Deter

Virtual Machine Monitors (VMMs) and hypervisors have become a foundational technology for system developers to achieve increased levels of security, reliability, and manageability for large-scale computing systems such as cloud computing. However, when developing software at the VMM layer, developers often need to interpret the very low level hardware layer state and reconstruct the semantic meanings of the guest operating system events due to the lack of operating system level abstractions.

Third-party hardware Intellectual Property (IP), written as code in a Hardware Description Language (HDL), is extensively used in modern integrated circuits. Contemporary electronics typically include 75% of third party hardware IP and only 25% in-house design to provide customization or a profit-making edge. Such extensive use of third-party hardware IP in both commercial and military applications raises security and trustworthiness concerns, especially in today's globalized market.

To address today's environment of constant security challenges and cyber-threats, the Hardware-Assisted Lightweight Capability Optimization (HALCYON) research explores novel techniques to make the performance of more secure system designs acceptable to users. Conventional system designs have achieved acceptable performance, but have evolved from hardware and software designs that carry forward compromises in security that made sense in the past, but not with modern hardware resources in today's security climate.

Modern computer applications are typically made up of different software components that are created by, or may act on behalf of, mutually distrustful entities. To ensure the security of computer systems, it is important to restrict the ability of the components to perform actions within the computer system. The Principle of Least Authority states that a component should be given only the ability (or authority) it needs to perform its task, and no more.

As wireless technologies become more pervasive, it becomes increasingly important for devices to authenticate the locations of other devices. For example, patients with implantable medical devices (IMDs) may reasonably expect that any device used to control their IMD would have to be within arm's reach, to help prevent unauthorized access to their device. In other words, IMDs should enforce policies based on the proximity, and in general the location, of wirelessly connected devices.