Biblio
The globalized supply chain in the semiconductor industry raises several security concerns such as IC overproduction, intellectual property piracy and design tampering. Logic locking has emerged as a Design-for-Trust countermeasure to address these issues. Original logic locking proposals provide a high degree of output corruption – i.e., errors on circuit outputs – unless it is unlocked with the correct key. This is a prerequisite for making a manufactured circuit unusable without the designer’s intervention. Since the introduction of SAT-based attacks – highly efficient attacks for retrieving the correct key from an oracle and the corresponding locked design – resulting design-based countermeasures have compromised output corruption for the benefit of better resilience against such attacks. Our proposed logic locking scheme, referred to as SKG-Lock, aims to thwart SAT-based attacks while maintaining significant output corruption. The proposed provable SAT-resilience scheme is based on the novel concept of decoy key-inputs. Compared with recent related works, SKG-Lock provides higher output corruption, while having high resistance to evaluated attacks.
Controller area network is the serial communication protocol, which broadcasts the message on the CAN bus. The transmitted message is read by all the nodes which shares the CAN bus. The message can be eavesdropped and can be re-used by some other node by changing the information or send it by duplicate times. The message reused after some delay is replay attack. In this paper, the CAN network with three CAN nodes is implemented using the universal verification components and the replay attack is demonstrated by creating the faulty node. Two types of replay attack are implemented in this paper, one is to replay the entire message and the other one is to replay only the part of the frame. The faulty node uses the first replay attack method where it behaves like the other node in the network by duplicating the identifier. CAN frame except the identifier is reused in the second method which is hard to detect the attack as the faulty node uses its own identifier and duplicates only the data in the CAN frame.
Cyber-physical systems are vulnerable to attacks that can cause them to reach undesirable states. This paper provides a theoretical solution for increasing the resiliency of control systems through the use of a high-authority supervisor that monitors and regulates control signals sent to the actuator. The supervisor aims to determine the control signal limits that provide maximum freedom of operation while protecting the system. For this work, a cyber attack is assumed to overwrite the signal to the actuator with Gaussian noise. This assumption permits the propagation of a state covariance matrix through time. Projecting the state covariance matrix on the state space reveals a confidence ellipse that approximates the reachable set. The standard deviation is found so that the confidence ellipse is tangential to the danger area in the state space. The process is applied to ship dynamics where an ellipse in the state space is transformed to an arc in the plane of motion. The technique is validated through the simulation of a ship traveling through a narrow channel while under the influence of a cyber attack.