Visible to the public Cyber Security Assessment of the Robot Operating System 2 for Aerial Networks

TitleCyber Security Assessment of the Robot Operating System 2 for Aerial Networks
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsSandoval, S., Thulasiraman, P.
Conference Name2019 IEEE International Systems Conference (SysCon)
Date PublishedApril 2019
PublisherIEEE
ISBN Number978-1-5386-8396-5
Keywordsaerial networks, authentication, autonomous aerial vehicles, autonomous systems, control engineering computing, cryptography, cyber security, cyber security assessment, Data Distribution Service standard, DDS security architecture, DDS standard, drones, Encryption, GCS, ground control station, Human Behavior, human factors, middleware, military computing, military grade unmanned systems, military systems, military-centric robotics platform, mobile robots, operating systems (computers), policy-based governance, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Robot Operating System 2, robot operating systems, robot programming, robotic middleware, robots, ROS, ROS 1 security vulnerabilities, ROS 2, security, Standards, UAV swarms, unmanned Naval aerial swarms
Abstract

The Robot Operating System (ROS) is a widely adopted standard robotic middleware. However, its preliminary design is devoid of any network security features. Military grade unmanned systems must be guarded against network threats. ROS 2 is built upon the Data Distribution Service (DDS) standard and is designed to provide solutions to identified ROS 1 security vulnerabilities by incorporating authentication, encryption, and process profile features, which rely on public key infrastructure. The Department of Defense is looking to use ROS 2 for its military-centric robotics platform. This paper seeks to demonstrate that ROS 2 and its DDS security architecture can serve as a functional platform for use in military grade unmanned systems, particularly in unmanned Naval aerial swarms. In this paper, we focus on the viability of ROS 2 to safeguard communications between swarms and a ground control station (GCS). We test ROS 2's ability to mitigate and withstand certain cyber threats, specifically that of rogue nodes injecting unauthorized data and accessing services that will disable parts of the UAV swarm. We use the Gazebo robotics simulator to target individual UAVs to ascertain the effectiveness of our attack vectors under specific conditions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of ROS 2 in mitigating the chosen attack vectors but observed a measurable operational delay within our simulations.

URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8836824
DOI10.1109/SYSCON.2019.8836824
Citation Keysandoval_cyber_2019