Biblio
Adversary emulation is an offensive exercise that provides a comprehensive assessment of a system’s resilience against cyber attacks. However, adversary emulation is typically a manual process, making it costly and hard to deploy in cyber-physical systems (CPS) with complex dynamics, vulnerabilities, and operational uncertainties. In this paper, we develop an automated, domain-aware approach to adversary emulation for CPS. We formulate a Markov Decision Process (MDP) model to determine an optimal attack sequence over a hybrid attack graph with cyber (discrete) and physical (continuous) components and related physical dynamics. We apply model-based and model-free reinforcement learning (RL) methods to solve the discrete-continuous MDP in a tractable fashion. As a baseline, we also develop a greedy attack algorithm and compare it with the RL procedures. We summarize our findings through a numerical study on sensor deception attacks in buildings to compare the performance and solution quality of the proposed algorithms.
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) depend on cybersecurity to ensure functionality, data quality, cyberattack resilience, etc. There are known and unknown cyber threats and attacks that pose significant risks. Information assurance and information security are critical. Many systems are vulnerable to intelligence exploitation and cyberattacks. By investigating cybersecurity risks and formal representation of CPS using spatiotemporal dynamic graphs and networks, this paper investigates topics and solutions aimed to examine and empower: (1) Cybersecurity capabilities; (2) Information assurance and system vulnerabilities; (3) Detection of cyber threat and attacks; (4) Situational awareness; etc. We introduce statistically-characterized dynamic graphs, novel entropy-centric algorithms and calculi which promise to ensure near-real-time capabilities.
With the increasing interdependence of critical infrastructures, the probability of a specific infrastructure to experience a complex cyber-physical attack is increasing. Thus it is important to analyze the risk of an attack and the dynamics of its propagation in order to design and deploy appropriate countermeasures. The attack trees, commonly adopted to this aim, have inherent shortcomings in representing interdependent, concurrent and sequential attacks. To overcome this, the work presented here proposes a stochastic methodology using Petri Nets and Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) to analyze the attacks, considering the individual attack occurrence probabilities and their stochastic propagation times. A procedure to convert a basic attack tree into an equivalent CTMC is presented. The proposed method is applied in a case study to calculate the different attack propagation characteristics. The characteristics are namely, the probability of reaching the root node & sub attack nodes, the mean time to reach the root node and the mean time spent in the sub attack nodes before reaching the root node. Additionally, the method quantifies the effectiveness of specific defenses in reducing the attack risk considering the efficiency of individual defenses.
In the past decade we have seen an active research community proposing attacks and defenses to Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Most of these attacks and defenses have been heuristic in nature, limiting the attacker to a set of predefined operations, and proposing defenses with unclear security guarantees. In this paper, we propose a generic adversary model that can capture any type of attack (our attacker is not constrained to follow specific attacks such as replay, delay, or bias) and use it to design security mechanisms with provable security guarantees. In particular, we propose a new secure design paradigm we call DARIA: Designing Actuators to Resist arbItrary Attacks. The main idea behind DARIA is the design of physical limits to actuators in order to prevent attackers from arbitrarily manipulating the system, irrespective of their point of attack (sensors or actuators) or the specific attack algorithm (bias, replay, delays, etc.). As far as we are aware, we are the first research team to propose the design of physical limits to actuators in a control loop in order to keep the system secure against attacks. We demonstrate the generality of our proposal on simulations of vehicular platooning and industrial processes.
Reliable and secure grid operations become more and more challenging in context of increasing IT/OT convergence and decreasing dynamic margins in today's power systems. To ensure the correct operation of monitoring and control functions in control centres, an intelligent assessment of the different information sources is necessary to provide a robust data source in case of critical physical events as well as cyber-attacks. Within this paper, a holistic data stream assessment methodology is proposed using an expert knowledge based cyber-physical situational awareness for different steady and transient system states. This approach goes beyond existing techniques by combining high-resolution PMU data with SCADA information as well as Digital Twin and AI based anomaly detection functionalities.