Biblio
Network security has become an important issue in our work and life. Hackers' attack mode has been upgraded from normal attack to APT( Advanced Persistent Threat, APT) attack. The key of APT attack chain is the penetration and intrusion of active directory, which can not be completely detected via the traditional IDS and antivirus software. Further more, lack of security protection of existing solutions for domain control aggravates this problem. Although researchers have proposed methods for domain attack detection, many of them have not yet been converted into effective market-oriented products. In this paper, we analyzes the common domain intrusion methods, various domain related attack behavior characteristics were extracted from ATT&CK matrix (Advanced tactics, techniques, and common knowledge) for analysis and simulation test. Based on analyzing the log file generated by the attack, the domain attack detection rules are established and input into the analysis engine. Finally, the available domain intrusion detection system is designed and implemented. Experimental results show that the network attack detection method based on the analysis of domain attack behavior can analyze the log file in real time and effectively detect the malicious intrusion behavior of hackers , which could facilitate managers find and eliminate network security threats immediately.
Although OpenFlow-based SDN networks make it easier to design and test new protocols, when you think of clean slate architectures, their use is quite limited because the parameterization of its flows resides primarily in TCP/IP protocols. Besides, despite the many benefits that SDN offers, some aspects have not yet been adequately addressed, such as management plane activities, network startup, and options for connecting the data plane to the control plane. Based on these issues and limitations, this work presents a bootstrap protocol for SDN-based networks, which allows, beyond the network topology discovery, automatic configuration of an inband control plane. The protocol is designed to act only on layer two, in an autonomous, distributed and deterministic way, with low overhead and has the intent to be the basement for the implementation of other management plane related activities. A formal specification of the protocol is provided. In addition, an analytical model was created to preview the number of required messages to establish the control plane. According to this model, the proposed protocol presents less overhead than similar de-facto protocols used to topology discovery in SDN networks.
"Moving fast, and breaking things", instead of "being safe and secure", is the credo of the IT industry. However, if we look at the wide societal impact of IT security incidents in the past years, it seems like it is no longer sustainable. Just like in the case of Equifax, people simply forget updates, just like in the case of Maersk, companies do not use sufficient network segmentation. Security certification does not seem to help with this issue. After all, Equifax was IS027001 compliant.In this paper, we take a look at how we handle and (do not) learn from security incidents in IT security. We do this by comparing IT security incidents to early and later aviation safety. We find interesting parallels to early aviation safety, and outline the governance levers that could make the world of IT more secure, which were already successful in making flying the most secure way of transportation.
Brute-force login attempts are common for every host on the public Internet. While most of them can be discarded as low-threat attacks, targeted attack campaigns often use a dictionary-based brute-force attack to establish a foothold in the network. Therefore, it is important to characterize the attackers' behavior to prioritize defensive measures and react to new threats quickly. In this paper we present a set of metrics that can support threat hunters in characterizing brute-force login attempts. Based on connection metadata, timing information, and the attacker's dictionary these metrics can help to differentiate scans and to find common behavior across distinct IP addresses. We evaluated our novel metrics on a real-world data set of malicious login attempts collected by our honeypot Honeygrove. We highlight interesting metrics, show how clustering can be leveraged to reveal common behavior across IP addresses, and describe how selected metrics help to assess the threat level of attackers. Amongst others, we for example found strong indicators for collusion between ten otherwise unrelated IP addresses confirming that a clustering of the right metrics can help to reveal coordinated attacks.
The use of a very wide windows operating system is undeniably also followed by increasing attacks on the operating system. Universal Serial Bus (USB) is one of the mechanisms used by many people with plug and play functionality that is very easy to use, making data transfers fast and easy compared to other hardware. Some research shows that the Windows operating system has weaknesses so that it is often exploited by using various attacks and malware. There are various methods used to exploit the Windows operating system, one of them by using a USB device. By using a USB device, a criminal can plant a backdoor reverse shell to exploit the victim's computer just by connecting the USB device to the victim's computer without being noticed. This research was conducted by planting a reverse shell backdoor through a USB device to exploit the victim's device, especially the webcam and microphone device on the target computer. From 35 experiments that have been carried out, it was found that 83% of spying attacks using USB devices on the Windows operating system were successfully carried out.
This paper argues about a new conceptual modeling language for the White-Box (WB) security analysis. In the WB security domain, an attacker may have access to the inner structure of an application or even the entire binary code. It becomes pretty easy for attackers to inspect, reverse engineer, and tamper the application with the information they steal. The basis of this paper is the 14 patterns developed by a leading provider of software protection technologies and solutions. We provide a part of a new modeling language named i-WBS (White-Box Security) to describe problems of WB security better. The essence of White-Box security problem is code security. We made the new modeling language focus on code more than ever before. In this way, developers who are not security experts can easily understand what they need to really protect.
It is now possible to synthesize highly realistic images of people who do not exist. Such content has, for example, been implicated in the creation of fraudulent socialmedia profiles responsible for dis-information campaigns. Significant efforts are, therefore, being deployed to detect synthetically-generated content. One popular forensic approach trains a neural network to distinguish real from synthetic content.We show that such forensic classifiers are vulnerable to a range of attacks that reduce the classifier to near- 0% accuracy. We develop five attack case studies on a state- of-the-art classifier that achieves an area under the ROC curve (AUC) of 0.95 on almost all existing image generators, when only trained on one generator. With full access to the classifier, we can flip the lowest bit of each pixel in an image to reduce the classifier's AUC to 0.0005; perturb 1% of the image area to reduce the classifier's AUC to 0.08; or add a single noise pattern in the synthesizer's latent space to reduce the classifier's AUC to 0.17. We also develop a black-box attack that, with no access to the target classifier, reduces the AUC to 0.22. These attacks reveal significant vulnerabilities of certain image-forensic classifiers.
Information Flow Control (IFC) is a collection of techniques for ensuring a no-write-down no-read-up style security policy known as noninterference. Traditional methods for both static (e.g. type systems) and dynamic (e.g. runtime monitors) IFC suffer from untenable numbers of false alarms on real-world programs. Secure Multi-Execution (SME) promises to provide secure information flow control without modifying the behaviour of already secure programs, a property commonly referred to as transparency. Implementations of SME exist for the web in the form of the FlowFox browser and as plug-ins to several programming languages. Furthermore, SME can in theory work in a black-box manner, meaning that it can be programming language agnostic, making it perfect for securing legacy or third-party systems. As such SME, and its variants like Multiple Facets (MF) and Faceted Secure Multi-Execution (FSME), appear to be a family of panaceas for the security engineer. The question is, how come, given all these advantages, that these techniques are not ubiquitous in practice? The answer lies, partially, in the issue of runtime and memory overhead. SME and its variants are prohibitively expensive to deploy in many non-trivial situations. The natural question is why is this the case? On the surface, the reason is simple. The techniques in the SME family all rely on the idea of multi-execution, running all or parts of a program multiple times to achieve noninterference. Naturally, this causes some overhead. However, the predominant thinking in the IFC community has been that these overheads can be overcome. In this paper we argue that there are fundamental reasons to expect this not to be the case and prove two key theorems: (1) All transparent enforcement is polynomial time equivalent to multi-execution. (2) All black-box enforcement takes time exponential in the number of principals in the security lattice. Our methods also allow us to answer, in the affirmative, an open question about the possibility of secure and transparent enforcement of a security condition known as Termination Insensitive Noninterference.
Distributed banking platforms and services forgo centralized banks to process financial transactions. For example, M-Pesa provides distributed banking service in the developing regions so that the people without a bank account can deposit, withdraw, or transfer money. The current distributed banking systems lack the transparency in monitoring and tracking of distributed banking transactions and thus do not support auditing of distributed banking transactions for accountability. To address this issue, this paper proposes a blockchain-based distributed banking (BDB) scheme, which uses blockchain technology to leverage its built-in properties to record and track immutable transactions. BDB supports distributed financial transaction processing but is significantly different from cryptocurrencies in its design properties, simplicity, and computational efficiency. We implement a prototype of BDB using smart contract and conduct experiments to show BDB's effectiveness and performance. We further compare our prototype with the Ethereum cryptocurrency to highlight the fundamental differences and demonstrate the BDB's superior computational efficiency.
Monitoring for security and well-being in highly populated areas is a critical issue for city administrators, policy makers and urban planners. As an essential part of many dynamic and critical data-driven tasks, situational awareness (SAW) provides decision-makers a deeper insight of the meaning of urban surveillance. Thus, surveillance measures are increasingly needed. However, traditional surveillance platforms are not scalable when more cameras are added to the network. In this work, a smart surveillance as an edge service has been proposed. To accomplish the object detection, identification, and tracking tasks at the edge-fog layers, two novel lightweight algorithms are proposed for detection and tracking respectively. A prototype has been built to validate the feasibility of the idea, and the test results are very encouraging.
With self-driving cars making their way on to our roads, we ask not what it would take for them to gain acceptance among consumers, but what impact they may have on other drivers. How they will be perceived and whether they will be trusted will likely have a major effect on traffic flow and vehicular safety. This work first undertakes an exploratory factor analysis to validate a trust scale for human-robot interaction and shows how previously validated metrics and general trust theory support a more complete model of trust that has increased applicability in the driving domain. We experimentally test this expanded model in the context of human-automation interaction during simulated driving, revealing how using these dimensions uncovers significant biases within human-robot trust that may have particularly deleterious effects when it comes to sharing our future roads with automated vehicles.
Embodiment of actions and tasks has typically been analyzed from the robot's perspective where the robot's embodiment helps develop and maintain trust. However, we ask a similar question looking at the interaction from the human perspective. Embodied cognition has been shown in the cognitive science literature to produce increased social empathy and cooperation. To understand how human embodiment can help develop and increase trust in human-robot interactions, we created conducted a study where participants were tasked with memorizing greek letters associated with dance motions with the help of a humanoid robot. Participants either performed the dance motion or utilized a touch screen during the interaction. The results showed that participants' trust in the robot increased at a higher rate during human embodiment of motions as opposed to utilizing a touch screen device.
In cyber threat information sharing, secure transfer and protecting privacy are very important. In this paper we solve these issues by suggesting a platform based on private permissioned Blockchain, which provides us with access control as well. The platform is called Anon-ISAC and is built on the Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) zero-knowledge proof scheme. It makes use of permissioned Blockchain as a way to keep identity anonymous. Organizations can share their information on incidents or other artifacts among trusted parties, while they keep their identity hidden. This will save them from unwanted consequences of exposure of sensitive security information.