Biblio
This paper integrates Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and Information -Centric Networking (ICN) framework to enable low latency-based stateful routing and caching management by leveraging a novel forwarding and caching strategy. The framework is implemented in a clean- slate environment that does not rely on the TCP/IP principle. It utilizes Pending Interest Tables (PIT) instead of Forwarding Information Base (FIB) to perform data dissemination among peers in the proposed IC-SDN framework. As a result, all data exchanged and cached in the system are organized in chunks with the same interest resulting in reduced packet overhead costs. Additionally, we propose an efficient caching strategy that leverages in- network caching and naming of contents through an IC-SDN controller to support off- path caching. The testbed evaluation shows that the proposed IC-SDN implementation achieves an increased throughput and reduced latency compared to the traditional information-centric environment, especially in the high load scenarios.
Today's companies are increasingly relying on Internet of Everything (IoE) to modernize their operations. The very complexes characteristics of such system expose their applications and their exchanged data to multiples risks and security breaches that make them targets for cyber attacks. The aim of our work in this paper is to provide an cybersecurity strategy whose objective is to prevent and anticipate threats related to the IoE. An economic approach is used in order to help to take decisions according to the reduction of the risks generated by the non definition of the appropriate levels of security. The considered problem have been resolved by exploiting a combinatorial optimization approach with a practical case of knapsack. We opted for a bi-objective modeling under uncertainty with a constraint of cardinality and a given budget to be respected. To guarantee a robustness of our strategy, we have also considered the criterion of uncertainty by taking into account all the possible threats that can be generated by a cyber attacks over IoE. Our strategy have been implemented and simulated under MATLAB environement and its performance results have been compared to those obtained by NSGA-II metaheuristic. Our proposed cyber security strategy recorded a clear improvment of efficiency according to the optimization of the security level and cost parametrs.
Fog computing is a new computing paradigm that utilizes numerous mutually cooperating terminal devices or network edge devices to provide computing, storage, and communication services. Fog computing extends cloud computing services to the edge of the network, making up for the deficiencies of cloud computing in terms of location awareness, mobility support and latency. However, fog nodes are not active enough to perform tasks, and fog nodes recruited by cloud service providers cannot provide stable and continuous resources, which limits the development of fog computing. In the process of cloud service providers using the resources in the fog nodes to provide services to users, the cloud service providers and fog nodes are selfish and committed to maximizing their own payoffs. This situation makes it easy for the fog node to work negatively during the execution of the task. Limited by the low quality of resource provided by fog nodes, the payoff of cloud service providers has been severely affected. In response to this problem, an appropriate incentive mechanism needs to be established in the fog computing environment to solve the core problems faced by both cloud service providers and fog nodes in maximizing their respective utility, in order to achieve the incentive effect. Therefore, this paper proposes an incentive model based on repeated game, and designs a trigger strategy with credible threats, and obtains the conditions for incentive consistency. Under this condition, the fog node will be forced by the deterrence of the trigger strategy to voluntarily choose the strategy of actively executing the task, so as to avoid the loss of subsequent rewards when it is found to perform the task passively. Then, using evolutionary game theory to analyze the stability of the trigger strategy, it proves the dynamic validity of the incentive consistency condition.
With the emergence of computationally intensive and delay sensitive applications, mobile edge computing(MEC) has become more and more popular. Simultaneously, MEC paradigm is faced with security challenges, the most harmful of which is DDoS attack. In this paper, we focus on the resource orchestration algorithm in MEC scenario to mitigate DDoS attack. Most of existing works on resource orchestration algorithm barely take into account DDoS attack. Moreover, they assume that MEC nodes are unselfish, while in practice MEC nodes are selfish and try to maximize their individual utility only, as they usually belong to different network operators. To solve such problems, we propose a price-based resource orchestration algorithm(PROA) using game theory and convex optimization, which aims at mitigating DDoS attack while maximizing the utility of each participant. Pricing resources to simulate market mechanisms, which is national to make rational decisions for all participants. Finally, we conduct experiment using Matlab and show that the proposed PROA can effectively mitigate DDoS attack on the attacked MEC node.