Functionality and Security Co-Design Environment for Embedded Systems
Title | Functionality and Security Co-Design Environment for Embedded Systems |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2018 |
Authors | Leemaster, J., Vai, M., Whelihan, D., Whitman, H., Khazan, R. |
Conference Name | 2018 IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference (HPEC) |
Publisher | IEEE |
ISBN Number | 978-1-5386-5989-2 |
Keywords | adversarial cyber effects, anomalies detection, asymmetric multicore processing, Availability, co-design, co-design environment, command and control systems, Complexity theory, computer network security, critical missions, cryptography, deliberate attacks, department of defense mission systems, DoD, electronic signal intelligence systems, electronic warfare, Embedded systems, functionality, Hardware, hardware development, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, Lincoln asymmetric multicore processing architecture, Mission Assurance, mission functions, Multicore processing, multiprocessing systems, pubcrawl, recovery, resilience, Resiliency, resilient embedded system, Resilient Security Architectures, Secure Processing, security, Software development, Sophisticated Attacks, surveillance, System recovery, testbed |
Abstract | For decades, embedded systems, ranging from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors to electronic warfare and electronic signal intelligence systems, have been an integral part of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) mission systems. These embedded systems are increasingly the targets of deliberate and sophisticated attacks. Developers thus need to focus equally on functionality and security in both hardware and software development. For critical missions, these systems must be entrusted to perform their intended functions, prevent attacks, and even operate with resilience under attacks. The processor in a critical system must thus provide not only a root of trust, but also a foundation to monitor mission functions, detect anomalies, and perform recovery. We have developed a Lincoln Asymmetric Multicore Processing (LAMP) architecture, which mitigates adversarial cyber effects with separation and cryptography and provides a foundation to build a resilient embedded system. We will describe a design environment that we have created to enable the co-design of functionality and security for mission assurance. |
URL | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8547516 |
DOI | 10.1109/HPEC.2018.8547516 |
Citation Key | leemaster_functionality_2018 |
- recovery
- Hardware
- hardware development
- intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance sensors
- Lincoln asymmetric multicore processing architecture
- Mission Assurance
- mission functions
- Multicore processing
- multiprocessing systems
- pubcrawl
- functionality
- resilience
- resilient embedded system
- Secure Processing
- security
- software development
- Sophisticated Attacks
- surveillance
- System recovery
- testbed
- computer network security
- Resiliency
- adversarial cyber effects
- anomalies detection
- asymmetric multicore processing
- Availability
- co-design
- co-design environment
- command and control systems
- Complexity theory
- Resilient Security Architectures
- critical missions
- Cryptography
- deliberate attacks
- department of defense mission systems
- DoD
- electronic signal intelligence systems
- electronic warfare
- embedded systems