Biblio
It has been a hot research topic to detect and mitigate Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks due to the significant increase of serious threat of such attacks. The rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) has intensified this trend, e.g. the Mirai botnet and variants. To address this issue, a light-weight DDoS mitigation mechanism was presented. In the proposed scheme, flooding attacks are detected by stochastic queue allocation which can be executed with widespread and inexpensive commercial products at a network edge. However, the detection process is delayed when the number of incoming flows is large because of the randomness of queue allocation. Thus, in this paper we propose an efficient queue allocation algorithm for rapid DDoS mitigation using limited resources. The idea behind the proposed scheme is to avoid duplicate allocation by decreasing the randomness of the existing scheme. The performance of the proposed scheme was confirmed via theoretical analysis and computer simulation. As a result, it was confirmed that malicious flows are efficiently detected and discarded with the proposed algorithm.
Physical Unclonable Function is an innovative hardware security primitives that exploit the physical characteristics of a physical object to generate a unique identifier, which play the role of the object's fingerprint. Silicon PUF, a popular type of PUFs, exploits the variation in the manufacturing process of integrated circuits (ICs). It needs an input called challenge to generate the response as an output. In addition, of classical attacks, PUFs are vulnerable to physical and modeling attacks. The performance of the PUFs is measured by several metrics like reliability, uniqueness and uniformity. So as an evidence, the main goal is to provide a complete tool that checks the strength and quantifies the performance of a given physical unconscionable function. This paper provides a tool and develops a set of metrics that can achieve safely the proposed goal.
Payment channel networks have been introduced to mitigate the scalability issues inherent to permissionless decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Launched in 2018, the Lightning Network (LN) has been gaining popularity and consists today of more than 5000 nodes and 35000 payment channels that jointly hold 965 bitcoins (9.2M USD as of June 2020). This adoption has motivated research from both academia and industryPayment channels suffer from security vulnerabilities, such as the wormhole attack [39], anonymity issues [38], and scalability limitations related to the upper bound on the number of concurrent payments per channel [28], which have been pointed out by the scientific community but never quantitatively analyzedIn this work, we first analyze the proneness of the LN to the wormhole attack and attacks against anonymity. We observe that an adversary needs to control only 2% of nodes to learn sensitive payment information (e.g., sender, receiver, and amount) or to carry out the wormhole attack. Second, we study the management of concurrent payments in the LN and quantify its negative effect on scalability. We observe that for micropayments, the forwarding capability of up to 50% of channels is restricted to a value smaller than the channel capacity. This phenomenon hinders scalability and opens the door for denial-of-service attacks: we estimate that a network-wide DoS attack costs within 1.6M USD, while isolating the biggest community costs only 238k USDOur findings should prompt the LN community to consider the issues studied in this work when educating users about path selection algorithms, as well as to adopt multi-hop payment protocols that provide stronger security, privacy and scalability guarantees.
In recent years, persistent cyber adversaries have developed increasingly sophisticated techniques to evade detection. Once adversaries have established a foothold within the target network, using seemingly-limited passive reconnaissance techniques, they can develop significant network reconnaissance capabilities. Cyber deception has been recognized as a critical capability to defend against such adversaries, but, without an accurate model of the adversary's reconnaissance behavior, current approaches are ineffective against advanced adversaries. To address this gap, we propose a novel model to capture how advanced, stealthy adversaries acquire knowledge about the target network and establish and expand their foothold within the system. This model quantifies the cost and reward, from the adversary's perspective, of compromising and maintaining control over target nodes. We evaluate our model through simulations in the CyberVAN testbed, and indicate how it can guide the development and deployment of future defensive capabilities, including high-interaction honeypots, so as to influence the behavior of adversaries and steer them away from critical resources.
Intrusion Detection system (IDS) was an application which was aimed to monitor network activity or system and it could find if there was a dangerous operation. Implementation of IDS on Software Define Network architecture (SDN) has drawbacks. IDS on SDN architecture might decreasing network Quality of Service (QoS). So the network could not provide services to the existing network traffic. Throughput, delay and packet loss were important parameters of QoS measurement. Snort IDS and bro IDS were tools in the application of IDS on the network. Both had differences, one of which was found in the detection method. Snort IDS used a signature based detection method while bro IDS used an anomaly based detection method. The difference between them had effects in handling the network traffic through it. In this research, we compared both tools. This comparison are done with testing parameters such as throughput, delay, packet loss, CPU usage, and memory usage. From this test, it was found that bro outperform snort IDS for throughput, delay , and packet loss parameters. However, CPU usage and memory usage on bro requires higher resource than snort.