Biblio
Selecting the best path in multi-path heterogeneous networks is challenging. Multi-path TCP uses by default a scheduler that selects the path with the minimum round trip time (minRTT). A well-known problem is head-of-line blocking at the receiver when packets arrive out of order on different paths. We shed light on another issue that occurs if scheduling have to deal with deep queues in the network. First, we highlight the relevance by a real-world experiment in cellular networks that often deploy deep queues. Second, we elaborate on the issues with minRTT scheduling and deep queues in a simplified network to illustrate the root causes; namely the interaction of the minRTT scheduler and loss-based congestion control that causes extensive bufferbloat at network elements and distorts RTT measurement. This results in extraordinary large buffer sizes for full utilization. Finally, we discuss mitigation techniques and show how alternative congestion control algorithms mitigate the effect.
The fifth generation of cellular networks (5G) will enable different use cases where security will be more critical than ever before (e.g. autonomous vehicles and critical IoT devices). Unfortunately, the new networks are being built on the certainty that security problems cannot be solved in the short term. Far from reinventing the wheel, one of our goals is to allow security software developers to implement and test their reactive solutions for the capillary network of 5G devices. Therefore, in this paper a solution for analysing proximity-based attacks in 5G environments is modelled and tested using OMNET++. The solution, named CRAT, is able to decouple the security analysis from the hardware of the device with the aim to extend the analysis of proximity-based attacks to different use-cases in 5G. We follow a high-level approach, in which the devices can take the role of victim, offender and guardian following the principles of the routine activity theory.
Root cause analysis (RCA) is a common and recurring task performed by operators of cellular networks. It is done mainly to keep customers satisfied with the quality of offered services and to maximize return on investment (ROI) by minimizing and where possible eliminating the root causes of faults in cellular networks. Currently, the actual detection and diagnosis of faults or potential faults is still a manual and slow process often carried out by network experts who manually analyze and correlate various pieces of network data such as, alarms, call traces, configuration management (CM) and key performance indicator (KPI) data in order to come up with the most probable root cause of a given network fault. In this paper, we propose an automated fault detection and diagnosis solution called adaptive root cause analysis (ARCA). The solution uses measurements and other network data together with Bayesian network theory to perform automated evidence based RCA. Compared to the current common practice, our solution is faster due to automation of the entire RCA process. The solution is also cheaper because it needs fewer or no personnel in order to operate and it improves efficiency through domain knowledge reuse during adaptive learning. As it uses a probabilistic Bayesian classifier, it can work with incomplete data and it can handle large datasets with complex probability combinations. Experimental results from stratified synthesized data affirmatively validate the feasibility of using such a solution as a key part of self-healing (SH) especially in emerging self-organizing network (SON) based solutions in LTE Advanced (LTE-A) and 5G.
Recently, cellular operators have started migrating to IPv6 in response to the increasing demand for IP addresses. With the introduction of IPv6, cellular middleboxes, such as firewalls for preventing malicious traffic from the Internet and stateful NAT64 boxes for providing backward compatibility with legacy IPv4 services, have become crucial to maintain stability of cellular networks. This paper presents security problems of the currently deployed IPv6 middleboxes of five major operators. To this end, we first investigate several key features of the current IPv6 deployment that can harm the safety of a cellular network as well as its customers. These features combined with the currently deployed IPv6 middlebox allow an adversary to launch six different attacks. First, firewalls in IPv6 cellular networks fail to block incoming packets properly. Thus, an adversary could fingerprint cellular devices with scanning, and further, she could launch denial-of-service or over-billing attacks. Second, vulnerabilities in the stateful NAT64 box, a middlebox that maps an IPv6 address to an IPv4 address (and vice versa), allow an adversary to launch three different attacks: 1) NAT overflow attack that allows an adversary to overflow the NAT resources, 2) NAT wiping attack that removes active NAT mappings by exploiting the lack of TCP sequence number verification of firewalls, and 3) NAT bricking attack that targets services adopting IP-based blacklisting by preventing the shared external IPv4 address from accessing the service. We confirmed the feasibility of these attacks with an empirical analysis. We also propose effective countermeasures for each attack.
The 911 emergency service belongs to one of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks launched from a mobile phone botnet pose a significant threat to the availability of this vital service. In this paper we show how attackers can exploit the cellular network protocols in order to launch an anonymized DDoS attack on 911. The current FCC regulations require that all emergency calls be immediately routed regardless of the caller's identifiers (e.g., IMSI and IMEI). A rootkit placed within the baseband firmware of a mobile phone can mask and randomize all cellular identifiers, causing the device to have no genuine identification within the cellular network. Such anonymized phones can issue repeated emergency calls that cannot be blocked by the network or the emergency call centers, technically or legally. We explore the 911 infrastructure and discuss why it is susceptible to this kind of attack. We then implement different forms of the attack and test our implementation on a small cellular network. Finally, we simulate and analyze anonymous attacks on a model of current 911 infrastructure in order to measure the severity of their impact. We found that with less than 6K bots (or \$100K hardware), attackers can block emergency services in an entire state (e.g., North Carolina) for days. We believe that this paper will assist the respective organizations, lawmakers, and security professionals in understanding the scope of this issue in order to prevent possible 911-DDoS attacks in the future.
Cellular networks play a dominant role in how we communicate. But, the current cellular architecture and protocols are overly complex. The 'control plane' protocol includes setting up explicit tunnels for every session and exchanging a large number of packets among the different entities (mobile device, base station, the packet gateways and mobility management) to ensure state is exchanged in a consistent manner. This limits scalability. As we evolve to having to support an increasing number of users, cell-sites (e.g., 5G) and the consequent mobility, and the incoming wave of IoT devices, a re-thinking of the architecture and control protocols is required. In this work we propose CleanG, a simplified software-based architecture for the Mobile Core Network (MCN) and a simplified control protocol for cellular networks. Network Function Virtualization enables dynamic management of capacity in the cloud to support the MCN of future cellular networks. We develop a simplified protocol that substantially reduces the number of control messages exchanged to support the various events, while retaining the current functionality expected from the network. CleanG, we believe will scale better and have lower latency.
With the growing demand for increased spectral efficiencies, there has been renewed interest in enabling full-duplex communications. However, existing approaches to enable full-duplex require a clean-slate approach to address the key challenge in full-duplex, namely self-interference suppression. This serves as a big deterrent to enabling full-duplex in existing cellular networks. Towards our vision of enabling full-duplex in legacy cellular, specifically LTE networks, with no modifications to existing hardware at BS and client as well as technology specific industry standards, we present the design of our experimental system FD-LTE, that incorporates a combination of passive SI cancellation schemes, with legacy LTE half-duplex BS and client devices. We build a prototype of FD-LTE, integrate it with LTE's evolved packet core and conduct over-the-air experiments to explore the feasibility and potential for full-duplex with legacy LTE networks. We report promising experimental results from FD-LTE, which currently applies to scenarios with limited ranges that is typical of small cells.
Cellular data networks are proliferating to address the need for ubiquitous connectivity. To cope with the increasing number of subscribers and with the spatiotemporal variations of the wireless signals, current cellular networks use opportunistic schedulers, such as the Proportional Fairness scheduler (PF), to maximize network throughput while maintaining fairness among users. Such scheduling decisions are based on channel quality metrics and Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) feedback reports provided by the User's Equipment (UE). Implicit in current networks is the a priori trust on every UE's feedback. Malicious UEs can, thus, exploit this trust to disrupt service by intelligently faking their reports. This work proposes a trustworthy version of the PF scheduler (called TPF) to mitigate the effects of such Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In brief, based on the channel quality reported by the UE, we assign a probability to possible ARQ feedbacks. We then use the probability associated with the actual ARQ report to assess the UE's reporting trustworthiness. We adapt the scheduling mechanism to give higher priority to more trusted users. Our evaluations show that TPF 1) does not induce any performance degradation under benign settings, and 2) it completely mitigates the effects of the activity of malicious UEs. In particular, while colluding attackers can obtain up to 77 percent of the time slots with the most sophisticated attack, TPF is able to contain this percentage to as low as 6 percent.