STARSS

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Small: IoT Circuit Locking, Obfuscation & Authentication Kernel (CLOAK), A compilable architecture for secure IoT device production, testing, activation & operation

Autonomy, control and actuation opportunities offered by a colossal deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) open the door to a revolution in the way we live and interact with our environment. However, widespread adoption of IoT comes with the danger of its misuse for malicious purposes, threatening the loss of privacy, property, and life. The scope and reach of potential IoT security threat grows as fast as the number and reach of IoT devices. Hence, protecting the hardware of IoT cannot be left as an afterthought.

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Small: Design of Low-Power True Random Number Generator based on Adaptive Post-Processing

Nearly all security protocols rely on random numbers. A hardware True Random Number Generator (TRNG) is a circuit implemented within an Integrated Circuit (IC). If a TRNG is not truly random, an adversary may be able to break into the security of a protocol. Hence true randomness is an important property. TRNG circuits are often large and power hungry. There is a need for low-power TRNG in battery operated devices or in energy constrained environments. This proposal addresses that need. The proposed research explores an alternative to traditional TRNG designs.

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Small: Collaborative: Managing Hardware Security in Three-Dimensional Integrated Circuits

Vertically stacked three-dimensional (3D) integration of semiconductor chips is an emerging technology to ensure continued growth in transistor density and performance of integrated circuits (ICs). Despite the well-characterized advantages and limitations, the hardware security of such circuits has not received much attention. With shrinking number of trusted circuit manufacturers, trustworthiness of electronic devices is a growing concern. Vertical integration brings unexplored and unique challenges in managing hardware security.

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Small: Wireless, Battery-less, Monolithic Tamper Detector for Semiconductor Chip Authenticity

This research explores the feasibility of a submillimeter-sized, battery-less, tamper detecting chip that can be placed inside a semiconductor package through a droplet ejector, and which can be interrogated wirelessly from the outside of the semiconductor package for detecting any recorded tampering activity. The research paves foundational technology for a paradigm-shifting concept of individualized detection and recording of tampering activities to ensure authenticity of semiconductor chips.

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Visible to the public STARSS: Small: Defending Against Hardware Covert Timing Channels

Safeguarding sensitive user information stored in computer systems is a fast growing concern, especially as computers are universally used everywhere from national defense to mobile phones. Malicious hackers have found unscrupulous ways to steal sensitive information largely by exploiting the vulnerabilities in existing hardware and software. Among the many forms of information leakage, covert timing channels exfiltrate secrets from a trojan process with higher security credentials to a spy process with lesser credentials by exploiting the access timing of system resources.

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Collaborative: IPTrust: A Comprehensive Framework for IP Integrity Validation

To reduce production cost while meeting time-to-market constraints, semiconductor companies usually design hardware systems with reusable hardware modules, popularly known as Intellectual Property (IP) blocks. Growing reliance on these hardware IPs, often gathered from untrusted third-party vendors, severely affects the security and trustworthiness of the final system. The hardware IPs acquired from external sources may come with deliberate malicious implants, undocumented interfaces working as hidden backdoor, or other integrity issues.

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Trojan Detection and Diagnosis in Mixed-Signal Systems Using On-The-Fly Learned, Precomputed and Side Channel Tests

The use of outsourcing in silicon manufacturing has rendered hardware susceptible to malicious bugs, called Trojans, that can cause an Integrated Circuit (IC) to fail in the field, similar to the way viruses manifest themselves in software. While there has been significant inroads into Trojan detection and diagnosis in the recent past, high-resolution Trojan detection has been hampered by the increased variability in silicon manufacturing processes, allowing Trojans to hide behind the design guardbands necessitated by process variability effects.

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Combatting Integrated Circuit Counterfeiting Using Secure Chip Odometers

Electronics counterfeiting is a significant and growing problem for electronics manufacturers, system integrators, and end customers, with an estimated annual economic impact in billions of dollars. These counterfeit Integrated Circuits (ICs) can have degraded reliability, smaller operating ranges, or lower performance compared to the genuine article.

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Visible to the public STARSS: Small: Self-reliant Field-Programmable Gate Arrays

Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are hardware circuits that can be reconfigured by a system user after being deployed. FPGAs are a compelling alternative architecture that may allow hardware performance to continue to improve at a dramatic rate. Unfortunately, systems that incorporate an FPGA may allow a potentially untrusted user to reprogram hardware after it has been deployed. Such a scenario enables novel security attacks that can leak a user's private information or corrupt critical information stored on a system, but are performed entirely in hardware.

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Visible to the public SaTC: STARSS: Design of Secure and Anti-Counterfeit Integrated Circuits

Hardware security, whether for attack or defense, differs from software, network, and data security in that attackers may find ways to physically tamper with devices without leaving a trace, and mislead the user to believe that the hardware is authentic and trustworthy. Furthermore, the advent of new attack modes, illegal recycling, and hard-to-detect Trojans make hardware protection an increasingly challenging task. Design of secure hardware integrated circuits requires novel approaches for authentication that are ideally based on multiple layers of protection.