Visible to the public Robust Channel Parameters for Crypto Key Generation in Underwater Acoustic Systems

TitleRobust Channel Parameters for Crypto Key Generation in Underwater Acoustic Systems
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsPelekanakis, Konstantinos, Gussen, Camila M. G., Petroccia, Roberto, Alves, João
Conference NameOCEANS 2019 MTS/IEEE SEATTLE
Date Publishedoct
KeywordsAd hoc networks, ad hoc underwater acoustic networks, channel impulse response, crypto-key generation algorithm, cryptography, Key Management, Metrics, physical layer security, Physical layer security (PLS), pubcrawl, quantisation (signal), Resiliency, robust channel parameters, Scalability, Signal processing, telecommunication security, underwater acoustic communication, Underwater acoustic communications, underwater acoustic systems, Underwater Networks
AbstractKey management is critical for the successful operation of a cryptographic system in wireless networks. Systems based on asymmetric keys require a dedicated infrastructure for key management and authentication which may not be practical for ad-hoc Underwater Acoustic Networks (UANs). In symmetric-key systems, key distribution is not easy to handle when new nodes join the network. In addition, when a key is compromised all nodes that use the same key are not secure anymore. Hence, it is desirable to have a dynamic way to generate new keys without relying on past keys. Physical Layer Security (PLS) uses correlated channel measurements between two underwater nodes to generate a cryptographic key without exchanging the key itself. In this study, we set up a network of two legitimate nodes and one eavesdropper operating in a shallow area off the coast of Portugal. We propose novel features based on the Channel Impulse Response (CIR) of the established acoustic link that could be used as an initial seed for a crypto-key generation algorithm. Our results show that the two nodes can independently generate 306 quantization bits after exchanging 187 probe signals. Furthermore, the eavesdropper fails to generate the same bits from her/his data even if she/he performs exactly the same signal processing steps of the legitimate nodes.
DOI10.23919/OCEANS40490.2019.8962548
Citation Keypelekanakis_robust_2019