not reveal the actual network topology and characteristics. We design this approach under a formal framework for Internet Service Provider (ISP) networks and apply it to the recently emerged indirect DDoS attacks, namely Crossfire, for evaluation. The results show that attacker spends more time to figure out the network behavior while the costs on the defender and network operations are negligible until reaching a certain network size.
Traditional address scanning attacks mainly rely on the naive 'brute forcing' approach, where the entire IPv4 address space is exhaustively searched by enumerating different possibilities. However, such an approach is inefficient for IPv6 due to its vast subnet size (i.e., 264). As a result, it is widely assumed that address scanning attacks are less feasible in IPv6 networks. In this paper, we evaluate new IPv6 reconnaissance techniques in real IPv6 networks and expose how to leverage the Domain Name System (DNS) for IPv6 network reconnaissance. We collected IPv6 addresses from 5 regions and 100,000 domains by exploiting DNS reverse zone and DNSSEC records. We propose a DNS Guard (DNSG) to efficiently detect DNS reconnaissance attacks in IPv6 networks. DNSG is a plug and play component that could be added to the existing infrastructure. We implement DNSG using Bro and Suricata. Our results demonstrate that DNSG could effectively block DNS reconnaissance attacks.
Internet of Things (IoT) has an immense potential for a plethora of applications ranging from healthcare automation to defence networks and the power grid. The security of an IoT network is essentially paramount to the security of the underlying computing and communication infrastructure. However, due to constrained resources and limited computational capabilities, IoT networks are prone to various attacks. Thus, safeguarding the IoT network from adversarial attacks is of vital importance and can be realised through planning and deployment of effective security controls; one such control being an intrusion detection system. In this paper, we present a novel intrusion detection scheme for IoT networks that classifies traffic flow through the application of deep learning concepts. We adopt a newly published IoT dataset and generate generic features from the field information in packet level. We develop a feed-forward neural networks model for binary and multi-class classification including denial of service, distributed denial of service, reconnaissance and information theft attacks against IoT devices. Results obtained through the evaluation of the proposed scheme via the processed dataset illustrate a high classification accuracy.
With the rapidly increasing number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and their extensive integration into peoples' daily lives, the security of those devices is of primary importance. Nonetheless, many IoT devices suffer from the absence, or the bad application, of security concepts, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in those devices. To achieve early detection of potential vulnerabilities, network scanner tools are frequently used. However, most of those tools are highly specialized; thus, multiple tools and a meaningful correlation of their results are required to obtain an adequate listing of identified network vulnerabilities. To simplify this process, we propose a modular framework for automated network reconnaissance and vulnerability indication in IP-based networks. It allows integrating a diverse set of tools as either, scanning tools or analysis tools. Moreover, the framework enables result aggregation of different modules and allows information sharing between modules facilitating the development of advanced analysis modules. Additionally, intermediate scanning and analysis data is stored, enabling a historical view of derived information and also allowing users to retrace decision-making processes. We show the framework's modular capabilities by implementing one scanner module and three analysis modules. The automated process is then evaluated using an exemplary scenario with common IP-based IoT components.
This article presents results and overview of conducted testing of active optical network devices. The base for the testing is originating in Kali Linux and penetration testing generally. The goal of tests is to either confirm or disprove a vulnerability of devices used in the tested polygon. The first part deals with general overview and topology of testing devices, the next part is dedicated to active and passive exploration and exploits. The last part provides a summary of the results.
Moving target defense (MTD) is a proactive defense mechanism of changing the attack surface to increase an attacker's confusion and/or uncertainty, which invalidates its intelligence gained through reconnaissance and/or network scanning attacks. In this work, we propose software-defined networking (SDN)-based MTD technique using the shuffling of IP addresses and port numbers aiming to obfuscate both network and transport layers' real identities of the host and the service for defending against the network reconnaissance and scanning attacks. We call our proposed MTD technique Random Host and Service Multiplexing, namely RHSM. RHSM allows each host to use random, multiple virtual IP addresses to be dynamically and periodically shuffled. In addition, it uses short-lived, multiple virtual port numbers for an active service running on the host. Our proposed RHSM is novel in that we employ multiplexing (or de-multiplexing) to dynamically change and remap from all the virtual IPs of the host to the real IP or the virtual ports of the services to the real port, respectively. Via extensive simulation experiments, we prove how effectively and efficiently RHSM outperforms a baseline counterpart (i.e., a static network without RHSM) in terms of the attack success probability and defense cost.
To gain strategic insight into defending against the network reconnaissance stage of advanced persistent threats, we recreate the escalating competition between scans and deceptive views on a Software Defined Network (SDN). Our threat model presumes the defense is a deceptive network view unique for each node on the network. It can be configured in terms of the number of honeypots and subnets, as well as how real nodes are distributed across the subnets. It assumes attacks are NMAP ping scans that can be configured in terms of how many IP addresses are scanned and how they are visited. Higher performing defenses detect the scanner quicker while leaking as little information as possible while higher performing attacks are better at evading detection and discovering real nodes. By using Artificial Intelligence in the form of a competitive coevolutionary genetic algorithm, we can analyze the configurations of high performing static defenses and attacks versus their evolving adversary as well as the optimized configuration of the adversary itself. When attacks and defenses both evolve, we can observe that the extent of evolution influences the best configurations.
Network reconnaissance aims at gathering as much information as possible before an attack is launched. Meanwhile, static host address configuration facilitates network reconnaissance. Currently, more sophisticated network reconnaissance has been emerged with the adaptive and cooperative features. To address this, in this paper, we present Hiding and Trapping (HaT), which is a deceptive approach to disrupt adversarial network reconnaissance with the help of the software-defined networking (SDN) paradigm. HaT is able to hide valuable hosts from attackers and to trap them into decoy nodes through strategic and holistic host address mutation according to characteristic of adversaries. We implement a prototype of HaT, and evaluate its performance by experiments. The experimental results show that HaT is capable to effectively disrupt adversarial network reconnaissance with better deceptive performance than the existing address randomization approach.