Biblio
In this article, we study the transmission secrecy performance of primary user in overlay cognitive wireless networks, in which an untrusted energy-limited secondary cooperative user assists the primary transmission to exchange for the spectrum resource. In the network, the information can be simultaneously transmitted through the direct and relay links. For the enhancement of primary transmission security, a maximum ratio combining (MRC) scheme is utilized by the receiver to exploit the two copies of source information. For the security analysis, we firstly derive the tight lower bound expression for secrecy outage probability (SOP). Then, three asymptotic expressions for SOP are also expressed to further analyze the impacts of the transmit power and the location of secondary cooperative node on the primary user information security. The findings show that the primary user information secrecy performance enhances with the improvement of transmit power. Moreover, the smaller the distance between the secondary node and the destination, the better the primary secrecy performance.
Secure network coding realizes the secrecy of the message when the message is transmitted via noiseless network and a part of edges or a part of intermediate nodes are eavesdropped. In this framework, if the channels of the network has noise, we apply the error correction to noisy channel before applying the secure network coding. In contrast, secure physical layer network coding is a method to securely transmit a message by a combination of coding operation on nodes when the network is given as a set of noisy channels. In this paper, we give several examples of network, in which, secure physical layer network coding realizes a performance that cannot be realized by secure network coding.
Key derivation from the physical layer features of the communication channels is a promising approach which can help the key management and security enhancement in communication networks. In this paper, we consider a key generation technique that quantizes the received signal phase to obtain the secret keys. We then study the effect of a jamming attack on this system. The jammer is an active attacker that tries to make a disturbance in the key derivation procedure and changes the phase of the received signal by transmitting an adversary signal. We evaluate the effect of jamming on the security performance of the system and show the ways to improve this performance. Our numerical results show that more phase quantization regions limit the probability of successful attacks.
This paper studies the physical layer security performance of a Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer (SWIPT) millimeter wave (mmWave) ultra-dense network under a stochastic geometry framework. Specifically, we first derive the energy-information coverage probability and secrecy probability in the considered system under time switching policies. Then the effective secrecy throughput (EST) which can characterize the trade-off between the energy coverage, secure and reliable transmission performance is derived. Theoretical analyses and simulation results reveal the design insights into the effects of various network parameters like, transmit power, time switching factor, transmission rate, confidential information rate, etc, on the secrecy performance. Specifically, it is impossible to realize the effective secrecy throughput improvement just by increasing the transmit power.
In this paper, we propose a frozen bit selection scheme for polar coding scheme combined with physical layer security that enhances the security of two legitimate users on a wiretap channel. By flipping certain frozen bits, the bit-error rate (BER) of an eavesdropper is maximized while the BER of the legitimate receiver is unaffected. An ARQ protocol is proposed that only feeds back a small proportion of the frozen bits to the transmitter, which increases the secrecy rate. The scheme is evaluated on a wiretap channel affected by impulsive noise and we consider cases where the eavesdropper's channel is actually more impulsive than the main channel. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme ensures the eavesdropper's BER is high even when only one frozen bit is flipped and this is achieved even when their channel is more impulsive than the main channel.
The increasing adoption of 3D printing in many safety and mission critical applications exposes 3D printers to a variety of cyber attacks that may result in catastrophic consequences if the printing process is compromised. For example, the mechanical properties (e.g., physical strength, thermal resistance, dimensional stability) of 3D printed objects could be significantly affected and degraded if a simple printing setting is maliciously changed. To address this challenge, this study proposes a model-free real-time online process monitoring approach that is capable of detecting and defending against the cyber-physical attacks on the firmwares of 3D printers. Specifically, we explore the potential attacks and consequences of four key printing attributes (including infill path, printing speed, layer thickness, and fan speed) and then formulate the attack models. Based on the intrinsic relation between the printing attributes and the physical observations, our defense model is established by systematically analyzing the multi-faceted, real-time measurement collected from the accelerometer, magnetometer and camera. The Kalman filter and Canny filter are used to map and estimate three aforementioned critical toolpath information that might affect the printing quality. Mel-frequency Cepstrum Coefficients are used to extract features for fan speed estimation. Experimental results show that, for a complex 3D printed design, our method can achieve 4% Hausdorff distance compared with the model dimension for infill path estimate, 6.07% Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) for speed estimate, 9.57% MAPE for layer thickness estimate, and 96.8% accuracy for fan speed identification. Our study demonstrates that, this new approach can effectively defend against the cyber-physical attacks on 3D printers and 3D printing process.
Modern automotive Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are increasingly adopting wireless communications for Intra-Vehicular, Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) protocols as a promising solution for challenges such as the wire harnessing problem, collision detection, and collision avoidance, traffic control, and environmental hazards. Regrettably, this new trend results in new security challenges that can put the safety and privacy of the automotive CPS and passengers at great risk. In addition, automotive wireless communication security is constrained by strict energy and performance limitations of electronic controller units and sensors. As a result, the key generation and management for secure automotive CPS wireless communication is an open research challenge. This article aims to help solve these security challenges by presenting a practical key generation technique based on the reciprocity and high spatial and temporal variation properties of the automotive wireless communication channel. Accompanying this technique is also a key length optimization algorithm to improve performance (in terms of time and energy) for safety-related applications constrained by small communication windows. To validate the practicality and effectiveness of our approach, we have conducted simulations alongside real-world experiments with vehicles and RC cars. Last, we demonstrate through simulations that we can generate keys with high security strength (keys with 67% min-entropy) with 20× reduction in code size overhead in comparison to the state-of-the-art security techniques.
Close physical proximity among wireless devices that have never shared a secret key is sometimes used as a basis of trust. In these cases, devices in close proximity are deemed trustworthy while more distant devices are viewed as potential adversaries. Because radio waves are invisible, however, a user may believe a wireless device is communicating with a nearby device when in fact the user's device is communicating with a distant adversary. Researchers have previously proposed methods for multi-antenna devices to ascertain physical proximity with other devices, but devices with a single antenna, such as those commonly used in the Internet of Things, cannot take advantage of these techniques. We investigate a method for a single-antenna Wi-Fi device to quickly determine proximity with another Wi-Fi device. Our approach leverages the repeating nature Wi-Fi's preamble and the characteristics of a transmitting antenna's near field to detect proximity with high probability. Our method never falsely declares proximity at ranges longer than 14 cm.
In this paper, the security performance of a dual-hop underlay cognitive radio (CR) system is investigated. In this system, we consider that the transmitted information by a source node S is forwarded by a multi-antenna relay R to its intended destination D. The relay performs the maximal-ratio combining (MRC) technique to process the multiple copies of the received signal. We also consider the presence of an eavesdropper who is attempting to intercept the transmitted information at both communication links, (i.e, S-R and R-D). In underlay cognitive radio networks (CRN), the source and the relay are required to adjust their transmission power to avoid causing interference to the primary user. Under this constraint, a closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability is derived subject to Nakagami-m fading model. The derived expression is validated using Monte-Carlo simulation for various values of fading severity parameters as well as the number of MRC branches.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of the antenna correlation on the secrecy of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels with multiple eavesdroppers, where transmit antenna selection (TAS) and maximal-ratio combining (MRC) are employed at the transmitter, receiver and eavesdroppers, respectively. For the practical passive eavesdropping, we first develop new and closed general formulas for the secrecy outage probability and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity to characterize the effect of spatial correlation, and results prove that the enhanced security performance can be achieved when multiple antennas are provided at the transmitter. We then explore how spatial correlation affects the asymptotic secrecy outage probability, and the secrecy diversity order is revealed. Based on these, the results show that when the average SNR of the main channel is relatively low, higher antenna correlation is more perfect to the secrecy. When the average SNR of the main channel is relatively high, higher antenna correlation is more destructive to the secrecy.
Post-quantum secure communication has attracted much interest in recent years. Known computationally secure post-quantum key agreement protocols are resource intensive for small devices. These devices may need to securely send frequent short messages, for example to report the measurement of a sensor. Secure communication using physical assumptions provides information-theoretic security (and so quantum-safe) with small computational over-head. Security and efficiency analysis of these systems however is asymptotic. In this poster we consider two secure message communication systems, and derive and compare their security and efficiency for finite length messages. Our results show that these systems indeed provide an attractive alternative for post-quantum security.
Embedded and cyber-physical systems are critically dependent on the integrity of input and output signals for proper operation. Input signals acquired from sensors are assumed to correspond to the phenomenon the system is monitoring and responding to. Similarly, when such systems issue an actuation signal it is expected that the mechanism being controlled will respond in a predictable manner. Recent work has shown that sensors can be manipulated through the use of intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI). In this work, we demonstrate thatboth input and output signals, analog and digital, can be remotely manipulated via the physical layer—thus bypassing traditional integrity mechanisms. Through the use of specially crafted IEMI it is shown that the physical layer signaling used for sensor input to, and digital communications between, embedded systems may be undermined to an attacker's advantage. Three attack scenarios are analyzed and their efficacy demonstrated. In the first scenario the analog sensing channel is manipulated to produce arbitrary sensor readings, while in the second it is shown that an attacker may induce bit flips in serial communications. Finally, a commonly used actuation signal is shown to be vulnerable to IEMI. The attacks are effective over appreciable distances and at low power.