Risk Management

This project develops a holistic approach to sociotechnical system security that combines innovations in both criminology and engineering/computer science. We design unified sociotechnical security models that capture how sociotechnical intrusions against social as well as technical aspects of the system (i.e., modeled as hidden sequences of system security states) result in observed hard data such as security sensor alerts and soft data produced by human/social sensors such as reports about slow machines.

Concern about the security and reliability of our electronic systems and infrastructure is at an all-time high. Economic factors dictate that the design, manufacturing, testing, and deployment of silicon chips are spread across many companies and countries with different and often conflicting goals and interests. In modern complex digital designs, behaviors at a good fraction of observable output signals for many operational cycles are unspecified and vulnerable to malicious modifications, known as Hardware Trojans.

By the end of this decade, it is estimated that Internet of Things (IoT) could connect as many as 50 billion devices. Near Field Communication (NFC) is considered as a key enabler of IoT. Many useful applications are supported by NFC, including contactless payment, identification, authentication, file exchange, and eHealthcare, etc. However, securing NFC between mobile devices faces great challenges mainly because of severe resource constraints on NFC devices, NFC systems deployed without security, and sophisticated adversaries.

Insiders pose substantial threats to an organization, regardless of whether they act intentionally or accidentally. Because they usually possess elevated privileges and have skills, knowledge, resources, access and motives regarding internal systems and data, insiders can easily circumvent security countermeasures, steal valuable data, and cause damage. Perimeter and host-based countermeasures like firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and antivirus software are ineffective in preventing and detecting insider threats.

The U.S. electric grid is being transformed from a one-way channel delivering electricity from central power plants to customers at set prices, toward a distributed grid with two-way flows of information and electricity and dynamic distributed markets. The benefits of creating distributed markets for electricity are potentially great. Consumers can participate as buyers and sellers in these markets, utilities can reduce costly peak electricity load and risk of outages, and firms can be rewarded for innovation.