Visible to the public Dynamically obfuscated scan for protecting IPs against scan-based attacks throughout supply chain

TitleDynamically obfuscated scan for protecting IPs against scan-based attacks throughout supply chain
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2017
AuthorsZhang, Dongrong, He, Miao, Wang, Xiaoxiao, Tehranipoor, M.
Conference Name2017 IEEE 35th VLSI Test Symposium (VTS)
Keywordsautomatic test pattern generation, boundary scan testing, chip security, Clocks, Collaboration, composability, Discrete Fourier transforms, dynamically-obfuscated scan design, EDA generated scan chains, industrial property, integrated circuit design, integrated circuit manufacture, integrated circuit manufacturing, integrated circuit test flow, integrated circuit testing, integrated circuits, intellectual property, ip protection, Logic gates, noninvasive scan attacks, pattern generation time, policy, policy-based governance, pubcrawl, Registers, Resiliency, scan-based attacks, scan-based test, Secure Scan, security, supply chain, Supply chains, Testability
Abstract

Scan-based test is commonly used to increase testability and fault coverage, however, it is also known to be a liability for chip security. Research has shown that intellectual property (IP) or secret keys can be leaked through scan-based attacks. In this paper, we propose a dynamically-obfuscated scan design for protecting IPs against scan-based attacks. By perturbing all test patterns/responses and protecting the obfuscation key, the proposed architecture is proven to be robust against existing non-invasive scan attacks, and can protect all scan data from attackers in foundry, assembly, and system developers (i.e., OEMs) without compromising the testability. Furthermore, the proposed architecture can be easily plugged into EDA generated scan chains without having a noticeable impact on conventional integrated circuit (IC) design, manufacturing, and test flow. Finally, detailed security and experimental analyses have been performed on several benchmarks. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can protect chips from existing brute force, differential, and other scan-based attacks that target the obfuscation key. The proposed design is of low overhead on area, power consumption, and pattern generation time, and there is no impact on test time.

URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7928947
DOI10.1109/VTS.2017.7928947
Citation Keyzhang_dynamically_2017