Masood, Arshad, Masood, Ammar.
2021.
A Taxonomy of Insider Threat in Isolated (Air-Gapped) Computer Networks. 2021 International Bhurban Conference on Applied Sciences and Technologies (IBCAST). :678–685.
Mitigation of dangers posed by authorized and trusted insiders to the organization is a challenging Cyber Security issue. Despite state-of-the-art cyber security practices, malicious insiders present serious threat for the enterprises due to their wider access to organizational resources (Physical, Cyber) and good knowledge of internal processes with potential vulnerabilities. The issue becomes particularly important for isolated (air-gapped) computer networks, normally used by security sensitive organizations such as government, research and development, critical infrastructure (e.g. power, nuclear), finance, and military. Such facilities are difficult to compromise from outside; however, are quite much prone to insider threats. Although many insider threat taxonomies exist for generic computer networks; yet, the existing taxonomies do not effectively address the issue of Insider Threat in isolated computer networks. Thereby, we have developed an insider threat taxonomy specific to isolated computer networks focusing on actions performed by the trusted individual(s), Our methodology is to identify limitations in existing taxonomies and map real world insider threat cases on proposed taxonomy. We argue that for successful attack in an isolated computer network, the attack must manifest in both Physical and Cyber world. The proposed taxonomy systematically classifies different aspects of the problem into separate dimensions and branches out these dimensions into further sub-categories without loss of general applicability. Our multi-dimensional hierarchical taxonomy provides comprehensive treatment of the insider threat problem in isolated computer networks; thus, improving situational awareness of the security analyst and helps in determining proper countermeasures against perceived threats. Although many insider threat taxonomies exist for generic computer networks; yet, the existing taxonomies do not effectively address the issue of Insider Threat in isolated computer networks. Thereby, we have developed an insider threat taxonomy specific to isolated computer networks focusing on actions performed by the trusted individual(s), Our methodology is to identify limitations in existing taxonomies and map real world insider threat cases on proposed taxonomy. We argue that for successful attack in an isolated computer network, the attack must manifest in both Physical and Cyber world. The proposed taxonomy systematically classifies different aspects of the problem into separate dimensions and branches out these dimensions into further sub-categories without loss of general applicability. Our multi-dimensional hierarchical taxonomy provides comprehensive treatment of the insider threat problem in isolated computer networks; thus, improving situational awareness of the security analyst and helps in determining proper countermeasures against perceived threats. The proposed taxonomy systematically classifies different aspects of the problem into separate dimensions and branches out these dimensions into further sub-categories without loss of general applicability. Our multi-dimensional hierarchical taxonomy provides comprehensive treatment of the insider threat problem in isolated computer networks; thus, improving situational awareness of the security analyst and helps in determining proper countermeasures against perceived threats.
Meijaard, Yoram, Meiler, Peter-Paul, Allodi, Luca.
2021.
Modelling Disruptive APTs targeting Critical Infrastructure using Military Theory. 2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS PW). :178–190.
Disruptive Advanced Persistent Threats (D-APTs) are a new sophisticated class of cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructures. Whereas regular APTs are well-described in the literature, no existing APT kill chain model incorporates the disruptive actions of D-APTs and can be used to represent DAPTs in data. To this aim, the contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we review the evolution of existing APT kill chain models. Second, we present a novel D-APT model based on existing ATP models and military theory. The model describes the strategic objective setting, the operational kill chain and the tactics of the attacker, as well as the defender’s critical infrastructure, processes and societal function.
Hong, Seoung-Pyo, Lim, Chae-Ho, lee, hoon jae.
2021.
APT attack response system through AM-HIDS. 2021 23rd International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology (ICACT). :271–274.
In this paper, an effective Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack response system was proposed. Reference to the NIST Cyber Security Framework (CRF) was made to present the most cost-effective measures. It has developed a system that detects and responds to real-time AM-HIDS (Anti Malware Host Intrusion Detection System) that monitors abnormal change SW of PCs as a prevention of APT. It has proved that the best government-run security measures are possible to provide an excellent cost-effectiveness environment to prevent APT attacks.