| Title | LANTENNA: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Networks via Ethernet Cables Emission |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2021 |
| Authors | Guri, Mordechai |
| Conference Name | 2021 IEEE 45th Annual Computers, Software, and Applications Conference (COMPSAC) |
| Date Published | July 2021 |
| Publisher | IEEE |
| ISBN Number | 978-1-6654-2463-9 |
| Keywords | Air gaps, air-gap, Communication cables, composability, Computers, covert channels, data leakage, electromagnetic, Ethernet, exfiltration, Human Behavior, LAN, Malware, Meters, Metrics, Portable computers, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Virtual machining |
| Abstract | In this paper we present LANTENNA - a new type of an electromagnetic attack allowing adversaries to leak sensitive data from isolated, air-gapped networks. Malicious code in air-gapped computers gathers sensitive data and then encodes it over radio waves emanated from Ethernet cables. A nearby receiving device can intercept the signals wirelessly, decodes the data and sends it to the attacker. We discuss the exiltration techniques, examine the covert channel characteristics, and provide implementation details. Notably, the malicious code can run in an ordinary user mode process, and can successfully operates from within a virtual machine. We evaluate the covert channel in different scenarios and present a set of of countermeasures. Our experiments show that with the LANTENNA attack, data can be exfiltrated from air-gapped computers to a distance of several meters away. |
| URL | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9529607 |
| DOI | 10.1109/COMPSAC51774.2021.00106 |
| Citation Key | guri_lantenna_2021 |
LANTENNA: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Networks via Ethernet Cables Emission