Dynamic Psychological Game for Adversarial Internet of Battlefield Things Systems

In this paper, a novel game-theoretic framework is introduced to analyze and enhance the security of adversarial Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) systems. In particular, a dynamic, psychological network interdiction game is formulated between a soldier and an attacker. In this game, the soldier seeks to find the optimal path to minimize the time needed to reach a destination, while maintaining a desired bit error rate (BER) performance by selectively communicating with certain IoBT devices. The attacker, on the other hand, seeks to find the optimal IoBT devices to attack, so as to maximize the BER of the soldier and hinder the soldier's progress. In this game, the soldier and attacker's first- order and second-order beliefs on each others' behavior are formulated to capture their psychological behavior. Using tools from psychological game theory, the soldier and attacker's intention to harm one another is captured in their utilities, based on their beliefs. A psychological forward induction-based solution is proposed to solve the dynamic game. This approach can find a psychological sequential equilibrium of the game, upon convergence. Simulation results show that, whenever the soldier explicitly intends to frustrate the attacker, the soldier's material payoff is increased by up to 15.6% compared to a traditional dynamic Bayesian game.